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1. Summary 
Introduction 
The research comprising this doctoral thesis examines the institutional and household 
factors that influence sustainable health financing coverage among the informal sector 
in Kenya and Cameroon. The dynamics of the informal sector in the sub-Saharan 
African context are complex, with the sector being highly variegated and difficult to 
generalise. This fact is particularly important when interrogating the interactions 
between the informal sector and more formalised establishments such as the 
healthcare system.  
Compounding these concerns has been a dearth of pragmatic social analysis that 
interrogates the intricacies of health decision-making at both institutional and 
household level. Existing health financing and policy literature has taken a largely 
empirical approach to research, ignoring the impact of context-specific considerations 
on decision-makers’ perceptions and choices. This limits our insights of the framework 
within which health decisions are made at government and household level, 
complicating the application of existing research to the real-world setting.  
This thesis seeks to investigate the factors which influence inclusive and sustainable 
financial risk protection among the informal sector in Kenya and Cameroon by focusing 
on two specific objectives: 
1. Investigating the influence of priority-setting by key health systems actors on 
universal health coverage (UHC) and health financing strategy  
2. Estimating and critically analysing the factors that influence the value 
proposition of voluntary health insurance among different constituent groups of 
the informal sector 
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It further seeks to understand the contextual social conditions that influence health 
decision-making and the substantive outcomes expressed within the health system.  
 
 
Methodology 
In order to investigate the influence of priority-setting by key health systems actors on 
UHC, this thesis sought to identify the fundamental priorities and values related to the 
achievement on UHC in Kenya. This was carried out by targeting a variety of national- 
and county-level health stakeholders with specialist knowledge on Kenya’s health 
priority-setting process through in-depth key informant interviews. The data collected 
were analysed using the Framework Method and focused on interpreting the 
similarities and differences amongst stakeholders on: (i) the challenges that hinder the 
achievement of UHC in Kenya’s health system; (ii) potential solutions to the problems 
identified; and (iii) the political and real-world considerations that aided or hindered the 
achievement of the articulated solutions. 
In order to investigate the household factors influencing voluntary health insurance 
demand, cross-sectional household surveys were conducted in Kenya and Cameroon 
to elicit responses on the determinants of scheme enrolment. Structured 
questionnaires were administered in each setting on health insurance membership; 
household attributes; headship characteristics; and health-seeking behaviour. Logistic 
regression was carried out to estimate the association between the explanatory 
variables and voluntary health insurance enrolment.  
In its analysis, this thesis focused on two informal sector sub-groups which exercise 
control over household investment decisions: local savings group members in Kenya 
and household heads in Cameroon respectively. Two regression models were utilised 
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in this research. The first model measured the association of each variable and health 
insurance enrolment within each targeted population sub-group. The second model 
included interaction terms for each targeted population sub-group and explanatory 
variable to determine the influence of sub-group membership on the association of 
each variable and health insurance enrolment. Finally, pragmatic social analysis was 
integrated into our interpretation of empirical findings, with a view to gain a greater 
understanding of the context within which health insurance decision-making is 
undertaken. 
 
 
Results 
Our findings suggest that Kenyan stakeholders recognise UHC as a major goal in the 
country’s health policy and priority-setting landscape. However, the national 
government has been unable to centre itself as the main steward of this policy 
objective, leading to a cacophony of interpretations of UHC’s contextual objectives and 
special considerations. As a result, we observed material differences between 
stakeholders on the country’s recommended priorities for population coverage, 
healthcare service provision, and cost-sharing under the UHC dispensation. 
Progressive universalism was nevertheless considered as the preferred approach 
towards UHC in Kenya, with most interviewees prioritising an equity-based approach 
towards increasing access to healthcare services and financial risk protection. 
However, divergence on UHC’s contextual values in the country suggests ongoing 
difficulties in objectively and holistically defining the priorities driving health financing 
investments in Kenya. It is therefore likely that the country’s health system will continue 
to be plagued by the misattribution of resources as it seeks to drive the country towards 
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UHC. The imbalance leaves the Kenyan population susceptible to ill health due to 
limited access to quality healthcare services, and increases the risk of impoverishment 
due to ill health due to a poorly-implemented financial risk protection system. 
With regards to the second thesis objective, our findings identify three key patterns 
across our studies in Kenya and Cameroon. Firstly, we suggest that social position 
may play an important role in determining a household’s exposure to certain social 
stratifiers that influence health insurance demand. In the Cameroon study, we found 
that wealth was associated with voluntary health insurance demand regardless of the 
household head’s gender. Women’s enrolment decision was associated with their 
income levels (OR=5.842 [CI:1.589-21.484]), while men’s demand was positively 
correlated with their socio-economic status (OR=2.207 [CI:1.173–4.153]). Similarly, 
men’s enrolment decision in the Cameroon study was linked to their education level 
(OR=2.238 [CI:1.228–2.552]) and age (OR=2.238 [CI:1.151–4.352]). In the Kenya 
study, we found that both members and non-members of local savings groups with 
high socioeconomic status showed stronger health insurance demand compared with 
poorer households; there was no evidence that the strength of this association was 
influenced by savings group membership status (p-value=0.47). 
Secondly, our findings suggest that access to resources that create social 
interdependence or provide access to economic resources may reduce the power 
asymmetry inherent within the societal framework. This is apparent in the Cameroon 
study amongst female household heads, whose health insurance demand is linked to 
their possession of economic power. Indeed, our findings suggest that enrolment 
decisions are likely to prioritise women’s direct knowledge of potential household 
health risks (presence of children (OR=3.734 [CI:1.228–11.348])) if they have access 
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to sufficient financial and decision-making resources. In the Kenya study, participants 
who were self-employed were significantly less likely to enrol into the NHIF if they did 
not belong to a local savings group (interaction test p-value=0.03). NHIF enrolment 
was found to be lower among female-headed households. There was a borderline 
effect of ROSCA membership on this association, with a lower odds ratio amongst non-
ROSCA members (p-value=0.09). These findings suggest that savings group 
membership may play a role in increasing health insurance demand amongst some 
traditionally under-represented groups such as women and the self-employed. 
Finally, given the association between certain social characteristics such as education 
on one’s position within the labour market we posit that the power inferred by one’s 
economic position may override their inherent disadvantages when interacting with the 
health insurance sector. This adds credence to the hypothesis that it is important to 
correctly contextualise the population under study in order to better understand how 
health decisions are made at household level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This exploratory and interpretive thesis highlights the complex and cross-cutting nature 
of research on health-related decision making at institutional and household level. It 
posits that the socio-cultural and political contexts within which decision-making is 
conducted is as important to health financing research as the empirical investigation of 
health-related outcomes. In doing so, it submits that integrating pragmatic analysis into 
empirical research facilitates a greater depth of understanding of the ways in which 
social structures play into voluntary health insurance decision-making. 
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The thesis further demonstrates the importance of reflecting the complexity of decision-
making groups in health financing research design in order to provide more 
representative analyses that can be applied to the real-world setting. Indeed, it is clear 
from our findings that reflecting the heterogeneity of decision-making groups better 
represents the realities of groups’ differential interaction with their environment, and 
presents research that is easily digestible and relatable to policymakers. We therefore 
posit that the nuanced methodological approach applied in this thesis is more likely to 
reflect real-world variations in the way different groups make the health financing-
related decisions.  
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Universal Health Coverage and its local application 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) has been framed as a unifying platform for global 
health systems development within policy circles (3). It is defined as “ensuring that all 
people can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health 
services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that the use 
of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship” (4). UHC is ultimately 
a progressive and aspirational goal which is characterised by the achievement of equity 
through three key dimensions: population coverage; service coverage; and cost-
sharing (5). By focusing on these crosscutting objectives, it aims to provide a holistic 
strategy for tackling the formidable health systems challenges faced across a variety 
of settings, as highlighted within the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
(6). 
While most stakeholders agree on the basic definition of UHC, a diversity of practical 
interpretations have emerged reflecting their differing perspectives on each country’s 
unique social, political, economic and epidemiological realities (7). This plurality of 
interpretation renders it imperative for governments to steward a participative decision-
making process through which a defined approach towards UHC may be developed 
(8). In spite of this, many sub-Saharan African governments have maintained a 
haphazard approach towards health systems priority-setting, resulting in arbitrary and 
inconsistent planning decisions (9). This makes it difficult to implement coherent health 
systems strategies towards achieving UHC. Given that UHC is a democratic process 
through which the attribution of limited financial resources is decided, it is important to 
understand the values and trade-offs underpinning countries’ health strategies (10). 
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This cannot be done without fully interrogating the political and economic dynamics 
that may influence a country’s chosen path towards UHC.  
Within existing health policy literature, there is recognition of the inherently political 
nature of health systems priority-setting and decision-making (9,11,12). However, this 
reality is often not reflected in research. Current scholarship on UHC in various sub-
Saharan African settings has largely overlooked the sociopolitical and economic 
considerations that impact health planning processes, with many existing studies 
focusing instead on the technical and managerial aspects of health reform 
implementation. In Kenya, for example, health policy research has tended to explore 
the hurdles emerging from the implementation of UHC-related interventions such as 
devolution (13–15) and free maternity health services (16). While these studies give 
an indication of the special interests inherent within the health system, they have 
largely neglected the contextual factors that influence the values and direction of the 
health reforms (15,17). This leaves a gap in our understanding of how the political 
economy of health affects health policy planning processes within these settings.  
In addition to discounting the political economy of health planning in the sub-Saharan 
African context, there has been a tendency in the sparse existing scholarship to equate 
UHC with health insurance reforms (18–21). This misconception suggests a limited 
appreciation for the holistic nature of UHC in health policy academia, especially given 
the wide range of health systems reforms needed to achieve UHC. For example, 
existing UHC studies in Rwanda have focused almost exclusively on population 
coverage efforts through health insurance reforms, while ignoring the country’s cost-
sharing and health service coverage endeavours through health infrastructure 
improvement and community-health program strengthening (22). Similarly, most UHC 
research in Ghana has focused on population and service coverage efforts through the 
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National Health Insurance Scheme, disregarding reforms to improve the quality of 
healthcare provision, as well as changes to district-level planning and management 
(23,24). These oversights leave a number of unanswered questions regarding UHC in 
the sub-Saharan African context: what exactly does UHC mean in terms of service 
coverage, population coverage and cost-sharing when considered in resource-limited 
country settings? What are the key values and trade-offs driving the interpretation of 
UHC within these settings? How do these values and systemic realities shape the 
direction of UHC priorities?  
In light of the limited scholarship investigating these questions, we will seek to address 
them as part of this thesis.  
 
 
2.2 Health financing realities of sub-Saharan African countries 
Against this backdrop, the availability of financial resources has remained central to 
the achievement of UHC. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that an 
annual financial investment of $58 per capita is required to achieve global health 
targets by 2030 – a figure well above current health expenditure levels of many sub-
Saharan African countries (25).  
The global financial architecture for health available to fund UHC is highly complex, 
involving a network of local and international players. Each of these players contributes 
to the healthcare system through a number of sources as highlighted in Figure 1, 
including: national and local government revenues; compulsory prepayment 
contributions; voluntary prepayment contributions; direct foreign financial contributions; 
and household out-of-pocket payment for service use. 
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Figure 1: Funding sources contributing to a healthcare system 
 
 
 
Governments are typically expected to provide broad budgetary support for health, 
while foreign players and individual households grant supplementary support to plug 
the remaining gaps in health financing. In spite of this, most sub-Saharan African 
governments fall short in their abilities to fund health services relative to their global 
commitments through agreements such as the Abuja Declaration (26). The 
government of Cameroon, for example, allocated only 4% of its total expenditure to 
health in 2014, while the Kenyan government gave 6% during the same period (27,28). 
This falls short of the 15% of government health expenditure agreed to by all African 
governments in the Abuja Declaration, and raises salient concerns about their 
willingness to invest sufficient funding towards their health agendas.  
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At the same time, development assistance for health (DAH) has slowed or stagnated, 
reducing the level of foreign financial contribution to various sub-Saharan African 
countries (29). While the proportion of DAH in the region is low in comparison to 
countries’ overall health expenditures, this channel provides an important source of 
funding for primary health care services and focus intervention areas in low-income 
settings (30). These diminishing funding channels leave the region’s health system 
underfunded and in need of alternative sources of financing.  
 
 
2.3 Households and health financing choices 
In order to fill the above-mentioned gaps in funding, households have been forced to 
pay directly into the health system in order to access services. Private household 
health expenditure – which is primarily comprised of regressive out-of-pocket 
payments – is associated with a disproportionate risk of being pushed into poverty 
(31,32). In acknowledgement of the potential impoverishing effects of household health 
payments (33,34), policymakers have promoted the idea of mandatory pre-payment 
mechanisms as a means of optimising access to healthcare services and offering 
financial risk protection to populations in low-resource settings. The most common of 
these in the lower- and middle-income country (LMIC) setting is health insurance 
schemes, which are ideally implemented as mandatory systems that are highly 
subsidised by government investment. However, the complex realities of developing 
economies greatly reduce their ability to effectively implement the archetypal health 
insurance structure for a number of reasons.  
The success of a functional health insurance system is typically reinforced by an 
effective and sustainable revenue collection system, as well as an efficient risk pooling 
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system that optimises equity irrespective of one’s social, financial or health status. 
However, many sub-Saharan African governments suffer from limited resource 
mobilisation for health due to a narrow tax base linked to low formal employment 
figures (35). These low levels of tax compliance are further exacerbated by insufficient 
government prioritisation of health services within their development agendas (28). As 
a result, governments are forced to ration their contributions towards the health sector, 
leaving individual households to plug the financing gap.  
Additionally, the high proportion of informally-employed individuals complicates the 
enforcement of mandatory health insurance enrolment in many sub-Saharan African 
settings. Estimates suggest that 85.8% of working-age sub-Saharan Africans are 
employed within the informal sector (1): a demographic that is often unwilling or unable 
to contribute to social services that do not meet their priority needs (36). This has 
resulted in a situation where the decision to enrol into health insurance is voluntary in 
practice, and dependent upon individual household decisions in line with their 
substantive economic and social realities. The delicate balance in household decision-
making requires important interrogations in order to identify the objective factors that 
may influence the choice to enrol into health insurance.  
 
 
2.4 State of the art: Current research on the informal sector and the 
determinants of voluntary health insurance enrolment 
Contemporary debate on voluntary health insurance is largely predicated on the 
centrality of economic, social, political and environmental factors on healthcare-related 
decisions (37,38), acknowledging the cross-cutting influence of the social determinants 
of health (39). These features – which include socioeconomic and political context, as 
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well as individual characteristics and associations – help explain the association 
between health outcomes and the differential distribution of power and resources. 
While current research presents an important first step in understanding the household 
considerations that influence the decision to enrol into health insurance, it possesses 
some key drawbacks that limit its internal and external validity, as highlighted below.   
 
i. Tendency to overgeneralise the informal sector 
A large part of health financing scholarship in the sub-Saharan African setting has been 
dedicated towards understanding the influence of structural and relational stratifiers on 
the decision to enrol into health insurance (40–48). These studies have identified 
associations between health insurance demand and sociodemographic factors such 
as the age, gender and occupation of the household head, as well as household 
composition. While it provides an understanding of the structural factors that influence 
the decision to enrol into health insurance, existing research seems to disregard 
inherent differences within the population groups under study. Indeed, when probed in 
detail, we note a tendency in this scholarship to analyse informal sector members as 
a monolith, reflecting an obsolete perspective of labour market dynamics that has been 
overtaken by recent characterisations (49–51). It is now widely accepted now that the 
informal sector is highly heterogeneous, covering a broad spectrum of unorganised 
economic activities that do not conform to normative definitions (1). This line of thinking 
has been further developed by several empirical studies within the development 
economics space, which identify two distinct groups in the sub-Saharan African context 
that join the informal sector: an upper tier and a lower tier (52–55). The upper tier of 
the informal sector comprises individuals that voluntarily carry out informal sector 
activities to gain a competitive advantage over their peers, while the lower tier 
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encapsulates individuals that are forced to work in the sector due to entry barriers in 
the formal labour market. These intricacies render the informal sector as a highly 
complex corpus for whose defining characteristics are exceedingly difficult to specify. 
It is therefore problematic to apply broad characterisations to the sector, as has been 
done in a large part of existing health financing literature (56–62).  
 
ii. Tendency to conflate group membership and decision-making power 
In addition to the above-mentioned generalisations, several studies have sought to 
investigate the interaction between social position and health insurance demand. 
Accordingly, a limited body of research has focused on the determinants of health 
insurance enrolment among specific vulnerable groups such as women and the elderly 
(63–67). While these studies have affirmed the association between social 
stratification, vulnerability, and health insurance demand, they largely confound group 
membership with their role as primary household decision-makers. This oversight on 
whether the study population is, in fact, responsible for household investment decisions 
makes it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from this scholarship. A second 
concern has been the dearth of comparative analysis with other population subgroups, 
making it difficult to ascertain exactly how vulnerable group membership influences 
health-seeking behaviour. To our knowledge, only a single empirical study has 
considered the role of gendered household decision-making in the decision to enrol 
into voluntary health insurance (65). This analysis found crucial educational, 
socioeconomic and marital differences in the determinants of health insurance 
enrolment between male and female individuals. While it is indicative of potential 
distinctions in the gendered determinants of health insurance demand, it is once again 
notable that this study did not confirm whether the populations under investigation were 
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actually responsible for the decision to enrol. This limits the external validity of this 
study. In spite of these concerns, it is important to view this body of scholarship as 
illuminating in its ability to shine a light on marginalised population groups that are 
systematically excluded from participating in the formal economy and health system.  
 
iii. Tendency to overlook the contextual social conditions that influence 
differential exposure to determinants of health insurance demand   
Overarching the above-mentioned concerns is the propensity of existing studies to 
view voluntary health insurance enrolment as an empirical phenomenon that is 
explained exclusively through solid data and statistical approaches. This positivist 
approach certainly has its methodological and analytical advantages: it encourages a 
highly scientific approach that allows for objective analysis of the factors associated 
with health insurance demand. However, it assumes that data on its own can explain 
human behaviour, which is problematic in a field that seeks to understand household 
decision-making (2). Given that the decision to seek health insurance is a complex 
interplay between epidemiology and social behaviour, this approach may misrepresent 
the realities of the populations under observation, as Bryman and Bell state (68):  
“The study of… people and their institutions is fundamentally different from the 
natural sciences… and requires a different logic of research procedure”  
 
While pragmatic analytical approaches are still nascent in the context of empirical 
voluntary health insurance research, we note a trickling of efforts to explore the 
linkages between contextual social conditions and the empirical factors influencing 
health insurance demand. Mladovsky et al. found that association with local economic 
or decision-making groups increased the likelihood of enrolling into a voluntary health 
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insurance scheme due to the improved social positioning (69). Similar approaches may 
offer an opportunity to introduce better framing of the empirical data associated with 
current voluntary health insurance research.  
 
Our research identified a gap in knowledge on UHC priority-setting and on the multiple 
factors that influence government priority-setting and adhesion to voluntary health 
insurance. This thesis anchors the above-mentioned existing research as an important 
foundation for understanding the gaps in health systems funding that necessitate the 
application of voluntary health insurance, as well as the determinants of voluntary 
health insurance demand as a health-seeking behaviour. Before discussing the 
methodology used in this thesis, we will first provide an overview of the Kenyan and 
Cameroonian health systems under investigation. 
 
 
2.5 UHC and voluntary health insurance in Kenya  
2.5.1 Country context 
Kenya is a lower-middle income country in East Africa with a population of 46.6 million 
(70). The country is currently in the midst of an economic boom, with a sustained gross 
domestic product (GDP) of between 4.5% and 6% in recent years (70). In spite of its 
increased economic output, the Kenyan Government budget consistently runs at a 
deficit with recurrent and development expenditure exceeding revenues. This situation 
is exacerbated by a narrow base due to low tax compliance, a high dependency ratio, 
and limited taxation on corporate revenues (35,70). This has resulted in high levels of 
domestic and external borrowing to plug the country’s widening funding gaps, with 61% 
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of government revenues focused towards servicing debt in 2019 (71). As a result, only 
a limited amount of funding is made available for essential social services such as 
health, with government investment towards health languishing at 6.7% of its total 
expenditure in 2016 (27). This amount is well below 15% of annual government budget 
agreed to in the Abuja Declaration.  
Against this backdrop, Kenya’s health sector has largely achieved marked 
improvements in reducing the burden of a number of key disease areas in the past two 
decades, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Trends in health impact indicators in Kenya (1993–2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(72) 
* U5MR: Under 5 mortality rate; IMR: Infant mortality rate; NMR: Neonatal mortality rate; MMR: Maternal mortality 
rate 
 
Concurrently – and in light of the rising burden of non-communicable diseases in the 
country – the low level of financial investment into the health sector risks undoing the 
gains made in health outcomes (26,72). Indeed, while total health expenditure in the 
country has increased by 167.5% in real terms since 2001/02, the amount spent per 
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capita on health has stagnated (27). This has significantly impacted the country’s 
ability to adapt to its changing demographic and epidemiological profile, and build a 
resilient healthcare system.  
 
2.5.2 Health financing priorities and strategies 
Kenya’s health financing system is comprised of a mix of public and private sources. 
The main sources of revenue for supporting health financing in Kenya are government 
taxation, insurance premiums from employers and employees, development 
assistance for health, and households through OOP payments and voluntary 
insurance contributions. 
The Kenyan Government is the main financier of health in Kenya, contributing 40% of 
the country’s total health expenditure (THE) (27). In order to ensure effective health 
systems planning, the Kenyan Ministry of Health maintains a varied list of priorities and 
strategic investments governed by a robust health policy framework, including the 
Kenyan Constitution 2010; Vision 2030; Kenya Health Act 2016; Kenya Health Policy 
Framework (1994-2010); Kenya Health Policy (2014-2030). When perused in detail, 
the country’s health strategy largely focuses on programmatic health goals through the 
achievement of core national health indicators, such as maternal and child health 
indicators. While this approach is important in combating specific health concerns, 
there remains an investment gap in systems-wide activities that would facilitate the 
UHC process within the Kenyan context. This complicates the country’s ability to build 
an equitable, resilient and responsive health system through which all can obtain 
quality healthcare services regardless of their social and economic status.  
In spite of this, the country has carried out a number of UHC-related activities focusing 
on improving access to health services at sub-national level and increasing population 
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health insurance coverage through the country’s national health insurance scheme. 
These interventions are discussed briefly below. 
 
i. Devolution of health services 
In 2010, Kenya promulgated a new constitution in order to improve social, political and 
economic representation within the country (73). As part of the new constitution, the 
Kenyan Government decentralised healthcare provision to the country’s designated 47 
counties in order to reduce health disparities and increase health systems performance 
(74). This development further conferred the responsibility for policy implementation, 
budgetary allocation and revenue-raising to the sub-national level: functions that were 
previously shared with the national level. This created a need for empowerment and 
capacity-building at sub-national level in order to optimise health service planning and 
provision. However, the hasty implementation of this reform has limited the impact of 
devolution within the health sector (14,75). 
In 2012, the Kenyan Parliament passed the public finance management law – the 
Public Finance Management Act – to formalise county autonomy over funding received 
at sub-national level (76). This has had an unintended effect of the health sector, given 
that all funding – whether allocated by national government or collected at health 
facilities as user fees – must be pooled in a County Revenue Fund controlled by the 
county government. This means that county governments are the ultimate decision-
makers on whether or not to prioritise health over other development priorities. This 
creates several problems: firstly, while the national government still maintains control 
of health policy, it has no way of enforcing implementation at county level. Secondly, 
county departments of health face uncertainty on whether requested funding may be 
received, thus hindering the effectiveness of healthcare planning processes.  
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ii. Household health costs and the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
In light of the limited funding provided by the national government, Kenya’s population 
continues to be plagued by high OOP expenditures, with household payments 
constituting 28% of the country’s current health expenditure (CHE) (27). This 
reinforces concerns about the government’s ability to protect its population from 
catastrophic health expenditure and inequitable access to healthcare services. 
In order to cushion its citizens from the impoverishing effects of illness (77), the Kenyan 
Government has advocated for all members of the public to join the publicly-run 
national health insurance scheme, the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). The 
NHIF is the government-run national health insurance scheme in Kenya. Established 
in 1966 to provide inpatient health services to the formal sector, this scheme provides 
coverage for approximately 14.6% of the Kenyan population (70). The Scheme was 
expanded in 1972 to cover the informal sector through its voluntary Informal Sector 
(IS) Scheme. Informal sector enrolment into the NHIF is elective. In order to enrol 
informal sector workers and their families into the NHIF, potential enrolees are charged 
a monthly flat-rate premium of KShs. 500/= (~USD 4.90). This fee can be paid annually, 
semi-annually, quarterly or monthly depending on the enrolee’s financial realities. 
Since being identified as the Kenyan Government’s chosen vehicle for achieving UHC 
in 2012, the NHIF has focused on the informal sector as a target market for growth 
(78,79). While the sector constitutes 83.5% of the country’s working population, only 
27.5% of its members are enrolled into the NHIF (70). The NHIF has therefore 
embarked on far-reaching reforms in priority areas to incorporate the sector, and has 
launched a number of government-funded flagship programs in the past five years as 
part of the Kenyan President’s Big Four priority areas: 
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i. Linda Mama program: providing free maternity services to all Kenyan women 
ii. Health Insurance Subsidy for the Poor (HISP): providing free comprehensive 
health insurance coverage to 9 million indigents by 2020 
iii. Inua Jamii program: providing free comprehensive health insurance coverage 
to the elderly and those with physical disabilities. 
 
While political rhetoric has championed these programs as a stepping stone towards 
UHC, government budgetary allocations towards the NHIF have remained limited. The 
Fund thus continues to face challenges in achieving the enrolment numbers necessary 
to fulfil its mandate, making it reliant upon individual members of the public enrolling 
on their own volition. It is for this reason that it is important to understand the factors 
influencing the decision to voluntarily enrol into the NHIF.  
Several studies to date have investigated the determinants of NHIF enrolment in Kenya 
(57,64,80). These studies generally have targeted both the formal and informal sector, 
leaving a significant gap in our understanding of the informal sector in the context of 
voluntary health insurance enrolment in Kenya. Indeed, to our knowledge, only a single 
study has exclusively targeted the informal sector to understand the empirical factors 
associated with voluntary health insurance demand (81). This makes it important to 
develop research to better understand the influencers of voluntary NHIF demand 
amongst the informal sector, in order to better target this vast population group for 
enrolment.  
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2.6 Voluntary health insurance enrolment in Cameroon  
Cameroon is a lower-middle income country in Central Africa with a population of 22.7 
million. As an oil-exporting country, Cameroon has faced a recent lag in its economic 
growth due to low global commodity prices (82). The country has therefore had to 
reduce its government spending in order to minimise its budgetary deficit. As a result, 
government health prioritisation in Cameroon remains amongst the lowest in Africa, 
with only 4% of its budget spent on health expenditure as shown in Figure 3 (28).  
 
Figure 3: Government health prioritisation and GDP per capita in 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(83) 
 
Against this background, Cameroon is undergoing an epidemiological transition, with 
reducing morbidity linked to communicable diseases and increasing rates of non-
communicable diseases. Between 1990 and 2015, the country significantly increased 
its life expectancy, reduced its under-five mortality rate, and reduced its burden of 
disease by 16,000 disability-adjusted life years (81). In spite of this, the country’s 
epidemiological profile is still consistently ranked amongst the most worrisome in the 
African region (84). This problem can be attributed to a myriad of supply- and demand-
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side barriers including poor health financing and resource allocation, and inadequate 
health-seeking behaviour. This is well-illustrated by the fact that only 2.9% of the 
country’s health budget is targeted towards health promotion and prevention programs: 
services that could significantly ameliorate the country’s emerging disease burden if 
appropriately implemented (85). 
 
2.6.1 Health financing priorities and strategy 
Cameroon’s health financing system is comprised of a mix of public and private 
sources, with households contributing 52% and the Government contributing 33% of 
healthcare funding in the country (86). Mechanisms to facilitate the pooling of financial 
resources in Cameroon are limited, with the central government offering two health 
insurance schemes for the formally-employed: a civil servant scheme (Régime de la 
Fonction Publique) and the Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale (CNPS) for 
workers under the Labour Code. The Régime de la Fonction Publique provides cash 
payments for maternity cover for all government employees. CNPS covers medical 
costs associated with occupational ailments and provides reimbursement for all 
maternity costs, in addition to its primary role of providing pensions and other familial 
benefits to formal sector workers and their dependents.  
Coverage of the informal sector through health insurance is the remit of both the private 
and public sectors, with many private microinsurance schemes operating at a localised 
level. Congruently, the Cameroonian Government has committed to covering 40% of 
its population through microinsurance schemes in line with its universal health 
coverage goals (86,87). However, the Government’s efforts have been hampered due 
to:  
• Varied knowledge and awareness among potential beneficiaries  
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• Significant regional disparities in health insurance coverage  
• Poor relationships with partner health facilities  
• Limited financial and technical support from government.  
 
As a result, the country has made limited progress towards universal financial risk 
protection, with only 2% of its population covered by microinsurance schemes by 2013, 
compared to approximately 70% of the population who are not in formal employment 
(88,89).  
Given the challenges faced in achieving UHC using its existing strategy and the 
Cameroonian Government’s plan to achieve 10% coverage of the population with 
microinsurance schemes by 2020 (86), the Cameroonian Government in collaboration 
with the WHO, the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the French 
Development Cooperation began work in 2015 to map out an alternative strategy for 
achieving universal financial risk protection. While these efforts are laudable, there is 
still an urgent need to investigate the influence of existing microinsurance schemes on 
financial risk protection in order to identify what strategies could be effective in 
expanding health insurance coverage across the Cameroonian population. Indeed, 
existing research into the determinants of health insurance enrolment in Cameroon is 
very limited, with the few studies on voluntary health insurance enrolment focusing 
either on willingness-to-pay or awareness of health insurance (90,91).  
 
 
2.7 Summary 
In this introductory section, we have discussed the considerations underpinning UHC 
and health priority-setting scholarship within the sub-Saharan African context, as well 
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as contemporary debates on the informal sector and determinants of voluntary health 
insurance enrolment. We have also provided an overview into the Kenyan and 
Cameroonian health systems, which we will be exploring further within this doctoral 
thesis.  
The subsequent chapters will focus on the research conducted during this doctoral 
study. Chapter 3 below aims to describe the aims and objectives of this thesis, as well 
as methodology used. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Goals and objectives of the thesis 
This thesis seeks to investigate the institutional and household factors which influence 
inclusive and sustainable financial risk protection among the informal sector in Kenya 
and Cameroon by focusing on two specific objectives: 
3. Investigating the influence of priority-setting by key health systems actors on 
universal health coverage and health financing strategy  
a. Identify the values and priorities of policymakers and strategic partners 
in achieving universal health coverage 
b. Document the perceived impact of key health financing stakeholders’ 
priorities on the health financing options for informal sector members  
4. Estimating and critically analysing the factors that influence the value 
proposition of voluntary health insurance among different constituent groups of 
the informal sector 
 
While these topics have been broadly explored within existing scholarship, we seek to 
add an additional emphasis on articulating the intricacies of health decision-making 
and the substantive outcomes expressed within the health system. In doing so, we aim 
to provide a more realistic and representative analysis of health financing decision-
making processes at institutional and household level.  
This research was originally designed to focus exclusively on the Kenyan healthcare 
system. However, we chose to leverage an existing Swiss Tropical and Public Health 
Institute (Swiss TPH) mandate in Cameroon in order to obtain further data of the 
household determinants of voluntary health insurance in a different setting. This 
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mandate sought to investigate the contribution of a mutual health insurance scheme, 
the Bamenda Ecclesiastical Provincial Health Assistance (BEPHA) Scheme, in North-
West Cameroon towards UHC. We thus centred this doctoral study in Kenya, with a 
sub-study carried out in Cameroon to investigate the factors influencing the value 
proposition of voluntary health insurance in this setting. Table 1 below provides an 
overview of the study type and setting for each objective.  
 
Table 1: Study overview 
 Specific objective Study type Study setting 
1 
To investigate the influence of priority-setting on health 
financing strategy for the informally employed 
Qualitative Kenya 
2 
Estimate and critically analyse the factors that 
influence the value proposition of voluntary health 
insurance 
Quantitative 
Kenya and 
Cameroon 
 
Before exploring the research setting, a brief overview of the methodological 
considerations of the research constituting this thesis will be provided below. 
 
 
3.2 Research approach  
This doctorate follows a published article thesis format and thus discusses the methods 
used for each study separately in each individual manuscript chapter. That 
notwithstanding, it is important to highlight the general methodology used, as well as 
any methodological differences between this body of research and existing convention 
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within health financing research. The philosophical and methodological foundations of 
our research are described below. 
 
Objective 1: To investigate the influence of priority-setting by policymakers 
and key opinion leaders on universal health coverage and health financing 
strategy 
The study of UHC priority-setting in LMICs is still in its nascent stage, with limited 
examples of its application in these contexts. Nevertheless, it is well-recognised in 
existing health systems research that policy development is a highly political process 
through which many competing values are considered and prioritised (11). The current 
standard within health priority-setting research design has been the application of an 
interpretivist approach, which acknowledges the complexity of human decision-making 
(2,92). It engages health systems actors to understand their subjective interpretations 
of a situation under investigation. Given that UHC priority-setting is a participatory 
process (10), it is imperative to understand the socio-political realities that shape 
societal values and goals in the healthcare system. This means that the philosophical 
perspectives of key health system actors must be documented in order to decide upon 
a unified and realistic approach towards Kenya’s UHC policy. 
In light of the emerging complexity of the UHC debate, we chose to apply the 
established interpretivist approach to understand the stakeholder values and priorities 
underpinning the move towards UHC. A series of in-depth interviews (IDIs) were 
carried out with key health system actors including government policymakers, 
development partners, and technical experts in order to identify the strategic framework 
underpinning Kenya’s health financing strategy. Thirteen target interviewees were 
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purposively selected based on their existing financial and technical support activities 
within Kenya’s health financing space.  
In order to accurately represent the considerations and trade-offs contextualising the 
UHC debate at country level, a discussion guide was developed centring on the three 
key UHC dimensions highlighted in Figure 4: population coverage; service coverage; 
and financial protection.  
 
Figure 4: Necessary steps towards achieving universal health coverage 
 
(93) 
 
The discussion guide was used to steer discussion at the beginning of interviews, as 
well as when stakeholders deviated from the topic at hand. However, respondents 
were largely allowed to shape the direction of the conversation in order to best 
articulate their preferred health systems values and priorities under the UHC banner. 
The key questions included within the discussion guide are provided in Appendix 11.5. 
 30 
In order to analyse our results, the textual data were analysed using the Framework 
Method that enables the systematic analysis of textual data (94). This analytical tool 
allows the collation of emerging themes within and between different stakeholder 
groups in order to compare and contrast their policy perspectives. Details on the 
analytical process are expounded upon in Section 4.3.3. 
 
Objective 2: To estimate and critically analyse the factors that influence the value 
proposition of voluntary health insurance among different constituent groups of 
the informal sector 
As highlighted within the literature review, existing studies into the household 
determinants of voluntary health insurance demand have tended to cluster informal 
sector members as a monolith. This ignores established convention on labour markets 
that adopts the position that informal sector dynamism complicates efforts to effectively 
identify its members (95). Concurrently, there is increasing recognition that the 
complex interplay between specific group characteristics and their social position may 
influence exposure to certain determinants of health insurance demand. As an 
example, informal employment exacerbates the already-significant income gap 
between men and women (53), making it plausible to expect disparities in the way 
micro-level factors influence each group’s health decisions. These subtleties are 
scarcely incorporated within existing health financing research, and expose existing 
studies on voluntary health insurance demand to a methodological conundrum: how 
can they claim to objectively identify the factors influencing a health-seeking behaviour 
while simultaneously confounding members of a highly heterogeneous group?  
In spite of the substantive differences in informal sector characteristics, one generality 
that can be applied is the sector’s tendency to be overrepresented amongst certain 
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population subgroups, such as the young and old; those with lower levels of education; 
those who face economic uncertainty; and households with female headship (1). We 
applied this nuance into the research in Chapters 5 and 7 by focusing our research 
and analysis on specific population groups overrepresented in the informal sector as 
shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Study approach for Objective 2 
 
Adapted from (1) 
 
This notwithstanding, it is important to note that our research question ultimately sought 
to understand the determinants of health insurance enrolment among the informal 
sector. Our sampling for this quantitative research was thus based on the estimated 
proportion of the population insured with a certain precision. This coverage rate was 
obtained from official government and insurance scheme data, depending on data 
availability.  
Cross-sectional household surveys were conducted to elicit responses on the factors 
influencing enrolment into the national health insurance scheme in Kenya and a 
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church-run micro health insurance scheme in Cameroon respectively. A structured 
questionnaire was administered in each research setting in order to identify the extent 
to which health insurance enrolment is influenced by a number of factors, including 
socioeconomic status, household-specific characteristics, and household head 
characteristics. These variables were adapted from existing health financing literature 
and country health surveys. The specific methods used for each study carried out 
under this objective are included in their respective chapters, and the questionnaires 
administered in each research setting are provided in Appendices 11.3 and 11.4 for 
the Cameroon and Kenya studies respectively.  
The data were analysed using STATA version 14.1 for Windows (STATA Corporation, 
College Station, Texas). The main outcome variable was voluntary health insurance 
enrolment in the year preceding the study. The explanatory variables were divided into 
five components: household composition and attributes, household head factors, mean 
perceived household health status and proxies for exposure to financial risk pooling. 
In order to prevent the excessive use of dummy variables, the explanatory variables to 
be tested were based on existing literature findings. Logistic regression was used to 
estimate the association between the explanatory variables and health insurance 
enrolment, with one key difference with the majority of existing research methodology: 
the use of interaction terms for informal sector subgroups under examination and each 
explanatory variable to analyse the influence of subgroup membership on the 
association of each variable and health insurance enrolment. In this way, the studies 
sought to understand how exposure to specific informal sector subgroups influenced 
the interactions between health insurance demand and each explanatory variable. 
Recognising the analytical complexities of these interplays, social analysis was applied 
to each research study in order to better understand how groups’ social and economic 
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realities affected their health-seeking behaviour. This pragmatic approach aligns to 
existing recommendations for the combination of empirical research with more 
inductive analysis in order to better understand and apply health financing scholarship 
(96). The theories and frameworks applied to each study were specific to the unique 
considerations of the population group under investigation, and are highlighted in each 
individual manuscript. 
 
 
3.3 Ethical considerations 
The study protocols for this thesis were reviewed and approved by the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) of Strathmore University, Kenya (Ethics Reference No. SU-IRB 
0057/16; Date of approval: 23rd February 2018) and the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) of the Catholic University of Cameroon in Bamenda, North-West Cameroon 
(Ethics Reference No. 001/HEPM/CATUC-IRB/16; Date of approval: 17th May 2016). 
The ethical approvals for both studies are provided in Appendices 11.1 and 11.2. The 
ethical procedures utilised during the duration of the study emphasised the need for all 
respondents to understand the project’s aims and objectives, as well as necessitated 
individual informed consent prior to any data collection.  
 
 
3.4 Thesis structure 
This thesis consists of five Results chapters. Chapter 5 and 7 will seek to directly 
address Objective 2 of this thesis, while Chapter 4 focuses on answering Objective 1. 
Chapters 6 and 8 comprise of working papers written to inform stakeholder actions on 
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UHC and health financing in Cameroon and Kenya respectively. The contents of each 
chapter is described sequentially below. 
Chapter 5 below seeks to examine the value interests that influence agenda setting in 
the country’s health financing space. It further aims to understand how viewpoints 
within and across policy networks may influence how health financing priorities are set 
within the country. 
Chapter 5 presents the influence of gender and household headship on voluntary 
health insurance in North-West Cameroon. This manuscript seeks to expand the 
discourse on the determinants of voluntary health insurance demand - an area where 
male household headship is typically assumed within existing literature.  
Chapter 6 is a working paper investigating the contribution of the Bamenda 
Ecclesiastical Provincial Health Assistance (BEPHA) Scheme towards universal 
population coverage and financial risk protection in North-West Cameroon. This Swiss 
TPH report was written as part of an existing mandate with BEPHA to provide technical 
assistance developing evidence on its impact in the Anglophone Cameroon. 
Chapter 7 presents the influence of localised savings groups and social capital on the 
uptake of national health insurance. In line with documented efforts to increase informal 
sector membership of the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) in Kenya, this 
manuscript seeks to investigate if and how localised rotating savings and cooperative 
association (ROSCA) membership influences national health insurance demand in 
Kisumu, Kenya. It further aims to understand how the social capital underpinning 
ROSCAs influences health insurance enrolment. 
Chapter 8 is a working paper that focuses on helping Kisumu County stakeholders 
better understand the factors influencing informally-employed households’ decision to 
enrol into the NHIF. The development of this report was particularly pertinent given the 
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emerging role of county governments in facilitating universal NHIF population coverage 
amongst their citizens through marketing and indigent subsidisation. 
The final chapter (Chapter 9) provides a summarisation and analysis of the findings 
from Chapters 5, 5, and 7. It further seeks to justify the contribution of this thesis to 
existing knowledge. In so doing, it seeks to interrogate the theoretical, methodological, 
and policy contributions of this thesis. 
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4.1 Abstract 
Background: Competing priorities in health systems necessitate difficult choices on 
which health actions and investments to fund: decisions that are complex, value-based, 
and highly political. In light of the centrality of universal health coverage (UHC) in 
driving current health policy, we sought to examine the value interests that influence 
agenda setting in the country’s health financing space. Given the plurality of Kenya’s 
health policy levers, we aimed to assess how the perspectives of stakeholders involved 
in policy decision-making and implementation shape discussions on health financing 
within the UHC framework. 
Methods: A series of in-depth key informant interviews were conducted at national 
and county level (n=13) between April and May 2018. Final thematic analysis using the 
Framework Method was conducted to identify similarities and differences amongst 
stakeholders on the challenges hindering Kenya’s achievement of UHC in terms of its 
the optimisation of health service coverage; expansion of the population that benefits 
from essential healthcare services; and the minimisation of out-of-pocket costs 
associated with health-seeking behaviour.   
Results: Our findings suggest that the perceived lack of strategic leadership from 
Kenya’s national government has lead to a lack of agreement on stakeholders’ 
interpretation of UHC and its contextual values and priorities. We observe material 
differences between and within policy networks on the country’s priorities for population 
coverage, healthcare service provision, and cost-sharing under the UHC dispensation. 
In spite of this, we note that progressive universalism is considered as the preferred 
approach towards UHC in Kenya, with most interviewees prioritising an equity-based 
approach towards increasing access to healthcare services and financial risk 
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protection. However, the conflicting priorities of key stakeholders complicate the 
likelihood of successfully achieving towards this policy objective. 
Conclusions: This study adds to existing knowledge of UHC in Kenya by rationalising 
and contextualising the values and priorities driving the process within the county. As 
such, it provides new insights about the broad range of considerations that should be 
taken into account as the country strategises over its UHC process.   
 
 
Key words 
Kenya; UHC; Priority-setting; Health financing; Health policy; Political economy 
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4.2 Introduction 
Priority-setting is a central part of building efficient, responsive and resilient healthcare 
systems (93,188). In many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), efforts to 
strengthen healthcare planning and delivery systems are often complicated by a 
plethora of epidemiological, social, economic, and administrative challenges. These 
issues necessitate difficult choices on which health actions and investments to fund: 
decisions that are complex, value-based, and highly political. Priority-setting aims to 
provide the best use of financial and other resources in line with population value 
choices, demand, and need. This government-led process theoretically allows a 
diverse range of healthcare stakeholders to articulate their preferred values and 
agendas in order to achieve consensus on the direction for a country’s health agenda 
(8). In practice, however, healthcare decision-making in many LMICs is often ad-hoc 
resulting in inefficient and inequitable resource allocation (12). 
Against this backdrop, universal health coverage (UHC) has been identified globally 
as the ultimate blueprint for a country’s health policy direction (189). It is defined as the 
aspiration of a country’s citizens to obtain access to essential health services based 
on need without the risk of financial hardship. At a notional level, UHC is measured by 
the progressive achievement of three key objectives: the optimisation of health service 
coverage; expansion of the population that benefits from essential healthcare services; 
and the minimisation of out-of-pocket costs associated with health-seeking behaviour 
(4). However, there are concerns about the diversity of interpretations of UHC and the 
lack of frameworks to guide its application in a context-specific manner (7). This 
concern has manifested itself in Kenya, where the national government has integrated 
UHC into its health policy documents and medium-term development agenda (190–
192). While there has been vocal support for this health policy goal within political and 
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bureaucratic circles, there remains limited articulation of the explicit choices and trade-
offs to be considered in steering the country’s UHC policy direction. There is therefore 
an urgent need to define the values underpinning Kenya’s UHC agenda, as well as the 
divergences that may limit the success of these endeavours. This paper seeks to 
investigate the fundamental priorities driving provisions towards UHC and its health 
financing strategy in Kenya. In doing so, we examine the political economy of UHC in 
Kenya and its impact on the country’s health financing decisions. This paper will be 
structured as follows: We will first provide an overview of existing health systems 
strengthening efforts carried out under the banner of UHC in Kenya, and the centrality 
of the multi-stakeholder approach in identifying health systems values. We will 
subsequently report our methodology and results, and finally follow up with an analysis 
of our findings. 
In order to understand Kenya’s ambitions within its current context, it is first necessary 
to identify the specific systems-wide approaches undertaken under the UHC banner. 
The national government has sought to promote interventions that apply six key 
principles highlighted within the current Kenya Health Policy: equity; people-
centeredness; participation; multi-sectoralism; efficiency; and social accountability 
(190). In terms of health service coverage, the Kenyan Government has promoted 
investments that passively encourage equity, people-centeredness and participatory 
approaches. Accordingly, healthcare provision in the country was decentralised to 
county level in 2012 in order to reduce regional disparities in health outcomes and 
increase responsiveness to the unique local epidemiological and social contexts 
(13,14,193). The government has further expanded service offerings within the 
country’s national health insurance scheme, the National Hospital Insurance Fund 
(NHIF), in order to improve formal sector service coverage and to attract informal 
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sector members (73,190). This has included the provision of fully-subsidised services 
for all Kenyans, including free maternity services. In order to increase the county’s 
population health coverage, Kenya’s national government sought to encourage social 
accountability by hiring local agents such as community-health workers (CHWs) to 
conduct NHIF population sensitisation and targeting activities (194). Through this 
process, it aims to convince informal sector members to join the NHIF, as well as to 
identify indigents who may benefit from the full subsidisation of their NHIF premiums. 
The government has also sought to integrate different health funding sources in order 
to optimise resource use, as well as to provide full NHIF premium subsidisation for 
vulnerable groups such as indigents and the elderly in order to minimise the financial 
risk associated with ill health. In spite of these efforts, we note that there is a lack of 
coherency in Kenya’s health priorities, which can be linked to the lack of definition of 
the values and trade-offs competing for resources within Kenya’s limited fiscal space. 
This has resulted in limited resource and strategic investment into health policy goals, 
thereby limiting the potential impact of actions and investments towards UHC in Kenya 
(185,191,195). 
Given the intrinsically participative nature of health priority-setting, the inclusion of a 
broad range of stakeholders is essential for the success of UHC in the Kenyan context 
(11). Indeed, the multiplicity of stakeholder interests and values has been highlighted 
in various studies investigating the political economy of various health systems reforms 
in the Kenyan healthcare sector (14–16). As such, it is imperative to identify and 
consider the ideological divide amongst key policy stakeholders when considering 
Kenya’s ideal path towards UHC. This study seeks to examine the value interests that 
influence agenda setting in the country’s health financing space. Given the plurality of 
Kenya’s health policy levers, we aim to assess how the perspectives of stakeholders 
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involved in policy decision-making and implementation shape discussions on health 
financing within the universal health coverage (UHC) framework. We further seek to 
understand how viewpoints within and across policy networks may influence how 
health financing priorities are set within the country.  
 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Study setting 
This manuscript reports the analysis of a series of in-depth key informant interviews at 
national and county level (n=13) carried out between April and May 2018. The 
interviews targeted national- and county-level policymakers with specialist knowledge 
on Kenya’s health priority-setting process in order to identify the fundamental values 
related to provisions for population coverage of UHC in Kenya; the range, scope and 
quality of health care service provision; and the investments necessary for reducing 
the financial impact of ill health amongst the Kenyan population. 
The rationale of these dimensions as a guide for the decision-making context 
underpinning UHC in Kenya was driven by a lack of existing frameworks through which 
dialogue on UHC policy could be approached. Given that the above-mentioned UHC 
dimensions have received near-universal backing amongst World Health Organization 
member states (189), we applied them to the study design in order to rationalise 
discussions on the country’s health systems priorities. This approach, in our view, was 
more likely to present a holistic perspective of the values and trade-offs to be 
considered in the push towards UHC.  
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National stakeholders were stratified into three policy circles: national government 
stakeholders responsible for defining national health financing policy in the country; 
development partner stakeholders who provide both financial and technical support on 
health systems strategies to the national and county governments, and the technical 
experts advising both groups. County-level stakeholders included current and former 
Chief Health Officers responsible for formulating and implementing county health 
strategies in Kisumu County.  
The presented research was undertaken in Nairobi – where most national stakeholders 
and technical experts are domiciled – and Kisumu. The key informant interviews at 
county level were embedded within a larger quantitative study in Kisumu, which aimed 
to investigate the factors influencing voluntary enrolment into the NHIF amongst 
residents of urban informal settlements (196).  
 
4.3.2 Data collection 
Thirteen in-depth interviews were conducted using a semi-structured discussion guide. 
Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes, and elicited discussions on 
stakeholder value interests in Kenya’s health financing space. In order not to pre-empt 
the value interests of respondents, the direction of conversation was steered as much 
as possible by preceding interviewees’ responses.  
Of the thirteen interviews conducted, three were national-level government 
stakeholders, two were county-level government stakeholders, three were 
development partners, and five were technical experts. Of the technical experts, two 
had played a role providing technical expertise to the NHIF directly, two had advised 
the Ministry of Health on its universal health care strategy directly, and three had 
played a role advising development partners at the time of the study. One of the 
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development partners had previously been a national government policymaker in the 
five years preceding this study. 
 
Table 1: Overview of key informants and where they worked (health system level) 
Research Phase Total 
In-depth interviews with national-level government stakeholders 3 
In-depth interviews with county-level government stakeholders 2 
In-depth interviews with development partners 3 
In-depth interviews with technical experts 5 
Total 13 
 
4.3.3 Data analysis 
Ten of the thirteen interviews were audio recorded and summary notes were taken. 
Audio files were transcribed verbatim. Three interviews were not recorded with respect 
to interviewee requests, but detailed notes of the interviews were written. Data were 
subsequently analysed using the Framework Method, which enables comparison of 
emerging themes across different policy networks through inductive and deductive 
approaches (94). This method was applied in this study using the following approach: 
(i) the transcribed data were compared with the audio files in order to ensure its 
veracity; (ii) the audio recordings were played severally in order to ensure 
familiarisation with its contents and themes; (iii) open coding of the transcripts was 
conducted in MaxQDA in order to categorise a preliminary set of themes based on the 
key UHC building blocks; (iv) iterations were made to the coding system as new themes 
emerged from the interview data; and (v) emerging themes were analysed across 
individual interviewees and policy groups using MaxQDA analysis functions.  
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Final thematic analysis focused on interpreting similarities and differences amongst 
stakeholders on the challenges facing Kenya’s health system that hinder the 
achievement of UHC in terms of its three building blocks; potential solutions to the 
problems identified; and the political and real-world situation that aided or hindered the 
achievement of the articulated solutions. 
 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Universal Health Coverage in Kenyan context 
Stakeholders across the policy divide viewed UHC as a complex process within which 
a variety of players, structures and concerns should be incorporated. While there was 
congruence on the multi-faceted nature of UHC, several stakeholders accused the 
national government of lacking a holistic approach towards UHC, suggesting that it 
often limited its interventions to healthcare financing through the NHIF:   
 
“… the main agenda has not always been about providing comprehensive public 
information about what UHC is about. If you go to the Ministry of Health they just tell 
you to enrol with NHIF.” (Development partner) 
4.4.2 Population coverage  
Our interviews revealed a lack of consensus on the definition of the population to be 
covered with essential health services in order to achieve UHC. When queried, 
respondents within and across policy networks oscillated between defining population 
coverage as providing UHC to the whole Kenyan population; at least 80% of the 
population; and focusing solely on the poorest Kenyans. In spite of this variance, we 
 46 
noted convergence amongst stakeholders on the role of the NHIF as the organisation 
responsible for pooling population groups in order to facilitate equitable access to 
healthcare services in Kenya.  
Stakeholders identified two target population groups as integral to efforts on optimising 
the NHIF under the UHC banner: the informal sector and indigents. Respondents 
across all policy networks acknowledged concerns about the low enrolment numbers 
amongst these population groups, citing difficulties in market segmentation. This, they 
intimated, was linked due to the mutability of these populations and weak household 
identification systems within the country. In order to mitigate these concerns, 
stakeholders submitted that the actions of the national government, county 
governments, and individual informal sector members were key to the success of the 
NHIF. The degree to which each group was held responsible for increasing population 
coverage within the NHIF, however, varied across policy networks. 
 
National and county government 
Respondents across all groups expressed strong expectations that the county 
government would play a central role in identifying and targeting households for 
enrolment into the NHIF. While acknowledging their role in identifying indigents, county 
stakeholders felt that the national government should provide the financial resources 
for increasing population coverage through the NHIF. 
 
“The national government should first tell us how much money they have for UHC… if 
they are going to cover the indigents, then the county does not need to worry about 
that.” (County stakeholder) 
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Respondents across policy networks acknowledged the NHIF’s efforts to improve the 
process of population targeting by engaging community health workers (CHWs) – who 
make up the first level of the Kenyan healthcare system – to sensitise and register all 
local households in a number of pre-selected counties. Given the positioning of CHWs 
under the county government system, respondents emphasised the need for counties 
to develop strong, sustainable CHW payment policies. It was noted that counties varied 
in their CHW payment policies: some paid CHWs directly, while others relied on donors 
for their payment. This, in stakeholders’ view, raised the possibility of donor priorities 
superseding government UHC strategy, thereby weakening the authority of 
governments to effectively use CHWs for implementing official Kenyan health policy.  
Few concrete solutions were offered on how to better facilitate the role of county 
governments in targeting and enrolling residents into the NHIF, highlighting the 
complexity of population coverage in Kenya. However, some general suggestions 
offered by stakeholders ranged from the use of innovation for population mapping to 
the complete integration of the NHIF into government services to enforce NHIF 
premium payment. 
 
“There should be some legal provisions to put some level of discipline on the 
population. For example, you can tie access to government services to NHIF 
enrolment…” (Technical expert) 
 
Individual informal sector households 
In light of the difficulties in enforcing mandatory NHIF coverage in Kenya due to 
ineffective household identification strategies, stakeholders across the policy divide 
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conceded that individual households would continue to play a major role in NHIF’s risk-
pooling strategy.  
Stakeholders showed unanimity in their reservations about the NHIF’s ability to 
effectively attract voluntary members. Some stakeholders considered financial 
instability as a key barrier to voluntary NHIF enrolment and expressed concerns about 
the equity implications of targeting heterogenous informal sector groups. 
 
“Let’s say we have two informal sector members who provide motorcycle transport. 
How will you be able to identify who is in a financial position to afford NHIF?” 
(County stakeholder) 
 
Limited solutions were offered for the underlying inequity within the NHIF’s population 
coverage, with respondents diverging on who ought to receive NHIF premium 
subsidisation. We did not identify any clear patterns on this issue within or across policy 
networks, with many stakeholders offering no opinion on the topic.  
 
“The question is, do we request the government to finance all households within the 
informal sector, or do we provide incentives or partial subsidies so that people can 
join the NHIF?” (Development partner) 
 
Another point of discussion was what stakeholders viewed as the complexity of 
financial decision-making amongst those with limited disposable income: in their view, 
the decision to enrol into the NHIF was complicated by a low NHIF value perception 
amongst informal sector members and ineffective NHIF outreach mechanisms. 
Technical stakeholders expounded on the need to simplify communication targeting 
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informal sector members, urging the targeting of specific population groups such as 
women, churches, and savings groups as a means of expanding voluntary NHIF 
enrolment. However, we were unable to identify through our interviews under whose 
purview the creation and dissemination of these sensitisation materials would fall. 
A small proportion of development partners and technical experts deplored what they 
viewed as obsolete enrolment procedures, such as requiring birth and marriage 
certificates for enrolment. They noted that this disregards the evolution of Kenyan 
societal norms by underestimating the difficulties faced by underprivileged 
communities in getting official documentation.  
 
“The NHIF has policies that are so archaic, such as availing marriage certificates. Go 
to slum areas… you'll find women of reproductive age who have multiple children but 
no identification card, much less a marriage certificate.” (Technical expert) 
 
It was further noted that perceived punitive measures for defaulting on premium 
payment disincentivised NHIF uptake. These concerns were, however, in the minority. 
4.4.3 Service coverage 
A majority of respondents felt that the priority of UHC in the context of service coverage 
was to avail adequate and quality healthcare services to the general public. There was, 
however, divergence on how this would be achieved in Kenya. Broadly, two areas of 
focus were mentioned as the main policy levers that directly impacted service coverage 
in Kenya: healthcare service planning and provision.  
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Healthcare service planning 
Stakeholders generally felt that health system needs were highly county-specific, 
noting the different levels of investment across the country.  
 
“… Each county has very specific needs. Some struggle with equipping facilities. 
Others have problems with the distribution of facilities, while others have issues with 
how facilities are managed.” (Technical expert) 
 
In spite of this, stakeholders across the policy divide generally agreed that healthcare 
service provision across the country was inadequate, highlighting concerns about 
limited investment into infrastructure and the human resource base. Some NHIF and 
technical expert respondents deplored what they viewed as misplaced healthcare 
investment decisions at national level.  
 
“Instead of buying high-end equipment, instead of doing all these fancy, politically 
visible, expensive things… they should be building more dispensaries, more health 
centres, making sure that everyone is within five kilometres of a health centre” 
(Technical expert) 
 
Further, some respondents expressed frustration about county governments’ 
unwillingness to allocate funds collected at health facilities towards improving local 
health systems. Several county government stakeholders and technical experts felt 
that many county governments often paid lip service to UHC, focusing on enrolling 
residents into the NHIF but not on providing the required capital investment into 
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healthcare facilities. This strategy, in their view, was counterproductive and risked 
exacerbating poor healthcare service provision at the local level.  
Concurrently, while acknowledging efforts to increase the population’s access to 
healthcare services through the NHIF, stakeholders across the policy divide expressed 
concern that there had been insufficient focus on increasing the number of NHIF-
empanelled healthcare facilities that target under-served populations.  
 
“Those in pastoralist and sparsely-populated communities may have to travel up to 
seventy kilometres to access healthcare services even after paying for NHIF. That 
doesn’t add up” (Development partner) 
 
Respondents acknowledged that the requirements for NHIF empanelment were often 
too high to be achieved by lower-level healthcare facilities, which were over-
represented in rural areas. This in turn led to an imbalanced system where healthcare 
facilities in urban and wealthier areas were over-represented on the NHIF-approved 
facilities list.  
Further, while some counties were collaborating with the NHIF to increase empanelled 
facilities, several respondents deplored what they viewed as political interference in 
the empanelment process. It was intimated that some counties had lobbied for lower-
quality facilities to be empanelled by the NHIF, which had led to concerns about 
maintaining the quality of care in NHIF-approved facilities. In order to mitigate this, 
respondents suggested strengthening the NHIF accreditation and quality improvement 
system. Details on how this would be achieved were, however, scarce. 
In order to mitigate concerns on the resilience and adaptability of local healthcare 
service provision, several technical experts proposed that the national and county 
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governments work to create distinct public-private healthcare networks with defined 
roles. County stakeholders also highlighted the integral role of preventative health in 
relieving pressure on the healthcare delivery system, suggesting that: 
 
“We must put a lot of emphasis on prevention of these diseases… A lot of diseases 
that we have in this region are communicable diseases.” (County stakeholder)  
 
Healthcare service provision 
When probed about Kenya’s essential healthcare benefit package, we observed a lack 
of consensus in the views expressed by the different policy networks. While a majority 
of development partners and technical experts lamented what they viewed as a broad 
and arbitrary healthcare benefit package, most NHIF and county stakeholders 
expressed satisfaction with the current voluntary NHIF healthcare benefit package. All 
stakeholders tasked the Ministry of Health with the responsibility of applying strong 
technical expertise in order to define and cost a realistic minimum healthcare benefit 
package that could be offered on a large scale in the country.  
 
“The Ministry of Health must own the process of defining the minimum health 
benefit package, regardless of who is financing it. We must not allow other parties 
to dictate to them” (Technical expert) 
 
We observed that the several stakeholders did not distinguish between the Kenya 
Essential Package for Health Services (KEPHS) – which highlights the universal 
minimum entitlements to be provided to all Kenyans in an equitable manner – and the 
NHIF healthcare benefit package during the course of the interviews. Only a single 
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technical expert explicitly articulated the need to definitively consider which KEPHS 
entitlements could realistically be offered through the NHIF, given the exclusion of 
several levels of healthcare providers from the NHIF-selected facilities.  
Stakeholders who expressed concerns about the sustainability of Kenya’s healthcare 
benefit package attributed their unease to political interference by the country’s 
President, and technical incapacity at the Ministry of Health.  
 
“The issue at the Ministry of Health has to do with knowledge and capacity… and is 
probably what has led to fragmentation of approaches on the implementation of 
UHC” (Development partner) 
 
Technical expert and development partner respondents articulated the need to revise 
the country’s minimum healthcare benefit package in line with the financial realities 
and epidemiological profile of the country, as well as a strong evidence base of cost-
effectiveness, risk, and equity. They further suggested that the private sector’s role lay 
in providing top-up insurance over and above the minimum healthcare benefit package.  
 
4.4.4 Cost-sharing and user fees 
Although most respondents expected UHC to reduce out-of-pocket payments for the 
Kenyan public, our findings uncovered a disconnect between stakeholders on the level 
of cost-sharing acceptable for receiving healthcare services in Kenya. While all county 
stakeholders interviewed envisaged co-payments by members of the public ceasing in 
their entirety under the UHC framework, some technical experts suggested that 
maintaining a moderate level of co-payment would help in controlling moral hazard in 
Kenyan hospitals. It was not clear which services respondents expected would be 
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subject to co-payment, although one respondent suggested limiting them to services 
beyond the minimum health benefit package. 
According to stakeholders, cost-sharing in the Kenyan context is largely executed at 
facility level, with responsibility falling upon three major players: the national 
government; county governments, and the NHIF. A minority of technical experts 
advocated for a tax-based health financing system, citing the implausibility of achieving 
UHC through the NHIF. Several technical experts opined that the national 
government’s role in cost-sharing had been negated by the 2012 Constitution, which 
devolved most healthcare functions to the sub-national level. Nevertheless, they noted 
that the national government still had a major role to play in revenue raising for the 
sub-national level and subsidising the NHIF.  
 
“Counties don’t have a leeway to source for financial support from outside countries 
without going through the national government. So, the national government remains 
a key instrument.” (Development partner) 
 
Indeed, it was observed that the availability of healthcare funding at county level was 
limited: according to the Kenyan legislative framework, funding collected from local 
healthcare facilities is required to be placed in a general county revenue collection 
account with no obligation for its subsequent allocation to health services. Given the 
pervasive link between county budgets and medium-term political goals, respondents 
expressed concern about the sustainability of revenue raising for health at sub-national 
level. 
When queried about their concerns on cost-sharing in Kenya’s health system, 
stakeholders across policy networks observed that the stability of resource mobilisation 
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for health would determine the level and sustainability of cost-sharing measures 
undertaken. At the national level, there was consensus that the diminishing healthcare 
funding was a major risk to revenue stability, linking it both to reduced donor funding 
as well as reduced government funding to the NHIF. NHIF stakeholders noted that 
national budget allocations to health had not matched political rhetoric on expanding 
the organisation’s population and service coverage. In order to navigate the reduced 
national financial allocations to health, several NHIF stakeholders and technical 
experts endorsed the pooling of parallel funding sources into the NHIF in order to 
increase its resource base. Some county and technical expert stakeholders also 
suggested aligning the minimum universal health entitlements to the financial 
constraints of the national government, with one technical expert stating: 
 
“We need to figure out our ability to mobilise resources… Following that, we need to 
determine the range of services that … we can offer for free”. (Technical expert) 
 
County stakeholders expressed frustration about what they viewed as the offloading of 
healthcare functions to county level without the necessary financial support being 
provided by national government. As an example, respondents pointed towards the 
national government’s purchase of unnecessary medical equipment, which they felt 
overstepped its governance role and diverted much-needed funds from the health 
system. Concurrently, NHIF stakeholders and technical experts felt that county 
governments had not used allocated health funds efficiently, pointing towards the 
return of allocated health funds to the National Treasury at the end of the financial year. 
Respondents blamed a “lack of understanding of budgeting processes” and “lack of 
accountability and efficiency” for these problems.  
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At facility level, stakeholders across policy networks considered the availability of NHIF 
funding as integral in aiding cost-sharing processes. A number of technical experts 
noted the lack of agreement on financing modalities to facilitate co-payment at facility 
level. Respondents further noted what they viewed as unfair NHIF reimbursement 
processes against public facilities, with a county stakeholder opining: 
 
“… NHIF reimbursements do not come as quickly as those for private facilities… My 
assumption is those who can pay a bribe get their reimbursement faster” (County 
stakeholder) 
 
These responses amplified concerns punctuated throughout our interviews about 
corruption within the NHIF. NHIF stakeholders did not however, share these concerns.
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4.5 Discussion 
In this study, we sought to ascertain the core values underpinning Kenya’s move 
towards UHC. In doing so, we examined the political economy of UHC in Kenya and 
its impact on the country’s health financing decisions.  
It is clear from the outset that Kenyan stakeholders recognise UHC as a major goal in 
the country’s health policy and priority-setting landscape. While the robust dialogue 
within Kenya’s health policy circles signals intentionality to create a path towards UHC, 
our findings suggest that the national government has been unable to centre itself as 
the main steward of this policy objective. As a result, there is a perception that the 
country lacks a centralised, systematic and inclusive process through which this 
agenda can be driven, leading to a cacophony of interpretations of UHC’s contextual 
objectives and special considerations. This necessitates an interrogation of the 
country-specific principles on which Kenya’s potential UHC and health financing 
priorities are likely to be based.  
Conflicting policy positions aside, progressive universalism has emerged as the 
preferred approach towards UHC in Kenya, with most interviewees prioritising an 
equity-based approach towards increasing access to healthcare services and financial 
risk protection. This strategy is particularly pertinent in the Kenya setting given the 
regressive nature of its household healthcare contributions and the impact of multi-
dimensional factors on the health system’s responsiveness and resilience 
(74,197,198). Our findings suggest that stakeholders across the policy divide are 
particularly supportive of systemic health financing and service delivery measures that 
counterbalance geographic and socioeconomic inequities in the Kenyan healthcare 
system. For example, there is broad support for the full subsidisation of indigents at 
county-level in order to optimise fairness in means-testing. Similarly, stakeholders are 
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sensitive towards disparities in health facility distribution in Kenya, suggesting a push 
towards geographic equity through the creation of strategic public-private healthcare 
networks. These findings align to a pro-poor approach towards UHC that prioritises 
equity and equality, and underline a commitment towards a more holistic healthcare 
approach under the UHC banner (199–202). While support for progressive 
universalism in Kenya’s UHC push seems unequivocal, the conflicting priorities of key 
stakeholders complicate the likelihood of jumpstarting progress towards this policy 
objective. Our findings reveal material differences between and within policy networks 
on the country’s priorities for population coverage, healthcare service provision, and 
cost-sharing under the UHC dispensation. We hypothesise that the lack of strategic 
leadership from Kenya’s national and county governments risks derailing progress 
towards the expansion of access to health services and financial risk protection.  
In terms of population coverage, there seems to be unanimity on the central role of the 
NHIF in expanding population risk pooling within the Kenyan population. Our findings, 
however, suggest divergence on two priority issues that may compromise the success 
of population coverage efforts: systemic support for a robust population identification 
mechanism; and clarity on stakeholder roles in the financial coverage of priority 
population groups. While existing NHIF reforms are timely (203–205), concerns remain 
about the Fund’s ability to incorporate under-served communities in an equitable, 
efficient and participatory manner. Indeed, stakeholders across the policy divide were 
apprehensive about NHIF efforts to effectively identify informal sector members for 
enrolment, highlighting inefficiencies in its current population identification and means-
testing mechanisms. One major concern raised was the feasibility of county-level 
population targeting efforts, with respondents decrying irregular CHW payment policies 
between counties. In addition to considerations on population sensitisation and 
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targeting, stakeholders revealed a lack of financial commitment by national and county 
governments as a key barrier towards achieving universal population health coverage. 
While stakeholders across policy circles agreed on the necessity of protecting indigents 
from the undue financial pressure of ill health, our findings suggest an unwillingness 
by county and national governments to provide the long-term financial support needed 
to facilitate the protection of indigents from the undue financial pressure of ill health. 
This discordance threatens the success of Kenya’s efforts towards population risk 
pooling, and reiterate the need for clarity and willingness to support the subsidisation 
of health costs for vulnerable groups.  
When queried about health service coverage, we observed discordance between 
policy networks on the range of healthcare services to be provided to the Kenyan 
population as part of the country’s UHC efforts. Stakeholders stated priorities were 
highly dogmatic, with government stakeholders preferring a broad set of healthcare 
services that prioritised socially-acceptable outcomes, and technical experts and 
development partners endorsing a limited costed essential healthcare benefit package 
based on a strong evidence-based process. We note that since the completion of our 
study, the Kenyan Ministry of Health has embarked on efforts to cost an essential 
healthcare benefit package (206). While the implementation of this evidence-based 
process is laudable and necessary, it is important to leverage this process against an 
understanding of the key value considerations that drive resource allocation in health. 
Indeed, it is acknowledged that technical approaches towards priority-setting are often 
not adhered to in the real-world setting, making it important to understand the drivers 
of Kenya’s health priorities outside of its budgetary, epidemiological and technical 
considerations (9,12,207). Our findings also reveal systemic ambiguity on the role of 
different players in providing access to the Kenyan essential benefit package. 
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According to stakeholders, three key healthcare service purchasers should exist within 
the realm of UHC in the Kenyan context: national and county governments, the NHIF, 
and private health insurance providers. It is clear from our findings that stakeholders 
believe that the role of purchasing healthcare services outside of the essential 
healthcare benefit package should fall to private health insurance providers. There is, 
however, a lack of articulation on how purchasing for the essential healthcare benefit 
package should be split between the county departments of health and the NHIF in an 
efficient and coherent manner. This is a key consideration that should be clarified and 
articulated in order to prevent inefficiencies within the system. 
In terms of cost-sharing, the limited financial investment by national and county 
governments into Kenya’s health goals remains a hindrance towards UHC efforts, with 
stakeholders expressing uncertainty about their commitment towards the country’s 
health agenda. Indeed, annual budget documents suggest that national government 
contributions towards the UHC agenda have largely stagnated in direct opposition to 
its policy rhetoric (185,191,195). Given that the national government bears 
responsibility for the coverage of the costs associated with the essential health benefit 
package, this calls into question the feasibility of implementing the full subsidisation of 
these health costs. Further, county departments of health are often reliant upon 
haphazard disbursements from county governments to fund existing health programs. 
The vast majority of this funding goes towards covering the wage bill for healthcare 
workers, thereby limiting counties’ ability to invest in infrastructure and service 
improvement, or further subsidisation of health costs for indigents. Technical experts 
further expressed frustration about the efficiency of the use of financial disbursements 
at county level, with several counties returning existing funding due to systemic 
inefficiencies. Given that the achievement of UHC is reliant upon cost-sharing for 
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healthcare services between governments and their citizens, this lack of substantive 
commitment by Kenya’s financial bureaucracy risks maintaining a high level of financial 
risk amongst the Kenyan population (202). 
In light of the emerging gaps in interpretation of UHC in the Kenyan setting, there 
remain significant challenges in the country’s ability to offer accessible health services 
and financial risk protection to all its citizens. Unless appropriate action is taken to 
remedy these divergence, Kenya’s health system will continue to be regressive due to 
its reliance on household contributions through out-of-pocket payments (77). It is 
therefore imperative for the national government to implement a strong governance 
system focused on defining a common and realistic set of health system values, as 
well as creating a strong policy, legal, institutional and regulatory framework to support 
the progressive achievement of UHC in Kenya.  
While our study provides an important starting point for the discussion on UHC value 
setting in Kenya, there are several considerations that limit the generalisability of our 
findings. We faced difficulties in interviewing several national stakeholders, thereby 
missing some important perspectives on the topic under research. Nevertheless, we 
made the effort to interview these stakeholders’ technical advisors in order to mitigate 
this omission. Due to resource limitations, we limited our study at county level to 
stakeholders from one of the fifty-two counties. This means that while our results may 
be relevant across the country due to the inclusion of national stakeholders, it would 
be difficult to generalise the responses of county stakeholders. In spite of these 
limitations, we note that this is the first study in Kenya seeking to understand health 
financing agenda setting under the UHC umbrella. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This study adds to existing knowledge of UHC in Kenya by rationalising and 
contextualising the values and priorities driving the process within the county. As such, 
it provides new insights about the broad range of considerations that should be taken 
into account as the country strategises over its UHC process. These insights are 
particularly pertinent, given the need to adjust current provisions of UHC in Kenya in 
line with the populations needs and realities.  
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Key messages 
Household heads are more likely to enrol into voluntary health insurance if involved in 
social networks, regardless of gender. 
Women prioritise their direct knowledge of potential household health risks when 
evaluating the decision to enrol voluntary health insurance enrolment.   
However, income ultimately determines women’s ability to participate in health 
insurance schemes. 
When purchasing health insurance, men prioritise on their understanding of household 
health risks, which is linked to their education and age. 
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5.1 Abstract 
Within existing health financing literature, males are typically categorised as the 
household’s decision-makers. While this view accurately reflects many local 
sociocultural realities, approximately a quarter of sub-Saharan African households are 
now headed by females. With efforts to increase health insurance coverage ongoing 
in many countries, it is necessary to examine whether the factors influencing voluntary 
health insurance enrolment are analogous across male- and female-headed 
households. This study sought to examine the gendered determinants of voluntary 
enrolment into a church-run micro health insurance scheme. A cross-sectional survey 
of 550 households was carried out in Bui and Donga-Mantung Divisions of North-West 
Cameroon in May 2016. A structured questionnaire was administered on health 
insurance membership; household attributes; headship characteristics; and health-
seeking behaviour. We assessed the influence of gender on the associations between 
health insurance enrolment and the explanatory variables using logistic regression. 
Our study found that voluntary health insurance demand was influenced by 
involvement in social networks regardless of gender. Ultimately, however, men’s 
enrolment decision was associated with their understanding of health insurance, while 
economically-empowered women tended to act in consideration of household welfare. 
Men’s demand for health insurance was correlated primarily with their education level 
(OR=2.238 [CI:1.228–2.552]), as well as with their socio-economic status (OR=2.207 
[CI:1.173–4.153]), age (OR=2.238 [CI:1.151–4.352]), and trust of the insurance 
provider (OR=4.770 [CI: 2.407–9.453]). Conversely, women’s enrolment decision was 
primarily associated with their income levels (OR=5.842 [CI:1.589-21.484]), as well as 
by the presence of children (OR=3.734 [CI:1.228–11.348]). The influence of wealth on 
health insurance enrolment highlights the need for policymakers to subsidise health 
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insurance schemes for vulnerable population groups. Further, it is imperative to 
develop sensitisation campaigns that are simple and digestible to facilitate 
understanding of health insurance across all target groups. 
 
 
5.2 Introduction 
Within existing health financing research, males are typically categorised as the 
gatekeepers in the decision to enrol into voluntary health insurance. While this view 
accurately reflects local sociocultural realities in the developing world, many sub-
Saharan African countries have been experiencing an increase in female-led 
households: In Cameroon, for example, women now head 26% of households (97). 
This necessitates an examination of whether the factors influencing voluntary health 
insurance enrolment are analogous across male- and female-headed households. This 
study seeks to identify if and how the gender of the household head influences 
enrolment into a voluntary micro health insurance scheme in North-West Cameroon. It 
further aims to analyse the influence, if any, of entrenched gender household roles on 
the decision to enrol. 
In many low- and middle-income countries, there is increasing recognition of the 
debilitating financial impact of illness on households (98–100). Against this backdrop, 
governments and health financing stakeholders have endorsed prepaid healthcare as 
the preferred approach for reducing out-of-pocket expenditure and facilitating access 
to health services (101). This has largely taken the form of risk-pooling mechanisms in 
developing countries, with many governments striving to develop functional and 
inclusive health insurance schemes (102–104). However, due to budgetary constraints 
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and complexities in identifying the informal sector, many African governments have 
been unable to achieve large-scale health insurance coverage (31,105,106). This has 
led to the proliferation of private micro health insurance schemes targeting those who 
would otherwise suffer from a disproportionate risk of impoverishment due to illness 
(107,108). Crucially, these schemes are voluntary, and depend upon an active decision 
by households to purchase the health benefit package.  
In order to better understand the factors which influence one’s likelihood to seek health 
insurance coverage, a range of studies have investigated the determinants of voluntary 
enrolment across various African settings. This work has largely focused on identifying 
the individual and household drivers of enrolment, with household size and 
composition; socioeconomic status (SES); and education level emerging as major 
determinants of voluntary health insurance enrolment (109–122). Most of these studies 
have approached the analysis of health financing decision-making from a patriarchal 
point of view, reflecting the established sociocultural conventions in the study areas. 
This approach, however, may no longer be fully representative of current household 
structures, given that 26% of sub-Saharan African households are now headed by 
females (123).  
The increase in female-led households in various sub-Saharan African countries may 
be attributed to several documented patterns in migration and epidemiology: 
widespread male economic migration to urban areas has resulted in de facto female 
household headship in many rural areas (124,125). Further, females are likely to live 
longer than males despite higher reported incidences of chronic diseases and 
exposure to death through childbirth (126). These realities underscore the need to 
explore the driving factors of voluntary health insurance enrolment not just from the 
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perspective of normative social convention, but also with a pragmatic view of existing 
household headship structures.  
In this regard, there remains a dearth of literature on the role of women as primary 
agents in the decision to enrol into voluntary health insurance. Most relevant studies 
have investigated the ability of health insurance schemes to reach women as a 
vulnerable demographic, but not as the decision-makers driving the demand for health 
insurance (115,127). To the authors’ knowledge, only a single study has been carried 
out investigating the gendered determinants of voluntary health insurance enrolment 
in the African context. Dixon et al. carried out a comparative analysis of the factors 
associated with voluntary health insurance in Ghana, and found crucial educational, 
socioeconomic, and marital differences between male and female individuals (112). 
While this work presents an important first step in the analysis of the gender dynamics 
in health insurance demand, Dixon et al. did not consider the role of gendered 
household headship in the decision to enrol. This means that there is still a significant 
knowledge gap on the influence of gender on voluntary health insurance demand when 
decision-making autonomy is acquired. 
Precursory insight into the relationship between gender and healthcare decision-
making may be gained from health-seeking behaviour literature, where several reviews 
have investigated the intersection between household roles and the decision to seek 
external health care. A systematic review by Colvin et al. on health-seeking behaviour 
found that timely treatment of sick household members is inextricably linked to the level 
of influence held by the mother on the final decision to seek external care (128). This 
study also noted that male partners are typically only involved in the care-seeking 
pathway as the decision-makers of the economic and medical case for seeking outside 
care. Congruently, a global review of morbidity and mortality literature found that 
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autonomy amongst mothers was associated with better overall health status amongst 
children in the household (129). These studies allude to potential gendered differences 
in the consideration of health-related decisions: they suggest that the divisional roles 
intrinsic within the household lead men and women to evaluate health risks differently. 
Based on this, we hypothesise that women are likely to prioritise their direct knowledge 
of the household’s potential healthcare needs when making healthcare decisions. 
Conversely, we hypothesise that men are likely to prioritise their understanding of 
potential health risks.  
 
 
5.3 Materials and Methods 
5.3.1 Research setting 
The Bamenda Ecclesiastical Provincial Health Assistance (BEPHA) Scheme is a micro 
health insurance scheme set up by the Roman Catholic Church in North-West and 
South-West Cameroon. It consists of four independently-operated schemes in 
Bamenda, Buea, Kumbo and Mamfe Parishes covering a total of 35,224 individuals as 
of November 2016 (130). For the purposes of this study, we will be focusing on the 
BEPHA Kumbo Scheme.  
The BEPHA Kumbo Scheme is active in the Bui and Donga-Mantung administrative 
divisions of North-West Cameroon. The North-West region is plagued by poor health 
outcomes, including the highest HIV prevalence rate in Cameroon (8.7%). It also 
suffers from a high malaria prevalence of 20% (131). Poor health outcomes in this 
region are exacerbated by steep out-of-pocket costs: according to the country’s 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), North-West Cameroon has the second-
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highest level of health spending in Cameroon in the event of illness, in spite of 
accounting for 13% of the country’s poor (89,97).  
Membership of the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme is voluntary with a minimum enrolment 
unit of four individuals. The annual premium per individual is set at FCFA 4000 (US$ 
6.80 in May 2016) and is paid in a maximum of three instalments. BEPHA annual 
coverage starts in either June or November. However, coverage within educational 
institutions begins in October in line with the annual academic calendar. The BEPHA 
benefit package covers three-quarters of the cost of inpatient services; delivery 
services; outpatient services; and surgery respectively. Enrolees are permitted to 
access BEPHA inpatient and outpatient care benefits twice annually, while surgery and 
maternity care can only be reimbursed once annually. BEPHA applies maximum cost 
ceilings for each of the offered services in order to ensure financial sustainability: FCFA 
15000 (US$ 25.50) for outpatient services and maternity services respectively; FCFA 
25000 (US$ 42.50) for inpatient services; and FCFA 70000 (US$ 119.00) for surgery. 
 
5.3.2 Study design  
A cross-sectional household survey was carried out in the Bui and Donga-Mantung 
divisions of North-West Cameroon between April and May 2016. All administrative sub-
divisions of Bui and Donga-Mantung were eligible for sampling. For operational 
reasons, the study was conducted in the sub-divisions where more than 30 households 
were enrolled into the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme.  
The study had two distinct aims: (i) to estimate the proportion of the population with 
BEPHA health insurance, and (ii) to assess the effect of explanatory variables on this 
proportion. For the first aim, we based the sample size on the ability to estimate the 
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proportion insured with a certain precision - in this case, with an expected BEPHA 
population coverage of 4%. This coverage rate was obtained from the BEPHA 
membership Audit carried out in FY 2015-2016 (130). Using the Hayes and Bennett 
equation and taking into account clustering in nine sub-districts, the required sample 
size for the first study aim was calculated to be 416 households with the precision of a 
95% confidence interval with width of 2% to 6% (132).  
The number of households interviewed in each sub-division was proportional to its 
demographic size (133), and we assumed that the measure of variability between 
clusters k, the standard deviation divided by the mean, was equal to 0.1 (132). As a 
sampling frame was not readily available for the study area, we randomly selected 
starting points within outposts in each sub-division. We subsequently carried out 
systematic sampling, with every nth household interviewed. Approximately 98% of the 
targeted households could be interviewed. 
In order to achieve the second study aim of estimating the factors associated with 
health insurance enrolment, we sampled additional insured households from the 
BEPHA membership list. BEPHA’s internal client management system stratifies 
insured households according to their sub-division of residence and randomly assigns 
membership numbers. In order to optimise our sample of insured households to 
address the second study aim, we selected every nth number from the BEPHA 
membership list. In total, 174 insured households were randomly selected stratifying 
by sub-division, from the BEPHA Kumbo membership list. These households were 
chosen from the same sub-divisions within which the random population sampling was 
conducted. Approximately 80% of these households could be identified and 
interviewed. 
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5.3.3 Survey tools and data analysis 
The survey was administered as a structured questionnaire using Open Data Kit (ODK) 
software on handheld tablets to answer questions on household composition; 
household assets; household expenditure and consumption; and health-seeking 
behaviour. Research assistants who were fluent in Pidgin English and the local dialect, 
Lam Nso’, and who had knowledge of the local geographical and sociocultural context 
were hired. Training was provided to familiarise research assistants with the 
questionnaire and data collection using handheld tablets. 
Insured households were defined as those where at least one member was enrolled 
into the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme in the year preceding the study. The household head 
was defined as the household member whose income contributed to at least half of the 
household’s costs in the preceding years. The household head’s gender was defined 
as the self-reported sex of the household head. De facto female household headship 
was assumed in households where no male adults lived for the preceding year. 
The data were analysed using STATA version 14.1 for Windows (STATA Corporation, 
College Station, Texas). The main outcome variable was health insurance enrolment 
into the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme. The explanatory variables were divided into five 
components: household composition and attributes; household head factors; 
perceived household health status; and proxies for exposure to financial risk pooling.  
In order to assess asset-based wealth, we constructed an asset index from the 
Cameroonian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) index which measures the 
relative wealth ranking of households (134). Household per capita consumption was 
calculated as the annual food, non-food, and consumer durables consumption per 
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household member. Mean perceived health status was calculated as the average self-
reported health status value for all household members. The final value of the mean 
perceived health status was assigned a value of between 1 and 4, with 1 being “very 
good” health status; 2 being “good” health status; 3 being “poor” health status; and 4 
being “very poor” health status. Chronic disease status in the context of this study was 
attributed on the basis of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10) (135). 
We used logistic regression to estimate the association between the explanatory 
variables and health insurance enrolment, with random effects for sub-division and 
outpost to account for the clustering in the sample. Our study utilised two regression 
models. The first model measured the association of each variable and health 
insurance enrolment within each gender group. The second model included interaction 
terms for gender and each explanatory variable to determine the influence of gender 
on the association of each variable and health insurance enrolment. 
 
 
5.3.4 Ethical approval 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained through the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) of the Catholic University of Cameroon in Bamenda, North-West Cameroon 
(Ethics Reference No. 001/HEPM/CATUC-IRB/16; Date of approval: 17th May 2016). 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Study population characteristics 
Table 1 reports the differences in each test variable according to insurance status and 
gender of the household head. A total of 550 households were enumerated in the 
survey, with male-headed households accounting for 70% of the study population. 80% 
of male-headed and 89% of female-headed households lived in rural areas, reflecting 
the largely rural nature of the population in the Bui and Donga-Mantung Divisions. 
Approximately 28% of male- and 36% of women-headed households were enrolled 
into BEPHA micro health insurance.  
The descriptive statistics for the sample population were similar across gender lines in 
terms of location, and the household head’s age, self-employment status, and religion. 
Overall, male and female household heads had an average age of 48.0 years, with a 
self-employment rate of 65%. The sample was predominantly Catholic (67%), 
highlighting BEPHA’s affiliation with the Church. The gender groups also showed 
similarities in their reported health status, with 6% of all households reporting the 
presence of chronic disease. 
We found important distinctions between male- and female-headed households in 
several household composition and socioeconomic characteristics. Male-headed 
households had more uniformity in the number of males and females within the 
household compared to their female counterparts. They were also more likely to be in 
the wealthiest socioeconomic quintile and have higher incomes than female-headed 
households. Female-headed households, on the other hand, were typically smaller in 
size, had more female than male household members, and were more likely to be 
located in a rural setting. Households also differed in their marital status, with 91% of 
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male household heads living within a marriage setting compared to 40% of female 
household heads who were widowed.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by gender and insurance status  
 
1 Results reported as Mean (Standard Deviation) 
2 Results reported as Median (Interquartile Range) 
Mean exchange rate for May 2016: US$1 = FCFA 588.24 
 
 Male  Female  
 Insured 
(n=105) 
Uninsured 
(n=275) 
Combined 
(n=380) 
Insured 
(n=61) 
Uninsured 
(n=109) 
Combined 
(n=170) 
Household characteristics 
Urban location 27% 18% 20% 11% 11% 11% 
Mean household size 1 5.81 (2.33) 5.66 (2.79) 5.70 (2.67) 4.95 (2.17) 4.43 (2.48) 4.61 (2.38) 
Household sex ratio (males to 
females) 1 
1.194 
(0.969) 
1.273 
(0.979) 
1.250 
(0.974) 
0.762 
(0.788) 
0.631 
(0.669) 
0.674 
(0.714) 
Households with children <=5 
years 
57% 60% 59% 41% 51% 48% 
Households with children 
<=15 years 
85% 85% 85% 90% 75% 81% 
Households with elderly >=60 
years 
32% 26% 28% 34% 28% 30% 
Average socioeconomic 
status (SES) score 2 
0.492 
(0.965) 
0.317 
(0.834) 
0.365 
(0.875) 
0.318 
(0.674) 
0.189 
(0.677) 
0.236 
(0.677) 
% of poor households (Q1-Q2) 36% 40% 39% 39% 45% 43% 
% of rich households (Q5) 30% 20% 23% 20% 9% 13% 
Household head characteristics 
Average age 2 49 (13.23) 47 (15.11) 48 (14.60) 49 (12.46) 47 (16.00) 48 (14.95) 
Literate 94% 76% 81% 77% 63% 68% 
Primary-level education 50% 41% 44% 54% 40% 45% 
Secondary-level education 21% 24% 23% 18% 19% 19% 
Higher-level education  23% 9% 13% 5% 3% 4% 
Married household heads 94% 90% 91% 28% 27% 27% 
Low income (≤ 47,000 FCFA) 50% 48% 49% 57% 60% 59% 
Proportion of Catholic faith 87% 57% 66% 87% 61% 71% 
Household health status 
Mean health status 1 
1.96 
(0.672) 
1.96 (0.67) 1.96 (0.67) 2.01 (0.76) 1.86 (0.74) 1.92 (0.76) 
Presence of chronic disease 8% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 
Use of curative services 
Outpatient service use in past 
30 days 
42% 35% 37% 33% 25% 28% 
Inpatient service use in past 
year 
42% 35% 37% 31% 28% 29% 
Annual per capita health 
expenditure (FCFA) 2 
5000 
(10500) 
4500 
(11750) 
5000 
(11634) 
5000 
(9500) 
5000 
(12500) 
5000 
(12500) 
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5.4.2 Factors associated with voluntary health insurance enrolment 
amongst male- and female-headed households 
Our study identified several commonalities amongst male- and female-headed 
households in the characteristics associated with health insurance demand. 
Regardless of gender, we found that Catholic Church membership was correlated to 
one’s likelihood of enrolling into BEPHA health insurance (OR=4.770 [CI: 2.407 – 
9.453] for males and OR=2.926 [CI: 1.076 – 7.953] for females). Practices in social 
solidarity were also found to be associated with BEPHA health insurance enrolment 
across genders: both male and female household heads showed higher odds of 
purchasing health insurance if they belonged to informal savings groups known as 
njangis (OR=2.301 [CI: 1.302 – 4.064] for males and OR=3.146 [CI: 1.429 – 6.921] for 
females).  
In spite of these broad convergences, we found that the influencing factors of BEPHA 
insurance enrolment differed depending on the gender of the household head. 
Amongst male household heads, demand for health insurance was correlated to their 
socioeconomic status, age, education level, and their trust of the insurance provider. 
Our study found that men belonging to the highest asset-based wealth quintile had 
2.207 higher odds of enrolling into health insurance compared to those with lower 
asset-based wealth (CI: 1.173 – 4.153). Older age was also identified as a significant 
contributor to health insurance enrolment, with male household heads aged above 50 
years showing increased health insurance demand compared to their younger 
counterparts (OR=2.238 [CI: 1.151 – 4.352]). Further, men educated to secondary 
school-level and above showing 2.238 higher odds of enrolment compared to those 
with lower education levels (CI: 1.228 – 2.552). Finally, we found that male household 
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heads were more likely to enrol if they expressed confidence in the Church as a 
potential health insurance provider (OR=4.770 [CI: 2.407 – 9.453]). 
Amongst female-headed households, the decision to enrol into BEPHA health 
insurance was associated with household composition and income. Our study found 
that demand for BEPHA health insurance amongst female-headed households was 
correlated to the presence of children below the age of fifteen (OR=3.734 [CI: 1.228 – 
11.348]). Women who earned higher incomes were also more likely to purchase 
BEPHA health insurance: the study found that women who earned earning above 
47000 FCFA had 5.842 higher odds of enrolling into health insurance than those 
earning less (CI: 1.589 – 21.484).  
When the interactions between gender, health insurance membership, and the 
explanatory variables were taken into account, we found that Catholic Church and 
njangi membership was correlated to health insurance demand in both male- and 
female-headed households (p-value=0.332 for Catholic Church membership, and p-
value=0.421 for njangi membership respectively). Income and education, however, 
were found to have varied associations with the decision to enrol into health insurance 
depending on the gender of the household head. Amongst female-headed households, 
we found that health insurance enrolment was associated with high income levels (p-
value=0.037) – a finding that was non-significant amongst male-headed households. 
Conversely, male-headed households with higher levels of education were found to 
have higher demand for BEPHA health insurance (p-value=0.008). This finding was 
non-significant amongst female-headed households. We found no further evidence of 
a relationship between the gender of the household head, BEPHA membership and 
other explanatory variables. 
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Table 3: Logistic estimates for probability of purchasing BEPHA health insurance at household level 
 Male Female Interaction 
Variable description Odds ratio CI Odds ratio CI p-value 
Household characteristics 
Location (Reference group: Rural) 
Urban 1.378 0.646 – 2.939 1.063 0.211 – 5.354 0.78 
Number of children <5 years (Reference group: None) 
One to two children 0.826 0.503 – 1.357 0.977 0.451 – 2.116 0.67 
Three or more children 0.933 0.373 – 2.333 0.151 0.168 – 1.357 0.13 
Presence of children < 15 years 1.143 0.567 – 2.306 3.734 1.228 – 11.348 0.051 
Presence of elderly household members 1.301 0.756 – 2.269 1.072 0.484 – 2.376 0.83 
Socioeconomic status (Reference group: Poor) 
Middle wealth 0.722 0.431-1.210 0.760 0.355 – 1.630 0.78 
Wealthiest quintile 2.207 1.173 – 4.153 2.698 0.825 – 8.826 0.94 
Household head characteristics 
Age (Reference group: Under-35) 
35 – 50 years 1.223 0.743 – 2.013 1.543 0.728 – 3.271 0.46 
Older than 50 years 2.238 1.151 – 4.352 1.916 0.697 – 5.264 0.82 
Education (Reference group: Primary education or less) 
Secondary education or more 1.770 1.228 – 2.552 1.554 0.903 – 2.675 0.008 
Monthly income (Reference group: No income) 
<23500 FCFA 0.576 0.322 – 1.029 0.559 0.257 – 1.214 0.93 
23500 – 47000 FCFA 1.658 0.902 – 3.047 1.883 0.707 – 5.020 0.86 
>47000 FCFA 1.401 0.810 – 2.425 5.842 1.589 –21.484 0.037 
Married 1.898 0.709 – 5.081 1.259 0.542 – 2.927 0.56 
Catholic religion 4.770 2.407 – 9.453 2.926 1.076 – 7.953 0.33 
Household health status 
Mean perceived household health status 
Good 1.043 0.621 – 1.751 0.860 0.399 – 1.854 0.49 
Poor 0.959 0.571 – 1.601 1.163 0.539 – 2.507 0.49 
Presence of chronic illness in household 1.519 0.574 – 4.018 0.795 0.128 – 4.924 0.99 
Exposure to concept of financial risk protection 
Member of informal savings group 
(njangi) 
2.301 1.302 – 4.064 3.146 1.429 – 6.921 0.42 
Trust BEPHA health insurance provider 5.170 2.365–11.301 2.830 0.884 – 9.061 0.23 
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5.5 Discussion 
In this study, we set out to expand the narrative on decision-making in voluntary health 
insurance by looking at how the gender of a household head influences voluntary 
health insurance enrolment. It is important to acknowledge from the outset that 
commonalities exist between male- and female-headed households, with the 
overarching influence of social networks on health insurance demand. Based on our 
findings, it is clear that involvement in networks that encourage solidarity and 
reciprocity, such as njangis and the Catholic Church, increase one’s likelihood of 
enrolling into voluntary health insurance regardless of gender. This reflects existing 
studies which have highlighted the importance of social solidarity as a key determinant 
of voluntary health insurance schemes demand (136,137).  
It is apparent within existing literature that the decision to enrol into voluntary health 
insurance is multidimensional and complex, driven in part by aversion to the risk of 
illness (138). We propose that the evaluation of health risks manifests differently 
between male and female household heads due to their unique household roles in the 
study setting. We therefore postulate that women prioritise their direct knowledge of 
the household’s healthcare needs in the decision to enrol into health insurance. 
Conversely, we suggest that men prioritise their understanding of potential health risks 
associated with their households. How does this reconcile with existing knowledge of 
health insurance and the everyday realities of household power structures? 
Within existing literature, it is acknowledged that the burden of caregiving is borne 
primarily by women – a dynamic that is particularly pronounced in the occurrence of 
illness in the domestic framework (128,129). This underlying knowledge of the 
physical, psychological, and economic cost of illness elevates the female voice as 
imperative in understanding and assessing household health risks. In the traditional 
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hierarchy dominant within North-West Cameroon, however, female influence is often 
relegated in decision-making due to their subordinate status (139). This means that, in 
the absence of direct knowledge of household health needs, male household heads 
are compelled to act on the basis of their appreciation of potential household health 
risks. Our findings suggest that this is primarily shaped by their level of education, 
which aligns to other health financing studies across Africa (111–113,115,116). We 
posit that an advanced level of education enables male household heads to better 
evaluate the potential social and economic implications of illness, as well as to assess 
the financial protection afforded by health insurance. Our study also found that men’s 
ability to evaluate potential health risks was correlated to a lesser degree to their old 
age. We suggest that older age provides male household heads with a better 
understanding of the potential health, economic and social costs of illness, thereby 
increasing their understanding of the utility of financial safety nets in adverse health 
events. In addition to the above characteristics, we found that male household heads 
place value on a specific return on investment, factoring in trust of a specific health 
insurance provider in their decision to enrol. This reflects other qualitative and 
quantitative health financing studies (113,114,136,140), and highlights the reliance of 
many voluntary health insurance schemes on the reputation of affiliated entities.   
When women hold a high level of economic power, on the other hand, we posit that 
enrolment decisions are likely to prioritise their direct knowledge of potential household 
health risks. According to our findings, health insurance enrolment was correlated to 
the presence of children in female-headed households. This implies that women with 
dependent children are attuned to the healthcare needs of their households, ostensibly 
due to their traditional role as caregivers. This reflects the findings of various health-
seeking behaviour studies, which have found that women’s role in caregiving provides 
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them with awareness of the potential health risks associated with childhood illness 
(128,129). While their willingness to prioritise the health needs of children is notable, 
poverty ultimately reduces women’s access to decision-making resources. Given that 
most asset-based wealth in North-West Cameroon has historically been held by males 
(139), income acts as a limiting factor for women’s participation in health insurance 
over and above the need to minimise potential household health risks . This aligns to 
the findings of various social science studies (112,125,141), and suggests that access 
to financial resources serves as an important gateway for facilitating women’s decision-
making autonomy. 
Given the wide variability in household structures between and within regions, care 
must be taken to avoid blunt generalisations on the nature of households. We concede 
that these findings are specific to the unique North-West Cameroonian context within 
which the research was carried out. We also appreciate that even within our designated 
gender groupings, there will inevitably be heterogeneity in the power relations that are 
associated with the decision to enrol into voluntary health insurance. That said, to the 
authors’ knowledge, this is one of the first studies investigating the role of household 
headship and gender in the context of voluntary health insurance enrolment. Our study 
has several design limitations that may affect the external validity of our findings: the 
number of BEPHA-insured female-headed households was substantially less than 
those in male-headed households. However, we contest that this is symptomatic of the 
low number of female-headed households in the study area in general, as well as the 
limited uptake of insurance amongst our study population. It would therefore be 
necessary to carry out further research on a larger number of female-led households 
to further test our findings. Additionally, translation and interpretation of interview 
questions into Lam Nso’ language may have biased the responses to the research 
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questions. These issues notwithstanding, our findings provide precursory insight into 
the evolving role of gender in health insurance decision-making.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Our study has embraced the realities of gender-specificity in household roles, and 
identified clear disparities in the way male- and female-headed households evaluate 
health risks in the decision to enrol into health insurance. Our findings suggest that 
voluntary health insurance demand amongst male household heads is associated with 
their ability to understand household health risks in the absence on a direct role in 
caregiving. Conversely, health insurance enrolment amongst women is correlated to 
the need to minimise potential household health risks based on their direct knowledge 
of potential household healthcare needs. The impact of education on male health 
insurance demand underscores the importance of simple and digestible sensitisation 
programs as a means of facilitating household decision-makers’ understanding of the 
concept of health insurance. Further, the influence of wealth on health insurance 
enrolment particularly amongst female-headed households provides important insight 
from a policy perspective, given the limited availability of subsidies to cover vulnerable 
populations in many sub-Saharan African health insurance schemes. Our findings 
highlight the need for partnerships between health insurance schemes and 
governments in order to develop a financial safety net to limit the impact of illness on 
the poor. Indeed, the ultimate goal of voluntary health insurance schemes such as 
BEPHA is to support governments in their quest towards achieving universal health 
coverage. It is through collaboration and responsiveness to the social, cultural and 
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economic realities of the target population that health insurance coverage will reach 
sustainable levels. 
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6.1 Executive Summary 
Bamenda Ecclesiastical Provincial Health Assistance (BEPHA) is a microinsurance 
scheme set up by the Roman Catholic Church in North-West and South-West 
Cameroon. Since its inception in 2006, BEPHA has set up four independent health 
assistance schemes in Kumbo, Bamenda, Buea and Mamfe Parishes, covering a total 
of 34,807 individuals as of May 2014. The populations in BEPHA’s areas of focus are 
plagued by poor health outcomes, with the North West suffering from HIV prevalence 
rate of 8.7% - the highest in Cameroon. Further, both the North West and South West 
suffer from high malaria prevalence rates (20% and 15% respectively) (131).  
In the backdrop of the Cameroonian Government revising its strategy for achieving 
universal health coverage, BEPHA sought to understand its contribution towards 
universal population coverage and financial risk protection in North-West Cameroon 
through a cross-sectional household survey in the Bui and Donga-Mantung 
administrative divisions. The study found that BEPHA Kumbo has been making 
tangible progress towards achieving universal health coverage, with 9% of the 
population insured in the study area. BEPHA membership was aligned to the study 
population in terms of age, sex, and marital status. The Scheme has succeeded in 
applying the principles of universal health coverage by: 
• Attracting and covering “easy-to-reach” populations – BEPHA has focused 
its enrolment efforts on a largely Catholic audience, with mandatory coverage 
of Church-affiliated institutions and voluntary enrolment of the Catholic 
congregation.  
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• Covering the poorest in the country - BEPHA has enrolled a high proportion 
of poorer households, with 61% of its membership falling within the poorest 
40% of the country’s population in terms of assets.  
• Covering households irrespective of their health status – BEPHA does not 
appear to be significantly impacted by adverse selection, with enrolees’ self-
reported health status mirroring that of uninsured households (p-value=0.598).  
• Enabling households to minimise their health burden – BEPHA 
membership provides an important financial safety net for households, with 
75% of insured households maintaining the proportion of healthcare 
expenditure below 10% of their non-food expenditure (p-value=0.049). 
 
While BEPHA has achieved positive steps towards covering the population of Bui and 
Donga-Mantung Divisions, there is still a need to increase coverage in a number of 
key populations including rural communities, the rich, illiterate and non-Catholics. 
This study’s findings reinforce the importance of including BEPHA in Cameroon’s 
universal health coverage plans at national level, given its success in implementing 
the principles of universal health coverage.  
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6.2 Introduction 
In most developing countries, the poor face a disproportionate risk of ill health due to 
their exclusion from the health system. Extensive research on health outcomes in 
developing countries has associated poor health status with limited access to quality 
health services, as well as with the high cost of obtaining medical assistance. In 
Cameroon, more than half of all households are unable to afford their healthcare 
expenditure, with 66.2% of households in the North-West spending more than their 
total income on health services annually (142). This aggravates the overall health 
status of the country, impacting both individuals’ wellbeing as well as economic growth 
(143). In an ideal case scenario, mitigating these risks and providing quality, affordable 
health services would be the sole responsibility of the government under the banner 
of universal health coverage. However, in reality, the health landscape in Cameroon 
is dependent upon a number of non-governmental actors working in tandem with the 
government to provide adequate healthcare services for all its citizens.  
Cameroon is a lower-middle income country in Central Africa with a population of 23.3 
million. In spite of its growing per capita gross national income (GNI) of USD 3,080 
(144), Cameroon ranks low in terms of its health indicators and is ranked 153rd on the 
Human Development Index among 187 countries (145). The country has a life 
expectancy of 55.5 years, with an under-five mortality ratio of 87.9 deaths per 1,000 
live births. Further, the maternal mortality ratio is high at 596 deaths per 100,000 live 
births (146). 
The majority of healthcare services in Cameroon are provided by the Government, 
which is responsible for the operation of 72% of all health facilities in the country (147). 
In North-West Cameroon, private hospitals, private not-for-profit health centres and 
other private health facilities constitute 31% of all healthcare providers. 
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6.2.1 Health financing system in Cameroon 
Cameroon’s health financing system is comprised of a mix of public and private 
sources, with households contributing 52% and the Government contributing 33% of 
healthcare funding in the country (148). Mechanisms to facilitate the pooling of 
financial resources in Cameroon are limited, with the central government offering two 
health insurance schemes for the formally-employed: a civil servant scheme (Régime 
de la Fonction Publique) and the Caisse Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale (CNPS) for 
workers under the Labour Code. The Régime de la Fonction Publique provides cash 
payments for maternity cover for all government employees. CNPS covers medical 
costs associated with occupational ailments and provides reimbursement for all 
maternity costs, in addition to its primary role of providing pensions and other familial 
benefits to formal sector workers and their dependents. 
Coverage of the informal sector through health insurance is the remit of both the 
private and public sectors, with many private microinsurance schemes operating at a 
localised level. Congruently, the Cameroonian Government has committed to 
covering 40% of its population through microinsurance schemes in line with its 
universal health coverage goals (148,149). However, the Government’s efforts have 
been hampered due to: 
• Varied knowledge and awareness among potential beneficiaries 
• Significant regional disparities in health insurance coverage 
• Poor relationships with partner health facilities 
• Limited financial and technical support from government. 
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As a result, the country has made limited progress towards universal financial risk 
protection, with only 2% of its population covered by microinsurance schemes by 
2013, compared to approximately 70% of the population who are not in formal 
employment (88,89).  
Given the challenges faced in achieving UHC using its existing strategy and the 
Cameroonian Government’s plan to achieve 10% coverage of the population with 
microinsurance schemes by 2020 (148), the Cameroonian Government in 
collaboration with the WHO, the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) and the 
French Development Cooperation began work in 2015 to map out an alternative 
strategy for achieving universal financial risk protection. While these efforts are 
laudable, there is an urgent need to investigate the influence of existing 
microinsurance schemes on financial risk protection in order to identify what strategies 
could be effective in expanding health insurance coverage across the Cameroonian 
population.  
 
6.2.2 Study background 
Bamenda Ecclesiastical Provincial Health Assistance (BEPHA) is a microinsurance 
scheme set up by the Roman Catholic Church in North-West and South-West 
Cameroon. Since its inception in 2006, BEPHA has set up four independent health 
assistance schemes in Kumbo, Bamenda, Buea and Mamfe Parishes, covering a total 
of 34,807 individuals as of May 2014. BEPHA’s regions of focus are plagued by poor 
health outcomes, with the North West suffering from HIV prevalence rate of 8.7% - the 
highest in Cameroon. Further, both the North West and South West suffer from high 
malaria prevalence rates (20% and 15% respectively) (131).  
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As the Cameroonian Government looks towards developing a new strategy for 
achieving UHC, BEPHA is seeking to understand its contribution towards universal 
health coverage in North-West Cameroon. The study thus aims to answer the main 
research question “What is the contribution of BEPHA towards Universal Health 
Coverage in Cameroon?” using indicators across three aspects of UHC: 
1. Population coverage:  
a. What proportion of the target population is covered by BEPHA 
membership? 
b. Is the profile of BEPHA insurees representative of the general 
population?  
2. Service coverage:   
a. What is the utilisation rate of health services within BEPHA-insured 
households compared to the uninsured? 
3. Financial coverage:  
a. Does BEPHA membership reduce the incidences of catastrophic health 
expenditure compared to similar households? 
b. Does BEPHA membership reduce the risk of impoverishment due to out-
of-pocket costs? 
 
Additionally, an assessment was made on the level of understanding of the concept 
of health insurance, BEPHA-specific insurance knowledge (with BEPHA clients only), 
as well as the willingness of the target population to pay for the current and 
hypothetical health insurance packages.  
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6.3 Methodology 
A cross-sectional household survey was carried out in the Bui and Donga-Mantung 
administrative divisions of the North-West region of Cameroon between April and May 
2016. The survey sample was drawn using a four-pronged approach.  
In the first stage, the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme was chosen by the BEPHA Provincial 
team due to the high enrolment rates in the Bui and Donga-Mantung divisions. The 
second stage involved the selection of nine ‘BEPHA-active’ locations within the two 
divisions, which was defined as parishes which had at least 30 households enrolled in 
the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme.  
In the third stage, it was calculated that 416 households would need to be interviewed 
in BEPHA-active parishes in order to estimate a BEPHA-insured population of 4% 
(132). These calculations were based on BEPHA’s estimation that it had achieved at 
least 4% population coverage in its target area through the Kumbo Scheme. In order 
to randomly identify the representative sample of households in the target area, the 
number of households to be interviewed in each parish was first calculated as a 
proportion of the population size in each constituent sub-division. Villages within each 
parish were then randomly selected based on a list of mission outposts provided by 
the local parish priests. A random starting household was selected at a required 
distance from the church facilities, with every seventh household subsequently 
targeted for interviewing. If the selected household was unwilling or unable to 
participate in the survey, the next household was chosen as a replacement. In some 
hard-to-reach areas or farming communities, snowball sampling was utilised to 
account for the absence of households. However, this approach was only used in 
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situations where it was determined that a disproportionate amount of time and 
resources would be required to adequately follow the sampling strategy due to the 
unavailability of the target households.   
Given the low expected number of BEPHA-insured households through random 
sampling, it was decided that 174 additional households would be randomly selected 
from the BEPHA Kumbo membership list. The number of BEPHA-insured households 
to be interviewed in each ‘BEPHA-active’ area was calculated based on the size of its 
constituent sub-divisions. BEPHA Local Agents were then used to locate the selected 
households.  
Interviews were conducted in either Pidgin English or Lam Nso', depending on the 
preference of the interviewee. 
The data collected were entered and analysed using STATA version 14.1 for Windows 
(STATA Corporation, College Station, Texas). In addition to descriptive statistics, the 
chi-square test or its equivalent was used to compare qualitative variables, and a p-
value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant. Logistic regression was 
carried out to identify the factors associated with BEPHA health insurance enrolment 
and a household’s willingness-to-pay for two health insurance benefit packages.  
Urban centres were defined as localities with a population of at least 5000 habitants 
(133). 
To investigate differences in socioeconomic status at national level, principal 
component analysis (PCA) was used based on Vyas and Kumaranayake’s guidelines 
to construct an asset index based on relative wealth ranking of households (150). The 
asset index was defined as follows:  
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𝐴𝑖 =  ∑ [𝑓𝑘
(𝑎𝑖𝑘 −?̅?𝑘)
𝑠𝑘
]𝑘  , 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑘 is the value of asset k for household i, ?̅?𝑘 is the sample mean, 𝑠𝑘  is the 
sample standard deviation, and 𝑓𝑘 are the weights associated with the first principal 
component depending on the household’s rural or urban status. Households were then 
classified into one of five socioeconomic groups based on defined national wealth 
quintiles (Q): Q1 or the wealthiest 20% in the country; Q2; Q3; Q4; and Q5 or the 
poorest 20% in the country. In order to measure socioeconomic status within the study 
population, the factor weights from the Cameroonian national wealth index were 
applied to the survey household asset data. STATA was then used to categorise 
households into wealth quintiles using the asset variables and weights within the 
Cameroonian National Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) wealth index (134). 
In order to measure health insurance knowledge, a knowledge index was constructed 
from the percentage of health insurance knowledge questions answered correctly 
about health insurance and the BEPHA health insurance package. All questions had 
an equal weight in the constructed index, and “above average” knowledge was defined 
as a health insurance index score higher than 0.5. A “Don’t know” response was 
treated as an incorrect response. Factors significantly associated with higher health 
insurance knowledge were analysed using linear regression. 
Annual healthcare spending per capita was calculated by dividing household annual 
healthcare expenditure by the number of household members. Calculation of 
catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment was based on the Xu approach 
for the estimation of catastrophic health expenditure, which defines catastrophic 
health expenditure as having health expenditure costs exceeding 40% of a 
household’s non-food expenditure (151). Impoverishment is defined as a situation 
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where household expenditure is equal to or higher than subsistence spending, but is 
lower than subsistence spending net of out-of-pocket health payments (151). 
 
6.3.1 Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained through the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) of the Catholic University of Cameroon in Bamenda. Ethical procedures utilised 
during the duration of the study emphasised the need for all respondents to 
understand the project’s aims and objectives, as well as necessitated individual 
informed consent prior to any data collection. Additionally, the study emphasised the 
importance of ensuring confidentiality and privacy in order to improve the quality of 
data collected. 
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Figure 6: Typical interview setting within household survey 
 
Photograph taken by Tessa Oraro-Lawrence 
 
 
6.4 Results and discussion 
6.4.1 Demographics 
The study response rate was 94%, with a total of 558 interviews completed. 417 
interviews were conducted using the random population sampling strategy, while 174 
households were randomly identified and interviewed using the BEPHA Kumbo 
membership list (Table 4).  
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Table 4: Number of respondents interviewed per parish 
Division Parish 
Random sample 
BEPHA membership list 
sample 
Total 
completed 
interviews 
% interviews 
completed 
Targeted Completed Targeted Completed 
Bui 
Kumbo 
Cathedral 
56 53 26 13 66 80% 
Tobin 13 13 6 6 18 100% 
Meluf 15 15 7 4 19 86% 
Nkar 75 76 31 29 105 99% 
Mbve 34 34 16 8 42 84% 
Kikaikom 15 15 6 6 21 100% 
Mbiame 32 38 13 11 49 108% 
Djottin 65 71 23 21 92 105% 
Donga-
Mantung 
Sabongari 112 115 46 31 146 92% 
 Total 417 429 174 128 591 94% 
  
The comparatively low number of completed “BEPHA membership list” interviewees 
in Kumbo Cathedral and Meluf parishes was attributed to the fact that many BEPHA 
enrolees were not known to their local agents, as they had enrolled directly through 
the BEPHA Kumbo Diocesan Office in Kumbo Town. In Mbve, the low completion rate 
of BEPHA list interviews was linked to the fact that there was no local BEPHA agent 
on record to help identify enrolled households.  
 
6.4.2 Study population characteristics 
75% of all households interviewed resided in Bui Division, while 25% lived in Donga-
Mantung. 17% of all households interviewed lived in urban areas, while 83% were 
rural households. The study population largely mirrored the general population in 
North-West Cameroon in terms of age and sex (Table 5).  
 
 99 
 
Table 5: Demographic characteristics of study population 
* Reference: (133) 
 
6.4.3 Population coverage 
Based on analysis of the random population sampling completed within this study, 
BEPHA Kumbo has achieved a population coverage rate of 9%. While the Cameroon 
National Health Plan 2011-2015 estimated that health insurance coverage in North-
 Insured Uninsured 
Total in study 
population 
North-West 
Cameroon 
(2014)* 
Location (n=2,959)  
Urban 22% 15% 17% 42% 
Rural 78% 85% 83% 58% 
Sex (n=2,959)  
Male 46% 44% 45% 48% 
Female 54% 56% 55% 52% 
Age group (n=2,959)  
<=5 years 15% 19% 18% 15% 
6-15 years 26% 24% 24% 29% 
16-19 years 14% 12% 12% 13% 
20-29 years 13% 16% 15% 16% 
30-44 years 15% 14% 14% 14% 
45-59 years 11% 9% 10% 8% 
60+ years 8% 6% 7% 6% 
Literacy status of all adult household members (n=1,478)  
Literate 88% 79% 81% N/A 
Illiterate 12% 21% 18% N/A 
Maximum level of education for literate adults (n=1,200)  
Primary school 46% 47% 47% N/A 
First cycle secondary 
school 
23% 28% 26% N/A 
Second cycle 
secondary school 
14% 12% 13% N/A 
Diploma 10% 8% 9% N/A 
University/ tertiary 6% 4% 5% N/A 
Non-formal education 0% 0.38% 0.25% N/A 
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West Cameroon lies at 35% (147), the findings in this report are likely to offer a more 
realistic snapshot of coverage rates within the region. Indeed, by all accounts, BEPHA 
holds the largest share of the health insurance market in the North-West (152). 
The study also found that BEPHA’s membership is primarily focused in urban areas, 
with the majority of targeted households falling within the middle- to lower-
socioeconomic quintiles of the national wealth index (134) (Figure 7). BEPHA’s 
success in targeting and enrolling the lower socioeconomic demographic is particularly 
laudable given that the poorest households in Cameroon are 8.5% less likely to seek 
any form of medical intervention when ill compared to the wealthiest (147). Access to 
health insurance mechanisms through local schemes such as BEPHA is therefore 
imperative in ensuring financial affordability, and therefore accessibility, of health 
services for the poor in Cameroon (153).  
 
Figure 7: Socioeconomic groups of BEPHA-insured households based on national wealth index 
 
 
When analysing the socioeconomic grouping of the study population based on an 
asset-based wealth index (134), the study found that belonging to a particular 
socioeconomic group did not influence a household’s likelihood to enrol into the 
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BEPHA Kumbo Scheme (p=0.093) (Figure 8). This suggests that the BEPHA Kumbo 
Scheme is largely representative of the study population in terms of its socioeconomic 
status. 
 
Figure 8: Socioeconomic status of households based on asset-based wealth index for study population 
 
 
BEPHA’s ability to reach households across the socioeconomic divide may be linked 
to its community outreach activities through its innovative Local Committee (LC) 
structure. This structure leverages upon the Scheme’s affiliation with the Catholic 
Church, which has a long history of engagement across geographical and socio-
economic boundaries. BEPHA engages local opinion leaders as volunteers to educate 
and enrol local community members at parish level. BEPHA’s success with the LC 
structure can be attributed to the high social capital held by the volunteers, given that 
they:  
i. represent an entity which is well-respected and trusted within the community;  
ii. have a good understanding of the social values ascribed to by the Church and 
society at large, and have a strong belief in the values central to the concept of 
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insurance (i.e. pooling of funds together for the good of the community as a 
whole), and; 
iii. are able to communicate the concept of health insurance using language that 
is understandable to the target population. 
While BEPHA has undoubtedly been effective in representing the population at large, 
there is still a need to further expand coverage to wealthier households in order to 
facilitate cross-subsidisation between the wealthy and poor. Indeed, analysis found 
that there were 8% fewer households in the wealthiest quintile enrolled in BEPHA, 
compared to those not enrolled (p-value=0.093). 
 
6.4.4 Age, sex and marital status of household head 
BEPHA’s membership is largely comprised of households headed by middle-aged 
individuals, with 44% of all insured household heads falling within the 35-45-year 
range (p-value=0.100) (Figure 9). These findings correspond to the age patterns of 
the uninsured population sampled, making BEPHA’s coverage representative of the 
age profile of household heads within the general population. 
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Figure 9: Percentage of household heads in each age group 
 
 
In addition to the similarities in age between BEPHA members and non-members, the 
study found that there was no statistically-significant difference in the sex (p-
value=0.350) and marital status (p-value=0.247) of insured and uninsured household 
heads. These findings are viewed as positive, given that they suggest that BEPHA’s 
membership is largely representative of the general population in terms of age, sex 
and marital status. 
 
6.4.5 Religion 
BEPHA members are more likely to be members of the Catholic faith, with 86% of its 
members professing to this faith (p-value=0.000) (Figure 10). While this finding 
represents the reality that BEPHA is a church-established and –run scheme, it 
highlights a greater need to improve outreach and engagement programs targeting 
non-Catholic populations. Indeed, the Catholic Church only represents 37% of the 
population in Cameroon (97). This membership gap has already been recognised in 
some localities within the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme, where key opinion leaders of 
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different faiths have been incorporated into BEPHA’s Local Committees. Given that 
areas with inclusive Local Committees are seeing more representative coverage of 
the population, it is imperative to institutionalise the inclusion of other religious and 
social groups into BEPHA in order to increase the diversity of its membership. 
 
Figure 10: Religion ascribed to by household heads 
 
 
6.4.6 Social structure 
Education of household head 
Literacy was found to be a determining factor of health insurance enrolment in BEPHA-
active areas, with literate household heads having 3.61 times higher odds of enrolling 
their families into the BEPHA Scheme than illiterate households (p-value=0.000). 
Paradoxically, the study also found that the decision to enrol was not impacted by the 
maximum level of education attained by the household head, in spite of the important 
role played by literacy in determining the decision to enrol into health insurance. This 
suggests that BEPHA has been able to extend its coverage across all levels of 
education, effectively representing households of all education levels in the study 
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population (Figure 11). This is likely to be a result of BEPHA’s community outreach 
strategy, which collaborates with key opinion leaders to educate and enrol local 
residents onto the BEPHA package. The Scheme’s reliance on individuals with strong 
social capital has enabled BEPHA to engage with individuals at a local level in a 
manner that is digestible, socially-aware and -sensitive, thereby improving the public’s 
ability to understand and relate to the Scheme. 
 
Figure 11: Maximum level of education of literate household heads 
 
 
Employment activity 
The self-employment sector had the highest proportion of BEPHA enrolees compared 
to other employment sectors, with 60% of enrolled household heads creating their own 
economic opportunities. This was, however, representative of the study area’s 
population where 65% of household heads are self-employed. While most sectors’ 
BEPHA enrolment figures mirrored the overall study population, the study found that 
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private sector employees had 4.63 higher odds of enrolling into BEPHA health 
insurance than remaining uninsured (p-value=0.002). This can be attributed to 
BEPHA’s mandatory coverage of Church-affiliated institutions, which ensures health 
insurance coverage for all employees by BEPHA. This strategy adapts the 
recommended universal financial risk protection process which targets the mandatory 
coverage of easy-to-reach populations as the initial step towards universal health 
coverage. Given the large employment footprint of the Church in Cameroon, 
mandatory coverage of Church-affiliated institutions through the Bishop’s decree has 
provided a stepping stone for coverage of the formal sector in Bui and Donga-Mantung 
within BEPHA. 
 
6.4.7 Health status, beliefs and knowledge 
Perceived and actual health status 
Self-reported health status of BEPHA-insured households mirrored that of uninsured 
households (p-value=0.598), suggesting that the health status of BEPHA members 
was representative of the general population within the study area. This suggests that 
it is likely that individuals do not actively seek for BEPHA membership on the basis of 
their perceived health status, thereby limiting the effect of adverse selection within the 
Scheme. Adverse selection is a situation whereby high risk or sick individuals are more 
likely to enrol into health insurance schemes than healthy individuals, thereby 
increasing its risk exposure.   
The self-reported health status findings largely correlated with individuals’ actual 
health status, with individuals who viewed their health as “very good” reporting 
substantially fewer health episodes than those who viewed their health as “poor” or 
“very poor”. However, there was a statistically-significant difference in actual illness 
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episodes between insured and uninsured individuals who viewed themselves as 
healthy, with the insured showing higher rates of reported illness episodes than the 
uninsured. Insured individuals who reported their health as “very good” were 5% more 
likely to suffer from an illness episode than uninsured households (p-value=0.004), 
while those with a “good” self-reported health status were 4% more likely to suffer from 
ill health than the uninsured (p-value=0.035) (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Percentage of actual illness episodes versus self-reported health status  
 
 
Socioeconomic status was found to have a significant impact on self-reported health 
status (p-value=0.000), with the wealthiest quintile reporting the highest proportion of 
individuals with both “very good” and “very poor” health status. The finding that the 
wealthiest group in the study population were more likely to report their health as “very 
poor” may suggest a higher level of awareness and concern about one’s individual 
health status. 
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Belief in social solidarity 
Having a strong belief in the social solidarity aspect of health insurance was found to 
be a key determinant of enrolment into BEPHA health insurance (p-value=0.000). As 
a proxy of social solidarity, njangi membership was found to be closely related to 
BEPHA membership, with BEPHA members 2.38 times more likely to belong to a 
njangi (p-value=0.000).  
According to the study findings, socioeconomic status also had a significant impact on 
njangi membership (p-value=0.017) (Figure 13). While njangi membership amongst 
BEPHA-insured households did not differ significantly (p-value=0.800), the study 
found that njangi membership was influenced significantly by socioeconomic status 
amongst uninsured households (p-value=0.009). More than half of uninsured 
respondents in the wealthiest quintile (60%), Q2 (69%) and the poorest quintile (57%) 
quintiles reported making regular payments to a njangi.  
These findings offer hope for the possibility of increasing the proportion of wealthier 
and poorer households in the Scheme with targeting mechanisms focused on aligning 
the public’s perceptions of BEPHA membership with the principles of social solidarity. 
It is also necessary to carry out further research to identify the factors that attract the 
rich towards njangis, in order to leverage these factors to better target this group within 
BEPHA. 
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Figure 13: Percentage of households belonging to a njangi based on socioeconomic grouping 
 
 
Health insurance knowledge 
BEPHA membership was found to be a strong determinant of health insurance 
knowledge (p-value=0.000). 85% of insured individuals were shown to have above-
average knowledge of the concept of health insurance, compared to 33% of uninsured 
individuals. 
BEPHA insurees were also found to have a higher level of confidence in their health 
insurance knowledge, with 89% rating their knowledge as either “very good” or “good”. 
Conversely, 70% of uninsured individuals considered their knowledge to be “poor”. 
This largely correlated with actual understanding of the concept of health insurance, 
with 78% of individuals who rated their knowledge as “very good” and 71% of those 
who rated their knowledge as “good” having above-average knowledge of the concept 
of health insurance (p-value=0.000) (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14: Actual health insurance knowledge score compared to individuals’ self-reported health insurance 
knowledge  
 
 
6.4.8 Service coverage  
Utilisation of health facilities 
BEPHA Kumbo has contracted 24 faith-based healthcare facilities and three 
government hospitals in Bui and Donga Mantung Divisions to provide health services 
to its enrolees. This study found that BEPHA-insured individuals were more likely to 
visit faith-based facilities when ill compared to the uninsured. While this is likely due 
to BEPHA enrolees visiting its partner health facilities, it is also important to note that 
the uninsured also visited faith-based facilities to a greater extent than other types of 
facilities (Table 6). This supports BEPHA’s strategy of targeting faith-based facilities 
as partners – indeed, the private sector accounts for 32% of healthcare provision in 
North-West Cameroon (147). 
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Table 6: Percentage of sick respondents attending healthcare facilities 
 
 
Inpatient services Outpatient services 
Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured 
Public hospital 0 %  6 %  2 % 4 % 
Public health centre 4 % 26 % 16 % 33 % 
Private for-profit health centre 26 % 29 % 30 % 23 % 
Private clinic 0 % 4 % 0 % 4 % 
Mission facility 69 % 34 % 52 % 31 % 
Dispensary 0 % 0 % 0 % 3 % 
Pharmacy/Chemist 0 % 0 % 1 %  2 % 
Other 0 % 1 % 0 % 0 % 
 
In addition to health insurance status, socioeconomic status was found to have a 
significant impact on the choice of health facility for outpatient and inpatient services. 
These findings are highlighted further in the sections below. 
 
Use of health facilities for outpatient services 
The choice of health facility for outpatient services varied significantly based on 
insurance status (p-value=0.000) and socioeconomic grouping (p-value=0.014) in the 
study population.  
Among the BEPHA-insured, all socioeconomic groups showed a preference for 
attending mission hospitals for ambulatory care, with more than half of Q1, Q2, Q3 
and Q5 obtaining treatment in these facilities, and 45% of Q4 visiting them for 
outpatient care (Figure 15). Given that BEPHA membership covers three-quarters of 
the costs associated with a single outpatient visit up to 15 000 FCFA for each enrolee 
per year, these findings support the assertion that 58% of all insured sick individuals 
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were able to fully benefit from BEPHA’s outpatient benefits in the month prior to the 
study.  
 
Figure 15: Types of health facilities visited for outpatient services by BEPHA-insured individuals 
 
 
Amongst the uninsured, on the other hand, patients in Q1, Q2, and Q5 showed a 
preference for public health centres for their ambulatory care (34%, 46% and 32% 
respectively) (p-value=0.009). These findings point towards the need for BEPHA to 
contract more public health facilities in order to better attract the uninsured. 
 
Use of health facilities for inpatient services 
The study found that the choice of health facilities when seeking hospitalisation was 
strongly influenced by BEPHA membership, with 69% of insured individuals seeking 
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care in mission hospitals (p-value=0.000). Conversely, only 34% of uninsured 
individuals sought hospitalisation in mission hospitals (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16: Proportion of sick insured and uninsured individuals visiting each type of health facility for inpatient care 
 
 
The study also found that socioeconomic status had a statistically significant influence 
on type of health facility visited for inpatient care (p-value=0.043). While more than 
half of BEPHA-insured individuals across the socioeconomic divide visited mission 
hospitals (Figure 17), the uninsured showed a preference for different types of facilities 
depending on their socioeconomic grouping. The study found that individuals from the 
first and second quintile had a preference for hospitalisation in public health centres 
(50% and 32% respectively), while the third and fourth quintiles had a preference for 
private for-profit health facilities. Conversely, 56% of sick uninsured individuals in the 
wealthiest quintile sought hospitalisation in mission facilities when ill (p-value=0.010). 
Given that inpatient costs can have a devastating effect of a household’s finances, it 
is imperative to carry out further research to ascertain the reasons why the poor are 
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less inclined to attend mission facilities when seeking inpatient care. This will enable 
BEPHA to better target partner facilities that will provide the poor with their preferred 
services. 
 
Figure 17: Percentage of sick individuals visiting mission facilities by insurance status 
 
 
6.4.9 Financial protection 
Out-of-pocket health expenditure 
The study found that BEPHA membership did not have a statistically significant impact 
on out-of-pocket expenditure for households (p-value=0.252) or individuals (p-
value=0.155) within the study population. Uninsured individuals spent more on 
average on healthcare than the BEPHA-insured, with 9,262 FCFA spent annually on 
health costs (standard deviation of 15,639 FCFA) compared to insured individuals, 
who had a mean annual health expenditure of 8,843 FCFA (standard deviation of 
11,704 FCFA). When median health spending was analysed, BEPHA-insured 
individuals were found to have higher levels of annual healthcare expenditure, with a 
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median amount of 5,000 FCFA spent annually compared to the 4,286 FCFA spend 
by the uninsured.  
Per capita annual healthcare expenditure was influenced by income (p-value=0.006) 
and njangi membership (p-value=0.000). The study found that annual healthcare 
expenditure was positively correlated to household income, except amongst 
households where the household head earned less than 47,000 FCFA per month. In 
situations where the household head earned between 23,000 FCFA and 47,000 
FCFA, a third of individuals spent at least 50,000 FCFA on healthcare costs annually. 
Similarly in households where the head earned less than 23,000 FCFA per month, 
29% of individuals had an annual per capita healthcare spend of at least 50,000 FCFA 
– the same proportion as individuals earning between 94,000 FCFA and 188,000 
FCFA (Figure 18).  
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Figure 18: Proportion of household annual out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita based on income 
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Incidences of catastrophic health expenditure 
Catastrophic health expenditure is defined as having health expenditure costs 
exceeding 40% of a household’s non-food expenditure (151). BEPHA membership 
did not have a statistically-significant impact on catastrophic health expenditure, with 
3% of insured households suffering from catastrophic health expenditure in the year 
prior to the research, compared to 7% of uninsured households (p-value=0.097). 
However, insurance status was found to have a statistically-significant impact on the 
burden of health payments, with 75% of BEPHA-insured households spending 10% 
or less of their non-food expenditure on healthcare costs annually compared to 66% 
of uninsured households (p-value=0.049) (Figure 19). This suggests that, while 
BEPHA coverage has a limited influence on reducing financial risk for households 
who spend more than 40% of their non-food expenditure on healthcare, it enables 
enrolees to minimise the burden of health payments below 10%. 
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Figure 19: Percentage of out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of a household’s capacity to pay 
(health burden) 
 
 
The study also found that catastrophic health expenditure among the study population 
was more likely amongst households where the household heads had lower incomes 
(p-value=0.010) and older age (p-value=0.004). Indeed, household heads above the 
age of 65 years accounted for 35% of households suffering from catastrophic health 
expenditure. 
 
Incidences of household impoverishment due to healthcare costs 
Impoverishment is defined as a situation where household health expenditure is 
higher than the minimum amount required to maintain basic life, otherwise known as 
subsistence spending (151). The study found that 0.7% of BEPHA Kumbo Scheme 
members were pushed into poverty due to healthcare expenditure, while 2% of 
uninsured households suffered from impoverishment due to health costs in the year 
preceding the study (p-value=0.227). These findings were, however, within the margin 
of error. 
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Oddly, no statistically-significant relationship was found between the number of illness 
episodes and impoverishment. Based on reported data, only one of the nine 
households facing catastrophic health expenditure utilised outpatient services in the 
month preceding the study, while four of the nine households had members 
hospitalised in the year preceding the study. However, these findings may reflect 
respondents’ unwillingness to share sensitive medical information. Analysis of the 
survey data revealed that expenses associated with inpatient care pushed families 
into poverty, with all ‘impoverished’ households who sought hospitalisation in the year 
preceding the study facing healthcare costs of at least 125,000 FCFA within a single 
sickness episode (p-value=0.007). 
The study also found that njangi membership significantly impacted impoverishment 
among households, with 78% of those facing impoverishment not belonging to a 
njangi (p-value=0.020). This reflects success of the microfinancing policies of njangis, 
which enable members to obtain financing when needed.  
 
Willingness-to-pay for BEPHA health insurance package 
BEPHA Kumbo’s current benefit package provides 75% coverage of the costs 
associated with outpatient consultations, laboratory tests, hospitalisation, medicines, 
and maternity services at an annual fee of 4,000 FCFA per person. The annual 
contribution was increased from 3,500 FCFA in the year preceding the study in order 
to improve the financial sustainability of the Scheme. 
The study revealed that the insured population was willing to pay an average of 
4,602.41 FCFA for the current BEPHA package, while the uninsured were only willing 
to pay an average of 3,933.59 FCFA (Table 7). Twenty-two more insured households 
(65%) expressed a willingness to pay the annual contribution amount associated with 
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the current BEPHA package (4,000 FCFA) compared to uninsured households (43%) 
(p-value=0.000). This represents a 13% reduction in the number of insured 
households willing to pay for the new annual contribution rate compared to the 
previous rate of 3,500 FCFA.  
 
Table 7: Willingness-to-pay for current and hypothetical BEPHA Kumbo packages 
Package  Mean (S.D.)* Median (Min – Max) 
Current BEPHA package  
(75% benefits covered) 
BEPHA-insured 4,602.41 (2,958.05) 4,000 (0 - 12,000) 
Uninsured 3,933.59 (3,319.01) 3,000 (0 – 12,000) 
Hypothetical BEPHA package  
(100% benefits covered) 
BEPHA-insured 6,698.80 (3,418.26) 5,000 (0 – 12,000) 
Uninsured 5,787.89 (3,863.17) 5,000 (0 – 12,000) 
*S.D. = Standard deviation 
 
Analysis also revealed that insured households would be willing to pay a mean annual 
contribution of 6,698.80 FCFA if BEPHA enhanced its benefit package to provide 
100% coverage of the costs associated with outpatient consultations, laboratory tests, 
hospitalisation, medicines, and maternity services, while the uninsured would be 
willing to pay a mean of 5,787.89 FCFA (Table 7). These findings suggest that the 
acceptability of the annual contribution change would increase amongst the insured 
population if they were able to perceive a tangible increase in the benefit package. It 
is therefore necessary to carry out further research to identify strategies to enhance 
the benefit package while maintaining the sustainability of the Scheme, in order to 
minimise the attrition rate due to the increased annual contributions. 
Socioeconomic status was found to influence a household’s willingness to pay for the 
current benefit package (p-value=0.005) and for the hypothetical 100% benefit 
package (p-value=0.000). Amongst insured households, a higher proportion of those 
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belonging to the poorest 20% and the richest 60% of the study population were willing 
to pay at least 4,000 FCFA for the current package, compared to the uninsured (p-
value=0.042). Conversely in the uninsured group, the study found that households in 
the lower socioeconomic quintiles were more willing to pay for the package amongst 
the uninsured respondents (Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20: Percentage of households willing to pay at least 4,000 FCFA per person for current BEPHA benefit 
package  
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value=0.078). However, analysis identified a negative correlation amongst the 
between socioeconomic status and the proportion of uninsured households willing to 
pay the current annual contribution for an enhanced benefit package (p-value=0.000). 
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least 4,000 FCFA for an enhanced benefit package compared to 55% of the wealthiest 
quintile (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21: Percentage of households willing to pay at least 4,000 FCFA per person for enhanced 
BEPHA benefit package 
 
 
Further research is required to explore the reasons why the lower socioeconomic 
quintiles seem to have a higher willingness to pay when uninsured.  
Location of residence was also found to have a significant impact on willingness-to-
pay, with urban households 31% more likely to be willing to pay at least 4,000 FCFA 
for the existing package (p-value=0.000). Further, the marital status of the household 
head had a significant influence on the maximum willingness-to-pay, with 
monogamous and widowed household heads more likely to pay more than 4,000 
FCFA compared to other household heads (p-value=0.004).  
The factors determining willingness-to-pay differed between the insured and 
uninsured. Among insured households, regression analysis found that location (p-
value=0.000) and marital status (p-value=0.022) were the determining factors for 
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willingness-to-pay. Urban households who were wither married in a monogamous 
setting or widowed were more likely to be willing to pay the current BEPHA annual 
contribution of 4,000 FCFA for the existing benefit package. The willingness of the 
uninsured to pay at least 4,000 FCFA was significantly influenced by location (p-
value=0.000), type of employment (p-value=0.003) and njangi membership (p-
value=0.008). Urban uninsured households whose head was formally-employed were 
more likely to be willing to pay the current BEPHA annual contribution of 4,000 FCFA 
for the enhanced benefit package. This suggests that BEPHA should target formal 
employers as part of an expansion strategy, in order to attract more higher-income 
members. 
Additionally, willingness-to-pay amongst uninsured households was determined by the 
household head’s understanding of the principles of health insurance, with 55% of 
individuals with “above average” health insurance knowledge willing to pay at least 
4,000 FCFA for the BEPHA package (p-value=0.044).  
 
 
6.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The BEPHA Kumbo Scheme has been making tangible progress towards achieving 
universal health coverage, with 9% of the population insured in the study area. The 
household survey found that BEPHA membership is aligned to the study population in 
terms of age, sex, and marital status. Interestingly, while literate household heads 
where more likely to enrol their households into BEPHA than the illiterate (p-
value=0.000), the study found that actual education levels had no substantive impact 
on the decision to enrol into BEPHA. This provides assurances that BEPHA’s use of 
  
124 
local opinion leaders within the context of the BEPHA Local Committee (LC) structure 
has enabled it to engage effectively with the target population irrespective of their level 
of educational achievement.  
Based on the findings of this research, it can be suggested that BEPHA has 
successfully applied the principles of UHC by: 
1. Attracting and covering “easy-to-reach” populations – BEPHA has focused 
its enrolment efforts on a largely Catholic audience, with mandatory coverage 
of Church-affiliated institutions and voluntary enrolment of the Catholic 
congregation. Catholic enrolees consequently make up 86% of the Scheme’s 
membership (p-value=0.000). Further, private sector employees, who are 
largely represented by Church- and NGO-affiliated institutions in the study area, 
have 4.63 higher odds of enrolling into BEPHA health insurance than remaining 
uninsured (p-value=0.002); 
2. Covering the poorest in the country - BEPHA has enrolled a high proportion 
of poorer households, with 61% of its membership falling within the poorest 
40% of the country’s population in terms of assets. This suggests that BEPHA 
has been able to provide an important gateway for access to health services to 
the poor in Bui and Donga-Mantung; 
3. Covering households irrespective of their health status – Contrary to the 
findings of many micro health insurance schemes, BEPHA does not appear to 
be significantly impacted by adverse selection, with enrolees’ self-reported 
health status mirroring that of uninsured households (p-value=0.598). This 
suggests that BEPHA has managed to minimise its risk profile with regard to its 
members’ health status; 
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4. Enabling households to minimise their health burden – BEPHA 
membership provides an important financial safety net for households in 
avoiding out-of-pocket payments, with 75% of insured households maintaining 
the proportion of healthcare expenditure below 10% of their non-food 
expenditure (p-value=0.049).  
 
While BEPHA has achieved positive steps towards covering the population of Bui and 
Donga-Mantung Divisions, there is still a need to increase coverage in a number of 
key populations including rural communities, the rich, illiterate and non-Catholics. Part 
of its limited coverage amongst these population groups may be linked to their inability 
to relate BEPHA coverage to the principles of social solidarity. The study found that 
njangi membership as a proxy of belief in social solidarity was high amongst the 
uninsured across the socioeconomic (p-value=0.009) and geographical (p-
value=0.000) divide, with more than half of individuals in the wealthiest 20% and 
poorest 40% within the uninsured population making regular payments into a njangi. 
In order to increase its coverage of the population, it is suggested that BEPHA 
improves its targeting strategy by: 
i. Carrying out further research on the reasons behind the high membership 
rates in njangis, in order to incorporate their key success factors into 
BEPHA’s community engagement strategy; 
ii. Institutionalising the inclusion of different religious and informal networks 
(e.g. njangis) into BEPHA Local Committees, in order to improve the 
representation of rural communities and non-Catholics within the Scheme; 
and, 
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iii. Developing an outreach strategy through secular formal employment 
institutions in order to target the wealthy and young. 
 
The study also identified the need for BEPHA to develop contractual agreements with 
a more diverse pool of health facilities, given the varied preferences of the uninsured 
and non-poor. Analysis showed that the richest 20% amongst the uninsured had a 
preference for public health centres when seeking ambulatory care, while the middle 
class had a preference for private for-profit health centres when seeking 
hospitalisation (p-value=0.010). Given that the BEPHA Kumbo Scheme has largely 
contracted faith-based facilities to provide inpatient and outpatient services for its 
enrolees, it is imperative for it to actively engage with government and private facilities 
in order to attract further membership. 
In terms of financial risk protection, BEPHA membership was found not to have a 
significant impact on out-of-pocket payments (p-value=0.252), catastrophic health 
expenditure (p-value=0.097), or impoverishment due to health costs (p-value=0.227). 
However, BEPHA was seen to play a significant role in keeping healthcare costs below 
10% of a household’s non-food expenditure (p-value=0.049). This finding is interesting 
given that similar rates of maintenance of health burden below 10% were seen in the 
successful government-run Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) Scheme in 
Rwanda (154). 
Severity of illness was found to be a major risk factor for impoverishment, with all 
impoverished households who sought hospitalisation facing healthcare costs of at 
least 125,000 FCFA for a single sickness episode (p-value=0.007). The study also 
found that annual healthcare expenditure was positively correlated to household 
income (p-value=0.006), except amongst households where the head earned less that 
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47,000 FCFA per month. This suggests that the health systems in Bui and Donga-
Mantung are discriminatory against households with lower incomes seeking health 
services. This trend was also witnessed in catastrophic health expenditure, where 
household heads with lower incomes (p-value=0.010) and older age (p-value=0.004) 
were more likely to have their households suffer from health expenditures greater than 
40% of their non-food expenditure. It is necessary to note, however, that health 
expenditure and utilisation data collected may have been impacted by recall bias, as 
well as some households’ unwillingness to share sensitive medical information. In 
order to gain further insight into the above findings, it is recommended for BEPHA to 
initiate further research to explore the reasons why certain socioeconomic groups are 
more prone to catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment. 
The study revealed that 65% of BEPHA members were willing to pay 4,000 FCFA for 
the current benefit package - a 13% reduction in the number of insured households 
willing to pay for the new annual contribution rate compared to the previous 
contribution of 3,500 FCFA (p-value=0.000). While this may lead to concerns about 
BEPHA’s sustainability, it is important to note that the study also found that a 
hypothetical enhanced BEPHA benefit package where 100% of costs associated with 
outpatient consultations, laboratory tests, hospitalisation, medicines, and maternity 
services were covered would be more acceptable to both the insured and uninsured, 
with insured households willing to pay an average of 6,698.80 FCFA and the uninsured 
5,787.89 FCFA. In order to further improve financial risk protection and coverage of 
the target population, it is suggested that BEPHA:  
i. Carry out a qualitative study to further investigate the reasons why insured 
households are unwilling to pay the increase BEPHA annual contribution 
rates; 
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ii. Carry out an exploratory study to investigate the feasibility of enhancing the 
BEPHA benefit package; and 
iii. Undertake an actuarial calculation for the health insurance annual 
contribution, and test annual contribution with the population in order to 
effectively gauge willingness- and ability-to-pay. 
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7.1 Abstract 
Background: Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are highly active in 
many sub-Saharan African countries, serving as an important gateway for coping with 
financial risk. In light of the Kenya’s National Hospital Insurance Fund’s (NHIF’s) 
strategy of targeting ROSCAs for membership enrolment, this study sought to estimate 
how ROSCA membership influences the determinants of voluntary health insurance 
enrolment.  
Methods: A cross-sectional survey of 444 households was carried out in Kisumu City 
between July and August 2016. A structured questionnaire was administered on health 
insurance membership, household attributes, headship characteristics and health-
seeking behaviour. We assessed the influence of ROSCA membership on the 
associations between NHIF enrolment and the explanatory variables using univariate 
logistic regression. 
Results: The study found that education was associated with NHIF demand regardless 
of ROSCA membership. Both ROSCA and non-ROSCA households with high 
socioeconomic status showed stronger health insurance demand compared with 
poorer households; there was, however, no evidence that the strength of this 
association was influenced by ROSCA status (p-value=0.47). Participants who were 
self-employed were significantly less likely to enrol into the NHIF if they did not belong 
to a ROSCA (interaction test p-value=0.03). NHIF enrolment was found to be lower 
among female-headed households. There was a borderline effect of ROSCA 
membership on this association, with a lower odds ratio amongst non-ROSCA 
members (p-value=0.09): the low treatment numbers amongst the insured infers that 
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ROSCA membership may play a role on the association between gender and NHIF 
demand.  
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that ROSCA membership may play a role in 
increasing health insurance demand amongst some traditionally under-represented 
groups such as women and the self-employed. However, the strategy of targeting 
ROSCAs to increase national health insurance enrolment may yield exiguous results, 
given that ROSCA membership is itself influenced by several non-observable factors 
– such as time-availability and self-selection. It is therefore important to anchor 
outreach to ROSCAs within a broader, multi-pronged approach that targets households 
within their social, economic and political realities. 
 
Key words 
ROSCAs; health insurance; social capital; Kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
132 
7.2 Introduction 
Informal economic networks based on geographical, sociocultural or occupational 
proximity are highly active in many sub-Saharan African countries, with an estimated 
24% of the population participating in local savings clubs in 2014 (155). In Kenya, 
where 24.6% of the population is excluded from formal savings and loans institutions, 
local rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) have emerged as important 
gateways for coping with financial instability (156). ROSCAs are typically created to 
meet an unmet social and economic need amongst vulnerable groups such as the 
working poor and women (155,157), with participants pooling their financial resources 
to create communal savings funds as a form of financial risk protection (158). In this 
sense, ROSCAs serve as social networks through which individuals obtain financial 
security through collective resource mobilisation. Due to their informal nature, 
ROSCAs’ success is contingent upon the trust, reciprocity and collective strength 
shared amongst group members – fundamental components of a phenomenon known 
as social capital (158,159). It is this reliance on social capital that has driven the use of 
similar welfare associations as launchpads for the national health insurance schemes 
in Germany and Japan (160,161).  
Against the backdrop of increasing ROSCA membership across sub-Saharan Africa, 
financial risk protection in health care has remained low. Several governments in the 
region such as those in Ghana and Kenya have sought to promote national health 
insurance schemes as a means of minimising the high out-of-pocket costs associated 
with ill health (98,99). In Kenya – where up to 28% of slum-dwelling households face 
catastrophic health expenditure (162) – the national government has established the 
National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) as a means of providing financial risk 
protection to its citizens. The NHIF operates like most national health insurance 
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schemes in the region, with the government and the formal sector providing the bulk of 
financial contributions to the scheme (4). However, given the high levels of informal 
employment in the Kenyan economy, the depth of insurance coverage has remained 
low, with only 13.5% of the population receiving NHIF coverage (163). A large 
proportion of Kenya’s informally employed households – who constitute 85% of the 
working population – are thus left susceptible to financial shocks in the event of ill 
health (163,164). This problem echoes findings across health insurance schemes in 
several sub-Saharan African countries, where low health insurance demand has been 
attributed to high levels of labour informality. 
As part of efforts to better understand the reasons behind the low uptake of voluntary 
health insurance, several research studies have identified a link between social 
solidarity and health insurance demand across various sub-Saharan African settings 
(165,166). This growing body of evidence has led Kenyan policymakers to target 
ROSCAs as a means of increasing NHIF demand amongst the informal sector, in line 
with their role as vehicles for social solidarity (167). Consequently, we seek to 
understand how ROSCA membership influences the drivers of voluntary health 
insurance in Kisumu, Kenya. This paper will be structured as follows: we will first 
provide a review of the research on the intersection between local group membership, 
social capital, and voluntary health insurance membership. We will subsequently report 
our methodology and results, and conclude with an analysis of our findings. 
In order to better understand the mechanisms through which ROSCAs may influence 
health insurance enrolment, it is first necessary to define the social capital underpinning 
the success of ROSCAs. Social capital as a concept focuses on the utility of 
relationships and resources in facilitating collaboration towards a common goal (168–
170). While different interpretations of its nature and effect exist, it is generally agreed 
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that social capital influences the depth of individuals’ engagement with local and 
national structures by facilitating trust and reciprocity within communities. ROSCAs – 
as local informal groupings – seek to empower economic cooperation in the face of 
complex resource and capacity constraints. In doing so, they tap into two key 
dimensions of social capital: intra- and inter-community collaborations. When 
constituting ROSCAs in low-resource settings, members often recruit those in whom 
they have inherent trust – ostensibly those with similar socioeconomic, professional or 
ethno-cultural characteristics. This structure mimics traditional African obligations to 
familial and tribal alliances (171), and derives its power from harnessing existing links 
within homogenous groups: a concept known as bonding social capital (172). 
Concurrently, in order to make ROSCAs sustainable, members seek to increase the 
associations’ capital base and minimise the risk of default (157). They thus expand 
their radius of trust beyond their typical personal, sociocultural and organisational 
bases - a phenomenon known as bridging social capital (172). In this vein, ROSCAs 
foment economic, social, and cultural links within local communities (173).  
In spite of the pervasiveness of ROSCAs and their linkages to national health insurance 
enrolment in several sub-Saharan African settings (57,59), there remains a paucity of 
research on the influence of ROSCAs on national health insurance demand. We can, 
however, draw lessons from studies carried out on the influence of social capital as a 
general concept on voluntary health insurance enrolment. According to existing 
research, active members of local mutual assistance groups such as ROSCAs are 
more likely to be part of voluntary health insurance schemes due to a shared ethos of 
social cooperation (174–176). These findings highlight the importance of common 
norms, values and objectives – characteristic features of social capital – in influencing 
households’ decision to enrol into voluntary health insurance. Given this, our paper will 
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seek to answer the following research question: How does ROSCA membership 
influence the determinants of voluntary health insurance enrolment? We will further 
seek to understand how existing knowledge on social capital can help explain the 
influence of ROSCAs on the determinants of health insurance demand.  
In order to answer these questions, we can apply several hypotheses to our study 
based on the findings of existing research. Given the link identified between local 
informal group membership and social capital, we anticipate that non-ROSCA 
members may have weaker bonding and bridging social capital compared with their 
ROSCA member counterparts. As a result of this, we expect wealth to manifest as an 
overarching determinant of NHIF demand amongst non-ROSCA members in line with 
existing national health financing studies (48,56–59,112). Additionally, we hypothesise 
that sociocultural sensitivities such as household composition; gender of household 
head; and marital status will influence households’ likelihood of enrolling into national 
health insurance (48,56–59,112,115). We however postulate that these inequities may 
be reduced by ROSCA membership due to their high social capital stock. 
 
 
7.3 Methodology 
7.3.1 Sampling methodology 
A cross-sectional household survey was carried out in Kisumu City between July and 
August 2016 to identify the extent to which NHIF enrolment is influenced by ROSCA 
membership; household composition and attributes; as well as household head 
characteristics such as occupation, age, gender and perceived health status of 
household members. 
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Our study aimed to estimate the proportion of the informally employed population with 
voluntary NHIF health insurance, and to assess the association between explanatory 
variables and this proportion. In order to achieve these aims, we calculated the sample 
size based on the ability to estimate the proportion insured with a certain precision - in 
this case, with an expected NHIF population coverage of 13.8% (177). Using the Hayes 
and Bennett equation and taking into account clustering in six sub-locations across 
Kisumu, required sample size was calculated to be 440 households with the precision 
of a 95% confidence interval with a width of 10% to 18% (132). The number of 
households interviewed in each sub-location was proportional to its demographic size, 
which was obtained from the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census (178).  
Multistage cluster sampling was used to obtain the study sample, with enumeration 
maps of the six sub-locations used to randomly identify existing informal settlements 
in Kisumu (179). In the second stage, we selected existing water points within informal 
settlements, and randomly selected starting points located near the water points. This 
strategy was driven by the use of watering points as navigation tools by the local 
communities. We subsequently carried out systematic sampling, with every nth 
household interviewed. Approximately 98% of the targeted households could be 
interviewed.  
 
7.3.2 Data collection  
The survey was administered as a structured questionnaire using Open Data Kit (ODK) 
software on handheld tablets to answer questions on household composition; 
household assets; household expenditure and consumption; and health-seeking 
behaviour. Research assistants who were fluent in English, Kiswahili and the local 
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dialect, Luo, and who had knowledge of the local geographical and sociocultural 
context were hired. Training was provided to familiarise research assistants with the 
questionnaire and data collection using handheld tablets. 
Household heads were targeted as the primary respondents for this study. In cases 
where the household head was not available, their spouse was interviewed.  
In order to identify the informally employed in our study area, we used a deductive 
approach of identifying households where the household head did not make mandatory 
monthly payments into the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). This approach was 
taken, as there is no clearly defined approach for identifying the informal sector in 
Kenya. However, the formal sector is defined distinctly within Kenya’s legal framework, 
with sector members legally obligated to make monthly pension payments to the NSSF 
(180). 
Insured households were defined as those where members were voluntarily enrolled 
into the NHIF in the year preceding the study.  
 
7.3.3 Statistical analysis 
The data were analysed using STATA version 14.1 for Windows (STATA Corporation, 
College Station, Texas). The main outcome variable was voluntary enrolment into the 
NHIF in the previous year. The explanatory variables were divided into five 
components: household composition and attributes; household head factors; perceived 
household health status; and proxies for exposure to financial risk pooling.  
In order to measure wealth, we used the asset index as described within the Kenya 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) to calculate households’ asset-based wealth 
(181) . We collected data on consumer items, dwelling characteristics such as housing 
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materials, water source, sleeping arrangements, and other characteristics linked to 
wealth status. We subsequently computed the asset index. Households were then 
classified into one of five socioeconomic groups based on quintiles (Q): Q1 or the 
poorest 20%; Q2; Q3; Q4; and Q5 or the wealthiest 20% in the sample. These groups 
were subsequently clustered into three groups: Q1 and Q2; Q3 and Q4; and Q5 
respectively, to account for the minimal differences amongst the proximal quintiles. 
Literacy within the study context was defined as those above the age of 15 years who 
could read and write (182). The mean perceived health status of each household was 
calculated as the average self-reported health status value for all household members. 
The final value of the mean perceived health status was assigned a value of between 
1 and 4, with 1 being “very good” health status; 2 being “good” health status; 3 being 
“poor” health status; and 4 being “very poor” health status.  
We used multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models to estimate the association 
between health insurance enrolment and the explanatory variables. We took the 
clustering of households at the village level into account using random effects for 
village. In light of the low numbers of insured households within our study population, 
it was not possible to include multiple covariates simultaneously in the model. 
Therefore, univariate models were run to estimate the association of each variable and 
health insurance enrolment for the ROSCA and non-ROSCA households respectively. 
We ran the regression models for (i) ROSCA and non-ROSCA separately to easily gain 
estimates of the univariate odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals; and (ii) on the 
full dataset with ROSCA and non-ROSCA households in order to use interaction terms 
to directly test whether the associations between each covariate and NHIF enrolment 
were affected by ROSCA membership. Each model included the covariate, ROSCA 
membership, and the interaction term as explanatory variables. 
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7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Study population characteristics 
A total of 444 households were enumerated in the survey, with ROSCA member 
households accounting for 63% of the study population. Approximately 29% of ROSCA 
households and 23% of non-ROSCA households were voluntarily enrolled into the 
NHIF. While ROSCA members are actively targeted by the NHIF for enrolment, our 
study did not find a statistically significant association between ROSCA membership 
and health insurance enrolment (OR: 1.33 0.85-2.09). Table 8 reports the differences 
in each test variable according to insurance status and household ROSCA 
membership status. 
 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics by gender and insurance status  
 ROSCA member Non-ROSCA member 
 Insured 
(n=81) 
Uninsured 
(n=200) 
Combined 
(n=281) 
Insured 
(n=38) 
Uninsured 
(n=125) 
Combined 
(n=163) 
Household characteristics 
Mean household size  4.160 4.035 4.071 4.553 3.920 4.067 
Households with children 
<=5 years 
48% 59% 56% 61% 58% 58% 
Households with children 
<=15 years 
75% 76% 76% 84% 78% 79% 
Households with elderly 
>=60 years 
11% 6% 7% 8% 10% 10% 
Average socioeconomic 
status (SES) score 2 
3.469 2.945 3.096 3.158 2.688 2.798 
% of poor households (Q1-
Q2) 
26% 42% 37% 29% 50% 45% 
% of rich households (Q5) 32% 18% 22% 18% 15% 16% 
Annual average household 
expenditure (KShs) 
365,060 361,195 362,309 373,513 230,524 263,859 
Household head characteristics 
Average age (median)  38.85 34.74 35.93 33.95 35.11 34.84 
Female household heads 21% 29% 26% 13% 34% 29% 
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1 USD = 102.45 KShs as of January 2018 
 
Most household heads in our study population reported themselves as economically 
active, with 94% of respondents carrying out casual income-generating activities in lieu 
of formal employment. The most common economic activities amongst our study 
population were small-scale business ventures, with 56% of the population engaging 
in activities such as carpentry, masonry, and hairdressing. This notwithstanding, our 
findings revealed that 26% of our study population lived below the poverty line, which 
is defined as a household income of less than $1.90 a day (164). 
The household characteristics and health status for the sample population were 
broadly similar regardless of ROSCA membership status. Overall, the median 
household size was 4, with 77% of all households having children below the age of 15 
Secondary-level education 
and above 
63% 49% 53% 71% 43% 50% 
Married household heads 83% 72% 75% 87% 66% 71% 
Small-scale business owner 56% 57% 57% 32% 62% 55% 
More than one earner 52% 32% 37% 39% 19% 24% 
Fixed salary 19% 13% 14% 42% 13% 20% 
Profits as remuneration 27% 24% 25% 18% 18% 18% 
Average monthly income 
(KShs) 
20,522 14,923 16,537 14,929 10,552 11,572 
Household health status 
Mean health status  2.036 1.961 1.983 2.026 2.039 2.036 
Presence of chronic disease 4% 6% 5% 3% 7% 6% 
Use of curative services 
Outpatient service use in 
past 30 days 
48% 49% 48% 45% 37% 39% 
Use of NHIF-accredited 
outpatient facilities  
32% 33% 32% 42% 19% 25% 
Inpatient service use in past 
year 
36% 25% 28% 16% 22% 21% 
Use of NHIF-accredited 
hospitalisation facilities  
32% 20% 23% 13% 18% 17% 
Annual per capita health 
expenditure (KShs) 2 
1,729 739 1,025 569 818 760 
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years. The number of households with elderly members was low across the study 
population, with only 8% of households having members above the age of 65 years. 
The study population also showed similarities in the gender and marital status of 
household heads, irrespective of ROSCA membership status. Further, the study found 
similarities in the mean household health status, with 5% of households reporting the 
presence of chronic disease.  
The study found important distinctions in the economic characteristics of ROSCA and 
non-ROSCA households. ROSCA members were more likely to have more than one 
earner in the household and higher monthly incomes compared to non-members.  
 
7.4.2 Factors associated with voluntary health insurance enrolment 
amongst ROSCA and non-ROSCA member households 
Household-level regression results are presented in Table 2 for ROSCA and non-
ROSCA member households. 
 
Table 2: Univariate logistic estimates for probability of purchasing NHIF health insurance at household level 
 ROSCA members  
(n=163)  
Non-ROSCA members 
(n=281)  
Interaction* 
(n=444) 
Variable description Odds ratio CI Odds ratio CI p-value 
Household characteristics 
Presence of children 
<15 years 
0.92 0.49–1.72 1.54 0.59–4.05 0.50 
Presence of elderly 
>60 years 
1.93 0.76–4.90 0.74 0.20–2.74 0.15 
Socioeconomic status (Reference group: First and second quintiles) 
Middle wealth 1.71 0.91–3.23 2.56 1.12–5.88 
0.47 
Wealthiest quintile 2.81 1.38–5.73 2.08 0.71–6.10 
Household head characteristics 
Sex of household head (Reference group: Male) 
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Female  0.65 0.35–1.23 0.29 0.11–0.79 0.09 
Age (Reference group: 24 years) 
25 – 29 years 0.71 0.27-1.90 1.29 0.35-4.72 
0.16 
30 – 45 years 0.92 0.38-2.22 2.16 0.65-7.17 
46 – 59 years 1.92 0.68-5.42 1.79 0.41-7.86 
60+ years 1.92 0.59-6.24 0.42 0.04-4.18 
Education (Reference group: Primary level or less) 
Secondary 
education or higher 
1.80 1.05–3.11 3.23 1.47–7.08 0.84 
Employment type (Reference group: Paid employees) 
Self-employed 0.95 0.55–1.66 0.25 0.11–0.57 
0.03 
No fixed 
employment 
1.15 0.35–3.75 0.55 0.14–2.25 
Remuneration (Reference group: Fixed salary) 
Daily/hourly pay 0.70 0.29–1.71 0.20 0.07–0.53 
0.19 
Task-based 
payment 
0.52 0.23–1.14 0.15 0.05–0.44 
Business profits 0.76 0.33–1.76 0.32 0.11–0.95 
Marital status (Reference group: Unmarried) 
Married 1.87 0.96–3.64 3.46 1.26–9.51 0.57 
Presence of chronic 
illness in household 
0.65 0.17–2.44 0.35 0.43–2.84 0.46 
*The p-values assess whether the association between each variable and NHIF membership is significantly different 
for the ROSCA and non-ROSCA households. The odds in the reference group are multiplied by the odds ratio for 
each category. 
 
Our study found that education and asset-based SES were associated with NHIF 
demand, regardless of ROSCA membership status. Household heads in the study 
population were more likely to enrol into the national health insurance scheme if they 
were educated to at least secondary school level (OR=1.80 (CI:1.05–3.11) for ROSCA 
members, and OR=3.23 (CI:1.47–7.08) for non-ROSCA members (interaction 
test=0.84). Our findings also suggest that SES was associated with health insurance 
demand, although there was no evidence that the strength of the association was 
influenced by ROSCA membership status (p-value=0.47).  
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Our analysis showed that the relationship between NHIF enrolment and some socio-
demographic and economic variables could be influenced by a household’s ROSCA 
status. The study found that household heads that were self-employed or had no fixed 
employment were significantly less likely to enrol into the NHIF if they did not belong 
to a ROSCA (p-value=0.03).  
Our findings also raise the possibility of a stronger relationship between gender and 
national health insurance demand if one does not belong to a ROSCA than if one does 
(p-value=0.09). According to our analysis, non-ROSCA female household heads were 
less likely to enrol into the NHIF compared with their male counterparts (OR=0.29 
(CI:0.11–0.79). The odds ratio among the ROSCA member group was 0.65 (CI:0.35–
1.23). Given the low treatment numbers amongst the insured, the borderline effect of 
ROSCA membership on the relationship between gender and health insurance 
demand infers that it may play an influencing role on the association between the 
explanatory variable and NHIF enrolment.  
In addition to the above associations, our findings suggest that NHIF demand may 
increase if the household head was married or received a fixed salary. There was, 
however, no evidence that these associations were influenced by ROSCA 
membership.  
 
 
7.5 Discussion 
This study investigated the influence of informal financial coping mechanisms on the 
demand for formal, more secure forms of financial risk protection in health. Before 
probing the associations between ROSCA membership and health insurance 
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enrolment, it is first necessary to examine the overarching determinants of NHIF 
demand within the general population sample. According to our findings, the NHIF has 
been successful in providing inclusive health insurance coverage regardless of 
household composition or health status. This may be attributed to the NHIF’s benefit 
structure, which enables a household to enrol all its identified dependents under a fixed 
premium irrespective of their individual circumstances. While successful in expanding 
coverage amongst the above-mentioned groups in our study area, we found that the 
NHIF still faces challenges in increasing health insurance demand amongst key 
vulnerable population groups, including those with low levels of education and limited 
asset-based wealth. These findings reflect similar national health financing studies 
across sub-Saharan Africa that have identified a positive correlation between health 
insurance demand and a household head’s educational or asset-based socioeconomic 
status (56,58,59,112,115).  
Viewed through the prism of ROSCA membership, our results inferred that 
sociocultural disenfranchisement due to female household headship reduced NHIF 
demand amongst those not involved in local ROSCAs. However, further analysis 
revealed that these sociocultural constraints on NHIF enrolment were limited amongst 
ROSCA members. With this in mind, it is necessary to examine how ROSCA 
membership changes the terms under which households engage with national power 
structures. 
According to Mladovsky and Mossialos’ social capital framework, bridging capital is 
vital in building norms and rules to facilitate productive behaviour in individuals (172). 
Amongst these norms is the sharing of information and resources amongst socially 
heterogeneous groups, in order to create a fair market. In the context of ROSCAs, 
regular social and economic interaction minimises the information and power 
  
145 
asymmetry witnessed in the general population. ROSCAs thus challenge the power 
structures that are inherent within our study area by developing a common identity 
under which heterogeneous groups interact. This implies that ROSCAs may foster 
social cohesion amongst its members, ostensibly by arming different sociocultural 
groups with the information and financial resources to better understand and afford 
NHIF membership.  
Based on our findings, however, it is, notable from our findings that ROSCA 
membership does not exclusively negate the influence of sociocultural biases on 
national health insurance demand. Cognisant of this, we postulate that the social 
alliances within ROSCAs are ultimately subservient to the economic power held by 
individuals. It is generally accepted that many ROSCAs exclude those unable to pay 
their dues during each payment cycle (183). This means that the wealthy either self-
select into the ROSCAs, or ultimately exclude their poorer counterparts due to non-
payment of fees (157). This leads to the pervasive exclusion of the economically 
marginalised, thus disempowering actors with weak economic agency. The role of 
potential ostracism in limiting the bridging social capital in ROSCAs is observed by the 
fact that the wealthier business owners in our study setting, either due to high 
household head income or multiple earners, were over-represented in ROSCA 
households. It is for this reason that we found that small-scale business owners were 
more likely to be enrolled into the NHIF if they had ROSCA membership.  
It is important to view the findings of this manuscript within the context of the NHIF’s 
broader Universal Health Coverage (UHC) strategy in Kenya. Since 2015, the Kenyan 
Government has provided fully subsidised NHIF coverage to indigents across the 
country through the Health Insurance Subsidy Programme for the Poor (HISP). This 
scheme has set the ambitious goal of expanding health insurance coverage to 9 million 
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indigents across the country by 2020 (184). Additionally, in 2016, the Kenyan 
Government began offering free maternity services (FMS) to all Kenyan women 
through the NHIF (185). With these programs in mind, the NHIF’s ROSCA targeting 
strategy would ostensibly be targeted towards a narrow group of informal sector 
workers who have some degree of economic agency. With this nuanced lens, the 
NHIF’s strategy of targeting the informal sector through ROSCAs may be feasible, 
given their alternative means of targeting those at the bottom of the pyramid through 
premium subsidisation. However, the success of these strategies will be highly 
dependent upon the successful planning and execution of these collaborative 
strategies as collective, as well as effectively identifying households at the bottom of 
the pyramid.  
Given the indefinite nature of social capital, care must be taken in viewing the 
associations reported in this study as causal. We must also acknowledge that the 
structures of ROSCAs and their relationships with stocks of social capital will vary 
considerably. We note that ROSCA membership may be influenced by several non-
observable factors, such as time-availability and self-selection, which directly impact 
one’s ability to participate in ROSCAs. We further acknowledge that the use of 
univariate logistic regression in our study limits our ability to control for some key 
confounders within our analysis. We therefore reiterate that the relationship between 
ROSCA membership and its associated social capital, NHIF enrolment and the 
explanatory variables is associative rather than causative within the context of our 
study. Further, the urban setting of this study limits its external validity in rural areas. 
Nevertheless, this article provides an insight into the transmutability of social capital 
from the local level to national level. It also provides an insight into how an in-depth 
understanding of the social and economic characteristics of target populations can feed 
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into in the design of national-level schemes. Our study has several design limitations 
that may affect the external validity of our study: the study took place in the transitory 
period during which changes to NHIF rates and benefits for the informal sector were 
being negotiated. Due to this context, the study’s applicability may be affected by the 
new NHIF voluntary health insurance regime.  
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This study examined the influence of ROSCA membership and social capital on 
voluntary health insurance enrolment. We posit that socially disadvantaged groups 
may accrue strong bridging social capital by participating in ROSCAs in resource-poor 
areas. However, we suggest that the full benefits of social capital in increasing health 
insurance demand can only be accrued by taking into account the underlying economic 
situation of the target population. We note that the educational and financial situation 
of a household serves as a strong indicator of its capacity to make investment 
decisions, including signing up to a voluntary health insurance scheme. It is therefore 
important to anchor outreach to ROSCAs within a broader, multi-pronged approach 
that targets households within their social, economic and political realities. These 
findings are particularly relevant to countries that may seek to increase voluntary health 
insurance coverage through local associations: it is important to understand the 
demographic challenges of these groups and utilise several strategies and targeting 
mechanisms to ensure equitable access to health insurance for all citizens. 
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8.1 Executive summary 
Background: The informal sector constitutes a sizeable proportion of Kenya’s working 
population, with an estimated 13.3 million workers employed across the country. 
However, this sector remains under-represented in their health insurance coverage, 
with only 18.9% insured through the Kenyan Government’s national health insurance 
scheme, the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF). In line with national and county 
government efforts to increase financial health risk protection amongst this population 
group, this study sought to understand the factors that influence voluntary National 
Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) enrolment amongst the informally-employed in 
Kisumu City. 
Methods: A cross-sectional survey of 440 households was carried out in six informal 
settlements in Kisumu City in July 2016. A structured questionnaire was administered 
on health insurance membership; household attributes; headship characteristics; and 
health- seeking behaviour. Bivariate analyses using χ2 tests were carried out to 
determine the relationship between the explanatory variables and NHIF enrolment. 
Results: The study found that the NHIF has made tangible progress towards covering 
the informal sector, with 27% of the population insured in Kisumu’s informal 
settlements. We found that NHIF membership is inclusive regardless of household 
composition, age, religion or perceived household health status. However, the study 
also revealed inadequacies in the NHIF’s abilities to effectively reach the socially- and 
economically-disadvantaged. In particular, we found that the NHIF still falls short in its 
coverage of key vulnerable population groups such as the “poor”, female-headed 
households, widowed or unmarried individuals, and those with low levels of education. 
Conclusions: While these shortfalls present challenges for the NHIF’s goal of 
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achieving universal health coverage, they are not insurmountable. Indeed, both 
national and the Kisumu County Government have expressed a willingness to increase 
subsidisation of disadvantaged communities within Kisumu City. There has also been 
increased innovation in marketing and payment strategies to increase the uptake of 
the NHIF amongst some underserved populations. Ultimately, the targeting of the 
informal sector will require collaboration between national and county governments to 
optimise the NHIF’s voluntary enrolment and achieve universal health coverage.
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8.2 Introduction 
The informal sector constitutes a sizeable proportion of the working population in 
Kenya, with an estimated 13.3 million workers employed across the country (70). While 
these workers make up approximately 83% of the working population, they remain 
under-represented in their health insurance coverage. Limited health insurance 
coverage is acknowledged to reduce a household’s ability to access health services 
without the threat of financial hardship (98,99,100). It is for this reason that it is 
important for informal sector members to obtain health insurance coverage. In line with 
national and county government efforts to increase financial health risk protection 
amongst this population group, this study sought to understand the factors that 
influence voluntary National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) enrolment amongst the 
informally-employed in Kisumu City. 
 
8.2.1 The National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
Background 
The National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) is a national health insurance scheme 
which provides coverage for approximately 10% of the Kenyan population (70). 
Established in 1966 by the Kenyan Government, it is the largest health insurance 
provider in the country, covering 88.4% of the insured population (187). The NHIF 
operates as a contributory scheme, with mandatory coverage of the formal sector 
through direct taxation of salaries and voluntary enrolment of the informal sector. As a 
result of this structure, the Scheme has achieved a near-universal coverage of the 
country’s formal sector, while informal sector coverage has remained low at 18.9% 
(70). 
  
153 
 
Informal sector and voluntary NHIF enrolment 
NHIF Informal Sector benefit package 
As previously highlighted, informal sector enrolment into the NHIF is elective. In order 
to enrol informal sector workers and their families into the NHIF, potential enrolees are 
charged an annual flat-rate premium. This fee can be paid annually, semi-annually, 
quarterly or monthly depending on the enrolee’s financial realities. The minimum 
monthly income for NHIF eligibility amongst the informal sector is KShs 1000 (US$ 
10.06). In June 2015, the NHIF’s flat-rate Informal Sector enrolment fee was increased 
from KShs 350 (US$ 3.52) to KShs 500 (US$ 5.03) to incorporate the provision of 
outpatient services into the voluntary benefit package. However, the outpatient service 
offerings to be incorporated into the NHIF Voluntary Scheme remained unclear at the 
time of publication of this report. Comparatively, NHIF’s inpatient coverage is more 
clearly defined: the Scheme offers a daily rebate of between KShs 400 (US$ 4.03) and 
KShs 2200 (US$ 22.14) for the first 180 days of hospitalisation. This service package 
is valid for all inpatient treatment with a few exceptions, such as circumcision.
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NHIF and universal health coverage in Kenya 
In 2012, the Kenyan Government identified the NHIF as its chosen vehicle for achieving 
universal health coverage (UHC) (78,79). This strategy was viewed as the most 
effective method for increasing financial health risk protection across the country, given 
the NHIF’s established national and regional networks. Due to the size of the informal 
sector workforce in Kenya, this demographic presents a key growth market for the 
NHIF in this regard. In recognition of this, several county governments, including the 
Kisumu County Government, have focused on targeting voluntary NHIF expansion as 
part of their development and financial health risk protection strategies (213). 
While progress has been made in attracting members of the informal sector 
countrywide, the NHIF continues to face challenges in achieving the enrolment 
numbers necessary to fulfil its UHC mandate. Several studies have been carried out to 
investigate the reasons for the low uptake of the Scheme amongst the informal sector, 
with the majority of work focusing on qualitative studies (80,205). This approach limits 
applicability to the broader Kenyan context, given that the findings in this context are 
only representative of the specific study population. Further, to the author’s knowledge, 
there are few robust quantitative studies investigating the determinants of voluntary 
health insurance enrolment outside of the capital city, Nairobi. Kisumu is one such 
area, where there has been limited quantitative investigation of the uptake of the NHIF 
amongst the informally-employed population. 
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8.3 Methodology 
8.3.1 Study objectives 
Our study sought to understand the factors influencing voluntary NHIF enrolment in 
Kisumu by: 
i. Identifying the population characteristics of the informally-employed 
residents of the four main informal settlements in Kisumu City; 
ii. Estimating the proportion enrolled into the NHIF Informal Sector Scheme 
among the informally-employed; and, 
iii. Investigating the household factors influencing voluntary NHIF 
enrolment. 
Based on the data analysed from the quantitative study, we sought to estimate the 
association between the explanatory variables and health insurance enrolment. 
 
8.3.2 Study design 
A cross-sectional household survey was carried out in Kisumu City between July and 
August 2016 to identify the extent to which health insurance enrolment is influenced 
by: 
▪ Household composition and attributes 
▪ Household head characteristics such as occupation, age, gender and 
membership in solidarity-based groups 
▪ Perceived health status and healthcare utilisation of household members. 
 
Kisumu is the third largest city in Kenya with a population of 491,893 individuals 
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(214). As the largest urban centre in Western Kenya, it has experienced sustained 
population increase, with an annual growth rate of 8% (214). While details on NHIF 
coverage within Kisumu City are not publicly available, the Kenya Health Household 
Expenditure and Utilisation Survey (HHEUS) 2013 reported that 13.80% of residents 
in Kisumu County had NHIF coverage (177). 
 
8.3.3 Sampling methodology 
Our study aimed to estimate the proportion of the informally-employed population 
with voluntary NHIF health insurance, and to assess the effect of explanatory 
variables on this proportion. In order to achieve these aims, we based the sample 
size on the ability to estimate the proportion insured with a certain precision - in this 
case, with an expected NHIF population coverage of 13.8% (177). Using the Hayes 
and Bennett equation, the required sample size was calculated to be 440 households 
with the precision of a 95% confidence interval with width of 10% to 18% (132). 
In spite of the complexities in identifying the informal sector, there is a supposition in 
global literature that the informally-employed are over-represented in informal 
settlements within cities (216). Our study therefore focused data collection in the 
informal settlements of Kisumu City. These settlements are broadly distributed in and 
around Kisumu City, with recent maps identifying ten informal settlements (Figure 
22). However, given the proliferation of these settlements, they often merge or new 
ones are created. Our study population thus encompassed Manyatta A, Manyatta B, 
Nyalenda A, Nyalenda B, Nyamasaria, and Obunga. These areas are understood to 
contain a sizeable proportion of informal settlement residents in Kisumu City (179). 
Our study further clustered sampling across twelve villages located within the six 
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informal settlements, based on the availability of sampling frames (179). 
 
Figure 22: Map of informal settlements in and around Kisumu City 
 
Map provided by Kisumu City Manager 
 
The number of households interviewed in each sub-division was proportional to its 
demographic size, and we assumed that the measure of variability between clusters 
k, the standard deviation divided by the mean, was equal to 0.2 (132). The 
demographic size of each sub-division was obtained from calculations carried out in 
the previous national census, whose estimates may be viewed in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Population within informal settlements and sample size calculation 
Sub-
location 
Population 
size* 
Number of 
households* 
Households 
interviewed 
Percentage of 
sample 
Manyatta A 48004 12525 136 31% 
Manyatta B 27952 7808 85 19% 
Nyalenda A 28269 8070 88 20% 
Nyalenda B 32430 8561 93 21% 
Obunga 12554 3553 39 9% 
* Obtained from (178) 
 
For the analysis of risk factors influencing NHIF enrolment, we did not know the likely 
distribution of the explanatory variables. Assuming that an influencing factor is found 
in 50% of the population, then the sample size would allow a comparison of 9% with 
health insurance with the factor compared to 19% without the factor with 80% power 
and 5% significance, based on simulation. 
In order to carry out sampling, we obtained slum enumeration maps developed by the 
Pamoja Trust in conjunction with informal settlement residents (179). We subsequently 
collaborated with the Assistant Chiefs and local community health workers in each 
settlement to confirm the accuracy of the available maps. We randomly selected our 
data collection starting points around watering points in each settlement. This was 
driven by the use of watering points as navigation tools by the local communities. We 
subsequently carried out systematic sampling, with every nth household interviewed. 
99% of the targeted households could be interviewed. 
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8.3.4 Survey tools and data analysis 
The survey was administered as a structured questionnaire using Open Data Kit (ODK) 
software on handheld tablets to answer questions on household composition; 
household assets; household expenditure and consumption; and health-seeking 
behaviour. Research assistants who were fluent in English, Kiswahili and the local 
dialect, Luo, and who had knowledge of the local geographical and sociocultural 
context were hired. Training was provided to familiarise research assistants with the 
questionnaire and data collection using handheld tablets. 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained through the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) of Strathmore University, Kenya (Ethics Reference No. SU-IRB 0057/16; Date of 
approval: 15th June 2016). Ethical procedures utilised during the duration of the study 
emphasised the need for all respondents to understand the project’s aims and 
objectives, as well as necessitated individual informed consent prior to any data 
collection. Additionally, the study emphasised the importance of ensuring 
confidentiality and privacy in order to improve the quality of data collected. All 
interviewees provided signed approval to participate in the study. 
Household heads were targeted as the primary respondents for this study. In cases 
where the household head was not available, a competent adult respondent within the 
household (usually a spouse) was interviewed. 
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Figure 23: Typical research setting 
 
 
Photograph taken by Tessa Oraro-Lawrence 
 
There is no clear-cut definition of the informally-employed to assist with their 
identification in research. Comparatively, the formal sector is defined distinctly within 
Kenya’s legal framework, with sector members legally obligated to make monthly 
payments to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) (180). The NSSF is the 
Government agency tasked with providing pension payments to all members of 
society. While monthly payments to the NSSF are mandatory for the formal sector, the 
informal sector can choose whether or not to make monthly contributions. We therefore 
viewed NSSF membership as the most effective way of excluding the formal sector 
given the study’s time and resource constraints. Consequently, informally-employed 
households were defined within the study as those where the household head did not 
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make mandatory monthly payments into the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). 
Insured households were defined as those where members were voluntarily enrolled 
into the NHIF Informal Sector Scheme in the year preceding the study. 
The data were analysed using STATA version 14.1 for Windows (STATA Corporation, 
College Station, Texas). The main outcome variable was enrolment into the NHIF 
Informal Sector Scheme in the previous year. The explanatory variables were divided 
into five components: household composition and attributes; household head factors; 
perceived household health status; health service utilisation; and proxies for exposure 
to financial risk pooling. 
In order to measure wealth, we constructed an asset index from the Kenya 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) index which measures the relative wealth 
ranking of households (181). We collected data on consumer items, dwelling 
characteristics such as housing materials, water source, sleeping arrangements, and 
other characteristics linked to wealth status. Weights were assigned for each 
household asset as provided for by the DHS wealth index. Households were then 
classified into one of five socioeconomic groups based on quintiles (Q): Q1 or the 
poorest 20%; Q2; Q3; Q4; and Q5 or the wealthiest 20% in the sample. The DHS 
wealth index used is included in Appendix D. Literacy within the study context was 
defined as those above the age of 15 years who could read and write (182). Mean 
perceived health status was calculated as the average self-reported health status value 
for all household members. The final value of the mean perceived health status was 
assigned a value of between 1 and 4, with 1 being “very good” health status; 2 being 
“good” health status; 3 being “poor” health status; and 4 being “very poor” health status. 
Bivariate analyses using χ2 tests were carried out to determine the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and NHIF enrolment. 
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In addition to the quantitative analysis, we carried out a literature review of various 
financial, health strategy and political documents to identify the external factors that 
may influence the ability of the NHIF to effectively target certain population groups.  
 
 
8.4 Results and discussion 
8.4.1 Study population characteristics 
A snapshot of the study population characteristics is provided in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Demographic characteristics of study population 
 Insured (n=118) Uninsured (n=316) Total (n=444) 
Location 
Manyatta A 39% 28% 31% 
Manyatta B 21% 21% 21% 
Nyalenda 36% 41% 39% 
Obunga 4% 11% 9% 
Socioeconomic quintile 
Q1 (poorest) 13% 22% 20% 
Q2 13% 22% 20% 
Q3 24% 20% 21% 
Q4 22% 18% 19% 
Q5 (richest) 28% 17% 20% 
% of households below 
poverty line * 
 
22% 
 
27% 
 
26% 
Sex of household head 
Male 82% 69% 73% 
Female 18% 31% 27% 
Sex of all household members (n=1,814) 
Male 50% 46% 47% 
Female 50% 54% 53% 
Age groups of household members (n=1,814) 
0-1 years 5% 5% 5% 
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1-5 years 11% 15% 14% 
6-15 years 25% 24% 25% 
16-19 years 8% 8% 8% 
20-29 years 25% 27% 26% 
30-44 years 17% 15% 16% 
45-59 years 6% 4% 4% 
60+ years 3% 2% 2% 
Maximum level of education for literate adults (n=931) 
Primary-level 24% 50% 46% 
Secondary-level 51% 42% 44% 
Tertiary-level 15% 8% 10% 
* Poverty line is defined as a household income of $1.90 daily (World Bank 2017) 
** Literacy is defined as the ability of an individual above the age of 15 years to read and write (UNESCO 2006) 
 
The average household size in our sample was 4.07, which correlates to the Kisumu 
County household size reported in the Kenya Housing Survey Report (217). More than 
half of the interviewed households (56.6%) had children below the age of five years, 
while 77% of households had children aged fifteen years and below. 
Literacy levels were very high in our study population, with 97% of household heads 
reporting themselves as literate (Figure 24). While most household heads had some 
level of exposure to formal schooling, we found that very few were educated to tertiary 
level: only 6.97% attended universities or colleges. This may be reflective of the nature 
of slum populations, where few inhabitants have access to the financial resources 
necessary to attend higher education facilities. 
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Figure 24: Percentage of household heads attending education level (n=444) 
 
 
Most household heads reported themselves as economically active, with 6% of 
respondents reporting unemployment. The most common economic activity in our 
study area was self- employment, with 56% of the population engaging in small-scale 
business ventures such as carpentry, masonry, and hairdressing (Figure 25). This 
finding reveals the realities of the informal economy, which relies on the creation of 
casual income-generating activities in the absence of formal employment. The 
haphazard nature of the informal sector means that members are forced to create or 
take advantage of various economic opportunities in order to finance their households’ 
needs. 
 
Figure 25: Main source of employment for household heads (n=444) 
 
3%
45%
45%
7% No formal education
Primary-level education
Secondary-level
education
Tertiary-level education
6%
38%
15%
41%
Unemployed
Paid employee
Self-employed with
employees
Self-employed without
employees
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According to our findings, households within our study area had an average monthly 
income of KShs 10792 ($108.57). However, twenty-six percent of this population lived 
below the poverty line, which is defined as a household income of less than $1.90 a 
day (144). Manyatta B was found to have the highest level of poverty (as defined by 
the poverty line), with 39% of households living below the poverty line. Manyatta A, 
Nyalenda, and Obunga registered poverty rates of 20%, 24% and 28% respectively. 
When average perceived health status for all household members was queried, our 
study found that 59% of households rated their health as “good”, mirroring the findings 
of the Kenya Healthcare Expenditure and Utilisation Survey 2011 (Figure 26). This 
notwithstanding, we also found that the study population was 18% more likely to report 
“poor” household health status compared to the overall Kenyan population (187). This 
may be linked to the high HIV prevalence of 14.6% within the County (214). 
 
Figure 26: Average household self-reported health status compared to national estimates (n=444) 
 
(187) 
In order to provide optimal healthcare services to the populace, the NHIF has 
contracted 73 government, private for-profit, and faith-based healthcare facilities for 
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outpatient care in Kisumu County. Further, it has accredited 18 hospitals to provide 
inpatient care within Kisumu City. Our study found that ill household members had a 
preference for public health facilities, with Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Teaching and 
Referral Hospital, private district hospitals and public health centres preferred over 
private facilities for both inpatient and outpatient care (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27: Percentage of patients visiting health facility type* 
 
* Inpatient results refer to household visits in the past year, and outpatient results refer to household visits in 
the past 30 days. 
 
8.4.1 NHIF population coverage 
Our study found that the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) has achieved a 
population coverage rate of 27% in the informal settlements of Kisumu City: almost 
twice as high as the 14% Kisumu County health insurance coverage estimated within 
the Kenya Health Household Expenditure and Utilisation Survey (HHEUS) in 2013 
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(177). This suggests that the NHIF has been successful thus far in targeting and 
enrolling the informally-employed in Kisumu’s informal settlements. 
 
8.4.2 Household composition and attributes 
Household size and composition 
Based on our findings, the average household size for NHIF-insured households was 
4.29, compared to the average non-insured household size of 3.99. Seventy-eight 
percent of NHIF-insured households had children below the age of 15 years, compared 
to 77% of non- insured households. Further, 10% of NHIF-insured households were 
found to have elderly members, compared to 8% of non-insured households. In spite 
of these differences, our study found that neither the household size (p-value=0.170) 
nor the presence of vulnerable members such as children (p-value=0.220) or the 
elderly (p-value=0.103) influenced the likelihood of enrolling into the NHIF. This 
highlights the advantage of NHIF’s enrolment strategy: The all-encompassing 
coverage of all spouses and underage dependents limits the likelihood of abstention 
from health insurance on the basis of household composition. 
 
Wealth status 
According to our findings, 50% of NHIF-insured households fell within the two 
wealthiest asset-based quintiles in the study population, compared to 35% of the non-
insured population (Figure 28). With households belonging to the poorest 80% less 
likely to enrol into the NHIF compared to the highest wealth quintile, our study found 
that wealth was an important determinant of voluntary NHIF enrolment (p-value=0.010) 
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Figure 28: Socioeconomic status of households based on asset-based wealth index (n=444) 
 
 
8.4.3 Household head characteristics 
Age 
NHIF’s membership in Kisumu’s informal settlements was largely comprised of 
households headed by young to middle-aged individuals, with 79% of all insured 
household heads falling below the age of 45 years (Figure 29). Nevertheless, our study 
found that households were not deterred from joining NHIF in Kisumu’s informal 
settlements due to the age of the household head (p-value=0.221). Indeed, the age 
patterns of NHIF members largely corresponded to those of non-insured household 
heads, making NHIF’s coverage representative of the age profile of household heads 
within the study population.
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Figure 29: Percentage of household heads in each age group (n=444) 
 
 
Gender and marital status 
Our study found that 18% of insured households in the study area were headed by 
women, compared to 31% of non-insured households. Further analysis revealed that 
that female- headed households were less likely to enrol into the NHIF compared to 
males (p-value=0.010). 
We also found that 84% of insured household heads were married, compared to 69% 
of the non-insured (Figure 30). Analysis revealed that households were more likely to 
enrol into NHIF if they had married household heads (p-value=0.006), echoing similar 
findings in other Kenyan studies investigating the determinants on NHIF enrolment 
(57,64). 
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Figure 30: Marital status of household heads (n=444) 
 
 
Education 
Due to the high level of literacy in Kisumu City, literacy as an independent factor did 
not influence NHIF enrolment. However, the level of education of a household head 
was identified as a determining factor of health insurance enrolment, with the 
proportion of insured individuals increasing proportionally to their level of education (p-
value=0.000) (Figure 31). Those educated to secondary-level and above were thus 
over-represented amongst the insured population, with 66% of the insured educated 
to at least secondary school level. 
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Figure 31: Maximum level of education of literate household heads (n=444) 
 
 
Income and remuneration type 
According to our findings, 25% of the study population reported earnings of less than 
KShs 1000 (US$ 10.06) per month – the minimum monthly income for NHIF eligibility. 
This inevitably calls into question the ability of the NHIF to comprehensively cover the 
informal sector given this prerequisite for enrolment. This concern is further bolstered 
by the fact that our study found that monthly income influenced health insurance 
enrolment (p-value=0.028). It is, however, important to note that the reported incomes 
may not be accurate, due to the informal sector’s unwillingness to share detailed 
financial information. 
We also found that those who earned regular incomes were more likely to be enrolled 
into the NHIF compared to this with less certain forms of income (p-value=0.005). As 
shown in Figure 32, those who earned regular incomes were almost twice as likely 
enrol into the NHIF than those whose remuneration was provided using other means. 
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This raises concerns about whether the informal sector, who typically have irregular 
sources of income, may be able to overcome barriers in the affordability, and therefore 
accessibility of the NHIF Informal Sector Scheme. 
 
Figure 32: Percentage of household heads by remuneration type (n=444) 
 
 
Belief in social solidarity 
According to our findings, more than two-thirds of household heads (68%) agreed in 
principle that other community members should benefit from their financial input into 
the NHIF if they do not contract illness (Figure 33). This suggests that there is a belief 
in social solidarity within our study area. 
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Figure 33: Percentage holding view on social solidarity within NHIF Informal Sector Scheme (n=444) 
 
 
While it is evident that many believe in helping their neighbours, it is important to note 
that we did not find any evidence suggesting that a strong belief in social solidarity 
results in NHIF enrolment (p-value=0.491). Similarly, we did not find a link between 
chamaas or Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisation (SACCO) membership and 
NHIF demand (p-value=0.206). This divergence implies that members of the public 
may be unable to link the NHIF and its activities to the concept of social solidarity. 
 
8.4.4 Perceived household health status and healthcare utilisation 
Average perceived household health status 
According to our findings, 65% of NHIF-insured households in the study population 
reported having ‘good’ or ‘very good’ average health status, compared to 68% of non-
insured households (Figure 34). However, self-reported health status did not differ 
significantly between NHIF-insured and uninsured households (p-value=0.784), 
suggesting that the households do not actively seek for NHIF membership on the basis 
of their perceived health status. 
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Figure 34: Average household self-reported health status by health insurance status (n=444) 
 
 
Use of free government-funded health programs by household members 
In the backdrop of the NHIF’s core activities, our study identified a number of parallel 
government-funded health programs providing free healthcare services to members of 
the population in Kisumu City. Based on our findings, 19% of household members in 
our study area were targeted by programs such as the Community HIV Health 
Programme and the Child Health Services (Figure 35). Of the free healthcare services 
provided by the Kenyan Government, only the Health Insurance Subsidy Programme 
for the Poor (HISP) is fully integrated into the NHIF. However, the Kenyan Government 
has recently taken steps towards channelling free maternity services through the NHIF. 
Accordingly, KShs 3.4 billion was allocated for the provision of free maternal healthcare 
in the 2017/2018 budget (185). 
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Figure 35: Percentage of individuals in study population receiving free public health care services (n=1,712) 
 
 
Due to the vertical nature of the other free healthcare services identified within our 
study, families are typically not holistically integrated into the healthcare system with 
these vertical programs. This necessitates a discussion amongst stakeholders on the 
feasibility of integrating these programs into the NHIF, in order to provide 
comprehensive healthcare families for affected households. 
 
Use of NHIF-accredited facilities 
Our study found that the study population was inclined to use public health facilities 
when ill. Amongst patients seeking outpatient services, 62% of NHIF-insured members 
sought care in at the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Teaching and Referral Hospital, or the 
various public district hospitals or health centres situated across Kisumu City. 
Conversely, 86% of non-insured patients sought healthcare services in the above-
mentioned facilities. However, it is important to note that insurance status did not 
influence patients’ likelihood to attend NHIF-accredited facilities (p-value=0.257) 
(Table 11). 
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Amongst the ill who sought hospitalisation, we found that 80% of both NHIF-insured 
and non-insured ill household members sought services in public facilities. In spite of 
the quality and cost benefits of attending NHIF-accredited facilities, our study found 
that NHIF members do not actively seek these facilities when facing hospitalisation (p-
value=0.179) (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Percentage of sick household members attending healthcare facility type according to health insurance 
status* 
 
 
Inpatient services Outpatient services 
Insured Uninsured Insured Uninsured 
National referral hospital 46% 26% 25% 22% 
Public district hospital 27% 49% 28% 26% 
Public health centre 5% 15% 9% 38% 
Private for-profit health centre 5% 1% 15% 4% 
Private clinic/surgery 11% 8% 15% 8% 
Mission/NGO facility 3% 1% 4% 0% 
Dispensary 0% 0% 4% 1% 
Other 3% 0% 0% 0% 
* Inpatient results refer to household visits in the past year, and outpatient results refer to household visits in the 
past 30 days 
 
This result is surprising, given that one would expect insured households to attend 
NHIF-accredited facilities in order to receive the benefits associated with their 
membership. It suggests that enrolees either may not understand the benefits of 
visiting NHIF-accredited facilities, or do not attribute quality healthcare services to 
accredited facilities. Further research is required to assess the reasons behind this 
finding. 
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8.5 Conclusions 
The NHIF Informal Sector Scheme has been making tangible progress towards 
achieving universal health coverage in Kisumu’s informal settlements. It has achieved 
a population coverage rate of 27% amongst the informally-employed in our study area: 
almost twice as high as the 14% Kisumu County health insurance coverage estimated 
within the Kenya Health Household Expenditure and Utilisation Survey (HHEUS) in 
2013 (177). We found that NHIF membership is inclusive of the informal sector 
population regardless of household composition, age, religion and perceived 
household health status. However, we also found that the Scheme is unable to 
effectively reach the socially- and economically-disadvantaged, including the poor; 
female-headed households; widowed or unmarried households; and households 
whose heads achieved low levels of education. 
According to our findings, wealth was an important determinant of voluntary NHIF 
enrolment (p-value=0.010), with only 13% NHIF-insured households falling within the 
poorest asset- based quintiles. Comparatively, 22% of uninsured households fell within 
the same wealth quintile. Female-headed households were also less likely to enrol into 
the NHIF compared to males (p-value=0.010). Further, households were less likely to 
enrol into the NHIF if the household head was unmarried (p-value=0.006). The amount 
(p-value=0.028) and regularity (p-value=0.005) of income played an important role in 
determining one’s enrolment into the NHIF. We further noted that 25% of our study 
population earned less than 1000 KShs per month – the minimum earning amount 
required to enrol into the NHIF Informal Sector Scheme. This inevitably calls into 
question the ability of the NHIF to comprehensively cover the informal sector given this 
prerequisite for enrolment. Finally, our study found a disconnect in the populace’s 
ability to attribute social solidarity to the NHIF. Indeed, while more than two-thirds of 
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the population agreed that other community members should benefit from the NHIF if 
they do not contract illness, we did not find any evidence suggesting that a strong belief 
in social solidarity results in NHIF enrolment (p-value=0.491). 
While these shortfalls present challenges for the NHIF’s goal of achieving universal 
health coverage, they are not insurmountable. Indeed, both national and county 
governments have expressed a willingness to increase subsidisation of disadvantaged 
communities within Kisumu City. In recognition of the need to provide health insurance 
coverage for the poor, the Kenyan Government set up the Health Insurance Subsidy 
Programme for the Poor (HISP) in 2015 – a fully-subsidised scheme providing 
coverage to indigents across the country. The scheme was originally set up in 2015 
to provide health insurance to 21,546 households, with a view of expanding to 9 
million indigents by 2020. Additionally, the Government has announced plans to offer 
free maternity services (FMS) to all Kenyan women through the NHIF. At county level, 
the Kisumu County Government allocated KShs 5 million in 2016 towards a revolving 
cash transfer fund in order to provide the elderly, needy and vulnerable with NHIF 
coverage (215). 
There has also been increased innovation in the marketing and payment strategies 
targeting voluntary enrolees into the NHIF. For example, in recognition of the low levels 
of formal banking amongst the informal sector, the NHIF has tapped into the 
burgeoning mobile application industry for the payment of NHIF remittances amongst 
the informal sector. Further, the Scheme has partnered with a mobile e-wallet 
application known as JamboPay to enable enrolees to pay their NHIF remittances 
through all mobile networks in the country. It is hoped that this will simplify payment 
processes for some underserved populations. 
In light of our findings and the above-mentioned developments, we recommend the 
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following actions at County level to increase the uptake of voluntary NHIF coverage: 
• Collaborate with chamaas and SACCOs to develop community outreach 
activities that: 
o Explains the concept of health insurance using simple language that is 
understandable to the target population; 
o Simply and effectively communicates the ethos central to the concept 
of social health insurance, i.e. the pooling of funds for the good of the 
community as a whole; and, 
o Shows NHIF alignment to the social values ascribed to by the public. 
• Extend Kisumu County funding towards the subsidisation of NHIF coverage 
for the elderly, needy and vulnerable. 
• Lobby Central Government to integrate vertical health programs into the NHIF 
to reduce administrative costs, and ensure that all household members 
receive adequate financial health risk protection. 
It is important to note that this study took place in the transitory period during which 
changes to NHIF rates and benefits for the informal sector were being negotiated. Due 
to this, the study’s results may not be applicable in the new NHIF voluntary health 
insurance regime. Nevertheless, it provides important insight into the progress of the 
NHIF coverage within Kisumu’s informal settlements. 
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9 General discussion and conclusion 
In this section, the research and analysis laid out in previous chapters is appraised 
from the point of view of their theoretical and methodological contributions towards 
scholarship on UHC priority-setting and adhesion to voluntary health insurance. 
Building on the gaps identified in Chapter 2, this doctoral thesis sought to understand 
the institutional and household factors which influence inclusive and sustainable 
financial risk protection among the informal sector in Kenya and Cameroon. It thus 
focused on two key objectives:  
1. Investigating the influence of priority-setting by key health systems actors on 
universal health coverage and health financing strategy  
2. Estimating and critically analysing the factors that influence the value 
proposition of voluntary health insurance among different constituent groups of 
the informal sector. 
 
The first research objective was addressed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, while the second 
objective was touched upon in Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 8. Chapter 6 sought to investigate 
if and how the gender of the household head influences demand for voluntary micro 
health insurance scheme in North-West Cameroon. Chapter 8 investigated the 
influence of localised savings group membership on the decision to enrol into voluntary 
national health insurance in Kenya. Comparatively, Chapters 7 and 8 presented 
working papers on UHC and voluntary health insurance that applied the standard 
empirical research approach on the determinants of voluntary health insurance 
demand. For the purposes of analysing our contribution towards Objective 1, we will 
focus our analysis on Chapter 4. For Objective 2, we will focus on the findings of 
Chapters 6 and 8 respectively. 
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By critically reviewing the above-mentioned research findings, this chapter argues that 
the socio-political context within which decision-making is conducted is as important to 
health financing research as the empirical investigation of health-related outcomes. 
We further demonstrate the importance of reflecting the complexity of decision-making 
groups in health financing research design in order to provide more representative 
analyses that can be applied to the real-world setting.  
 
 
9.1 Summary of findings 
An overview of the research findings as pertains to this thesis’ research objectives is 
provided below. We highlight the key takeaways of the research undertaken and relate 
them to the existing knowledge on health policy, the social determinants of health, and 
behavioural economics. 
 
Objective 1: To investigate the influence of priority-setting by policymakers and 
key opinion leaders on universal health coverage and health financing strategy 
in Kenya 
In the absence of a substantive priority-setting process through which the UHC health 
strategy could be defined in Kenya, the research in Chapter 4 sought to investigate the 
values and priorities underpinning the country’s potential paths towards UHC.  
Our findings reveal a highly dynamic environment in Kenya’s health policy 
environment, where actors differ substantively in the way they perceive potential UHC 
values and priorities. This reflects other priority-setting studies that have found 
variances in the way different stakeholders interact with the Kenyan healthcare system 
and perceive health systems decisions at local level (14,15). We postulate that 
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stakeholders’ articulated values are aligned to their dogmatic principles and their depth 
of interaction with the country’s health and political systems. Accordingly, our findings 
suggest that county and national government stakeholders prioritise health 
maximisation as their main UHC policy goal in Kenya, ostensibly due to proximity to 
elected government officials. Conversely, technical experts seem to value the 
legitimacy of their policy decisions, pushing for objectives that, in their view, optimise 
technical feasibility and sustainability. Development partners, on the other hand, 
leverage their fiduciary obligation to funders when participating in priority-setting 
activities.  
In light of this heterogeneity on Kenya’s preferred health systems values, we observe 
continued uncertainty on what UHC will look like and how it will develop within the 
country. Indeed, while stakeholders agree in principle to the suitability of a progressive 
move towards UHC, there is an undeniable variance in their preferences for the priority 
actions and investments necessary to achieve UHC. This reiterates existing findings 
on the inherently political nature of health policy in various sub-Saharan African 
settings (18,20,21,23), and provides a ripe environment for a politically-driven priority-
setting that may favour haphazard decision-making.  
Our findings ultimately suggest that a perceived lack of leadership from the national 
Ministry of Health may be detrimental to Kenya’s ability to define its priorities in its 
move towards UHC. This reflects global consensus that places the responsibility of 
delivering a rational path towards UHC on each country’s government (8,11,207–209). 
We further note that the decentralisation of healthcare delivery to the sub-national level 
in Kenya presents an additional consideration in the country’s move towards UHC. Our 
findings suggest that the inability of Kenya’s county governments to identify their health 
systems gaps and to align between policies, technical planning and budgetary 
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allocation may exacerbate the country’s ambivalent progress towards UHC. This 
supports existing scholarship that has questions the technical capacity of county 
governments in Kenya to adapt to their newly-implemented roles in healthcare planning 
and implementation (14).  
Without a common understanding of Kenya’s UHC priorities, this thesis suggests that 
it will continue to face difficulties in objectively and holistically defining the UHC 
priorities driving its health financing investments. It is therefore likely that Kenya’s 
health system will continue to be plagued by the misattribution of resources as it seeks 
to drive the country towards UHC. The imbalance created by poor public investment 
leaves the Kenyan population susceptible to ill health due to limited access to quality 
healthcare services, and increases the risk of impoverishment due to ill health due to 
a poorly-implemented financial risk protection system.  
 
Objective 2: To estimate and critically analyse the factors that influence the value 
proposition of voluntary health insurance among different constituent groups of 
the informal sector 
In order to conduct tackle Objective 2 of this thesis, we sought to examine if and how 
membership of two informal sector subgroups influenced health insurance demand: 
female household heads and members of localised informal savings groups. The 
rationale behind the targeting of these particular subgroups was two-fold: firstly, these 
groups are likely to hold authority to exercise control over their household’s investment 
decisions due to their household headship position or involvement in other financial 
decision-making. Secondly, they represented populations that are typically excluded 
from formal social and financial institutions.  
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Taken cumulatively, our results suggest that social position plays an important role in 
determining one’s exposure to health-aiding or health-hindering characteristics. As 
such, we hypothesise that informal sector subgroups have differential vulnerability to 
certain social stratifiers that influence their buy-in into social support networks such as 
health insurance. In the Cameroon study in Chapter 6, female household heads were 
less likely in seeking health insurance if they had a lower income: a finding that was 
non-significant in males. In Chapter 8, small-scale business owners were less likely to 
enrol into health insurance in Kenya if they did not belong to local savings groups. 
These results support the previous assertions that certain groups may be 
disadvantaged in the sociocultural environment due to their underlying characteristics, 
resulting in limited access to information, financial resources and support networks 
(69).  
In spite of this, our analysis suggests that exposure to resources that create social 
interdependence or provide access to economic resources may reduce the power 
asymmetry inherent within the societal framework. Indeed, it is clear from our findings 
that proximity to economic, social and cultural power reduces the potential barriers 
towards health insurance enrolment. According to our findings in Cameroon, belonging 
to a social network increased the likelihood of enrolling into voluntary health insurance 
regardless of the gender of the household head. This finding echoes several existing 
studies that have documented a link between social solidarity schemes and voluntary 
health insurance demand (60,69). Similarly, we found in Chapter 8 that individuals with 
higher levels of education and socioeconomic status were more likely to make the 
decision to enrol into the voluntary health insurance scheme whether or not they 
belonged to local savings groups, reflecting a general consensus within existing health 
financing research (56,58,59,112,115). Given the association between certain social 
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characteristics such as education and work experience on one’s position within the 
labour market we posit that the power inferred by one’s economic position may override 
their inherent disadvantages when interacting with the health insurance sector. This 
further add credence to the assumption that it is important to correctly contextualise 
the population under study in order to better understand how health decisions are 
made at household level. 
 
 
9.2 Contributions of the study 
i. Articulation of the social context within which health-related household 
decisions are made  
In existing health financing discourse, there has been limited investigation into how 
social conditions may affect the interaction between voluntary health insurance 
demand and its empirical determinants. This disregards the very basis of this branch 
of research which seeks to identify the social conditions – such as age, income, and 
education – that influence voluntary health insurance enrolment. The strictly empirical 
approach towards voluntary health insurance demand research leaves a significant 
gap in our understanding of health-related decision-making in this context. Indeed, it is 
clear that the decision to enrol into health insurance is not made in a vacuum: it is 
subject to context-specific considerations that shape the way in which a household 
decision-maker views and interacts with its environment (39).  
This thesis has deviated from this established approach by integrating pragmatic social 
analysis into its interpretation of empirical findings, with a view to gain a greater 
understanding of the context within which health insurance decision-making is 
undertaken (2). This methodological triangulation has been applied in two major ways: 
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by centring the sociocultural contexts relevant to the population under study in our 
analysis; and by utilising inductive theories and frameworks through which the patterns 
in empirical evidence could be systematically analysed (210,211).  
In Chapter 6, an adaptation of expected utility theory and analysis of respondents’ 
access motives are used to explain why risk aversion was expressed differently 
between male and female household heads (96). The examination of traditional gender 
roles in rural Cameroon and its influence of the way individuals view the utility of health 
insurance helps us to understand why women in that context prioritise their direct 
knowledge of household health risks, while men rely on their understanding of potential 
household health risks when making the decision to enrol. Chapter 8, on the other 
hand, applies social capital theory to hypothesise the reasons why sociocultural 
disenfranchisement is observed in members of the general population, but not in local 
solidarity groups in urban informal settlements in Kenya (172). These findings mirror 
the social realities of similar groups in various sub-Saharan African contexts, 
suggesting that our findings may be transferrable to areas with relative similarities in 
their sociocultural environment.  
While it is important to acknowledge the relative subjectivity of this theoretical 
approach, we suggest that the analyses within this thesis may be generalisable to a 
wider setting. Indeed, given the relative similarities in the social conditions in some 
sub-Saharan African settings, there are particular groups (such as women and those 
with limited economic power) that are inevitably disadvantaged within the sociopolitical 
environment. As a result, the decision-making process is likely to be impacted by 
similar factors as those identified in our research.  
We submit that integrating pragmatic analysis into empirical research facilitates a 
greater depth of understanding of the ways in which social structures play into 
  
187 
voluntary health insurance decision-making. While it is important to acknowledge the 
relative subjectivity of this theoretical approach, we suggest two key advantages in the 
context of this form of research: (i) it allows us to maintain the scientific rigor of 
objectively identifying the determinants of health insurance demand amongst a target 
group; and (ii) it contextualises analysis of why these empirical factors are significant.  
Through this process, the pragmatic approach taken in Chapters 6 and 8 enhances 
our understanding of the decision-making space, thus strengthening the applicability 
of the research analysis.  
 
ii. A more holistic investigation of UHC priority-setting in the sub-Saharan 
African context 
While UHC has been consistently identified as a critical health reform objective in 
global literature, it lacks a comprehensive framework through which the broader 
considerations of the political economy of UHC may be measured. This complicates 
research on the value considerations and priorities of UHC, with many studies in the 
sub-Saharan African setting opting to focus on specific programs and investments 
rather than on UHC as a holistic process. It has thus created a situation where 
scholarship on UHC are often reduced to solely health financing reforms (22–24).  
In spite of the lack of procedural guidelines, most health actors agree that the UHC 
process is ultimately a trade-off between investments in three critical areas of a health 
system: population coverage; service coverage; and financial protection (93). Chapter 
4 applies this theoretical norm into political economy research by centring stakeholder 
opinions on the three key dimensions of UHC in their discussion of population value 
choices, demand, and need under the UHC banner. This provides a cumulative 
contribution towards research on the political economy of health in the sub-Saharan 
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African setting by using a theoretically-justified approach to rationalise qualitative 
discussions on health policy.  
The methodology used in Chapter 4 allows respondents to provide a holistic 
representation of the programs and investments competing for financial and other 
resources in the pursuit of the country’s UHC objective. We perceive several 
advantages to this research approach: (i) it extends our depth of knowledge of the 
contextual considerations of what UHC entails within a country setting; and (ii) it 
enables systematic research on the values and priorities considered when defining a 
country’s preferred path towards UHC; and (iii) it facilitates the ease of comparative 
analysis when carrying out similar research at different time points.     
 
iii. Methodological insights into incorporating the complex nature of the 
informal sector into health financing research 
Empirical findings on sub-Saharan African labour markets have demonstrated the 
complex and multi-faceted nature of the informal sector (52–55). The existence of 
heterogeneity within this group is often not represented within existing health financing 
research, leading to a philosophical divide between the two intersecting fields of 
knowledge. This means it is often difficult to effectively apply research findings to the 
policy environment due to their unrealistic assumptions.  
This thesis chose to deviate from the customary health financing methodology by 
adapting existing knowledge on the variability of the informal sector into our analytical 
approach. As such, rather than analysing the informal sector as a homologous group, 
we conducted subgroup analyses to assess the interaction between group 
membership and the determinants of voluntary health insurance demand. This 
approach aims to achieve a number of objectives: (i) to better represent the realities of 
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informal sector grouping and differential vulnerability to certain explanatory variables; 
and (ii) to present research in a way that is easily digestible and relatable to 
policymakers.  
Our findings certainly support the assertion that different informal sector subgroups 
have differential vulnerability to social stratifiers that influence voluntary health 
insurance enrolment. In Chapter 6, for example, our findings suggest that men’s 
enrolment decision is determined by their understanding of health insurance through 
age and education, while financial empowerment is paramount to women’s ability to 
purchase health insurance. This supports illustrations from labour economics that find 
variances in the power held by certain groups: there is consensus that female workers 
are likely to have lower incomes irrespective of their position within the formal or 
informal economy (53,54). We therefore hold that the nuanced methodological 
approach in this thesis is more likely to reflect real-world variations in the way different 
groups make the decision to enrol into voluntary health insurance.  
 
 
9.3 Limitations and challenges 
While this thesis presents an innovative analysis of UHC priority-setting and adhesion 
to voluntary health insurance, it inevitably has some limitations. In this section, the 
general limitations of the thesis regarding the depth of methods used are reflected 
upon. 
 
i. Robustness of subgroup analyses 
An inevitable criticism of subgroup analysis centres upon the extent to which subgroup 
effects can be considered accurate. This concern is certainly justifiable: in both studies 
  
190 
investigating Objective 2 of this thesis, there were subgroup differences whose 
confidence intervals that were outside our desired effect size, but near the confidence 
limit.  
These results point towards the limitations of a small subgroup sample size, abetted 
by the low treatment numbers of voluntary health insurance enrolment within the 
general population. While our sampling approach is sufficient to yield credible results 
for the determinants of voluntary health insurance within the informal sector as a group, 
we were unable to adapt the sampling strategy to increase the statistical power in our 
population subgroups due to resource limitations. In light of this, we suggest that the 
credibility of our subgroup analysis may be further increased in two ways: (i) by 
incorporating subgroup population into sample size calculations; and (ii) by adapting 
the sampling approach through stratified randomisation. 
 
ii. Limitations of univariate analysis  
Our analysis in Chapter 8 was unable to fit a model with multiple covariates and 
multiple interactions with our dataset due to a number of reasons: 
• The low voluntary health insurance enrolment numbers in the Kenyan general 
population were reflected within our study (212), which led to small numbers of 
enrolled households in both sub-groups, particularly amongst households who 
did not belong to local savings groups 
• Carrying out multiple regression with these low numbers was not feasible, as 
the model would frequently not converge or gave unstable estimates. 
 
It was therefore necessary to carry out simple logistic regression, which limited the 
ability of the study to control for some key confounders within the analysis. While this 
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challenge was unavoidable in this particular instance, it would be prudent to increase 
the sample size in future studies in order to be able to fit multiple logistic regression 
with the interactions and main effects. 
 
iii. Small sample size for qualitative research 
A potential concern with the qualitative study reported in Chapter 4 is the small sample 
size of key health systems actors (n=13). In particular, we faced challenges in recruiting 
national government and development partner stakeholders to participate in this 
research study. The resistance faced reflects perceptions of opacity within the Kenyan 
healthcare system highlighted by various respondents in the study, who felt that 
various health-related activities were often shrouded in secrecy.  
In spite of this, we believe that we reached the point of saturation for the targeted policy 
circles due to stakeholders’ involvement in multiple roles within the informal sector. 
Indeed, two of the technical experts interviewed had played a role providing technical 
expertise to the NHIF directly, two had advised the Ministry of Health on its universal 
health care strategy directly, and three had played a role advising development 
partners at the time of the study. One of the development partners had also previously 
been a national government policymaker in the five years preceding this study. This 
suggests that the interviewed stakeholders were able to articulate multiple viewpoints 
on Kenya’s UHC journey, as can be seen by the primacy and variety of technical expert 
opinions in our findings.  
 
iv. Perceived generalisation within population sub-groups 
One of the concerns regarding existing research has been its tendency to assume 
homogeneity within the informal sector. In analysing this thesis, we acknowledge that 
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there may similarly be apprehension about the disaggregation of informal sector sub-
groups in our research. We recognise the validity of this argument: indeed, it is well-
established that each informal sector sub-group inevitably possesses broad levels of 
heterogeneity (52–55). It is, however, important to note that we approached this thesis 
with the objective of understanding the factors that influence voluntary health insurance 
enrolment amongst different constituent members of the informal sector. With this in 
mind, we considered it important to ensure that the level of disaggregation used within 
our analysis maintained an acceptable balance between reflecting the heterogeneity 
within the informal sector, and ensuring the utility of our findings in the real-world 
setting. We therefore maintain that further disaggregation of our data would not be 
useful in answering our research questions and objectives. 
 
 
9.4 Opportunities for future research 
This exploratory and interpretive thesis highlights the complex and cross-cutting nature 
of research on health-related decision making at institutional and household level. 
There are, however, opportunities for future research based on a number of challenges 
in our research approach. These ideas, as well as possible future research directions, 
are discussed in the section below. 
 
i. Stakeholders in UHC decision-making 
Our findings partially explore the process of priority-setting in UHC decision-making in 
terms of concept validation. In retrospect, we concede that this thesis took a rather 
narrow view of what constituted a health systems stakeholder in our study: our 
research focused almost exclusively on stakeholders who hold a high level of power in 
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influencing the core direction of government policy. This approach ignores the 
complexity of stakeholder salience, and adds inevitable bias into research outputs by 
ignoring a wider group of health sector users and actors. Given this, we would use a 
broader definition of stakeholders in future analyses to include all groups that affect 
and are affected by the government’s UHC policies. This would enable the inclusion of 
a wider range of health actors with a stake in the government’s health policy decisions, 
allowing a more comprehensive depiction of the predominant health priorities as the 
country moves towards UHC. 
In addition to stakeholder typology, we noted in Section 9.3 about the potential 
concerns about the sample size used within our study. While we maintain that our study 
has strong internal validity, it would be useful to spend more time in situ in order to 
identify and interview more key opinion leaders within the target stakeholder groups. 
This would act as a confirmatory study for the findings highlighted within this thesis, 
and reduce potential concerns about the robustness of our sample size. 
Finally, we recognise the importance of the sub-national level in ensuring effective 
UHC policy implementation in Kenya. Our study was, however, limited to only one of 
47 counties due to logistical and financial considerations. In future – time and 
resources permitting – we would conduct a stakeholder analysis where the value 
choices of sub-national stakeholders across all counties were considered. This would 
provide a more holistic perspective of the health considerations and societal values 
across the country, in order to collate a more representative set of health system values 
through which to define Kenya’s UHC goals and process. 
 
ii. Determinants of voluntary health insurance enrolment 
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As part of this thesis, we initially considered conducting a comparative analysis 
between the Kenyan and Cameroonian studies in order to investigate the extent to 
which the nature of health insurance scheme influenced the value proposition of 
voluntary health insurance. This idea was based on a desire to reflect the variety of 
health insurance schemes that have been implemented in the sub-Saharan African 
context. Indeed, the Kenyan voluntary health insurance scheme is a national health 
insurance scheme, while the Cameroonian one is a mutual health insurance scheme. 
Both schemes play a significant role in achieving universal population coverage 
through health insurance in their specific contexts. The feasibility of conducting this 
comparative analysis was, however, complicated by the fact that the Kenyan sample 
was exclusively urban, while the Cameroonian target population was a mixture of urban 
and rural habitants. It was impossible to adapt the Cameroonian sample, as our sample 
size calculations were based on the proportion of scheme members living across both 
the urban and rural areas in North-West Cameroon. This was driven by the original 
Swiss TPH client mandate of investigating the impact of the scheme on universal 
health coverage in North-West Cameroon. In view of this thesis’s objectives, we would 
consider conducting an additional study where the urban sample size was expanded 
in order to allow for more robust analyses across the two countries. We would also 
suggest carrying out comparative analyses between similar informal sector population 
groups in order to assess whether the factors influencing voluntary health insurance 
demand are similar across these different settings. In addition to allowing us to assess 
the external validity of the social analysis used within this thesis, this approach would 
provide evidence on whether research findings on voluntary health insurance demand 
for smaller community-based health insurance schemes – which are more widely-
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available in health financing scholarship – are transferrable to national health insurance 
schemes.   
In addition to conducting comparative analyses, we view an opportunity to strengthen 
the Kenyan study by increasing the sampling of the target informal sector group. This 
may be achieved by the use of more innovative sample size calculations and sampling 
strategies. 
This thesis also presents the opportunity for innovation in the way that target 
populations are considered and assessed. More in-depth interdisciplinary research 
involving expertise from health policy, labour economics, statistics, and behavioural 
economics will be necessary to refine and strengthen the findings of this thesis. This 
approach could be used to conduct qualitative and quantitative research through which 
the facilitators and barriers to voluntary health insurance enrolment may be better 
understood. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the presence of voluntary health insurance 
will continue to be an inevitable reality in the sub-Saharan African context as countries 
develop the fiscal space for more sustainable health financing mechanisms. In light of 
this, it will be important to develop and test various social marketing mechanisms to 
ensure that the various constituent groups of the informal sector are appropriately 
targeted for health insurance enrolment.  
 
 
9.5 Policy recommendations  
This thesis has addressed its main research questions by highlighting the socio-
political and economic contexts in which healthcare decisions are made. While the 
implications of this research on existing and future health financing scholarship have 
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been discussed in detail, there is also an opportunity to apply our findings to improve 
institutional approaches towards government and household decision-making. The 
policy recommendations aligned to each research question are discussed in the 
sections below. 
 
i. UHC priority-setting and health policy strategy 
Government priority-setting for health has been critiqued as a highly complex and 
mutable process in light of the competing and evolving priorities inherent within a health 
system. Our research centres itself within this space by highlighting the opposing 
values and priorities influencing government actions and investments in Kenya’s health 
sector.  
It is clear from our findings that there has been a lack of strategic leadership from 
national and sub-national governments in driving the health priority-setting and 
planning process. As a result, it is necessary to appropriately address the variety of 
health needs within the country in a way that optimises its epidemiological, social, 
economic and political realities. We suggest that clear policy action is required from 
national government and county government in order to develop a logical and 
consistent approach towards UHC in Kenya. The suggested policy interventions, 
expected outcomes, and action timelines required to aid decision-making and planning 
for Kenya’s UHC reforms are enumerated below.  
 
National government 
Given that the Kenyan Constitution explicitly lays the purview of health system 
governance on the national government, the responsibility for encouraging and 
influencing the actions of all actors within the sector ultimately falls to its Ministry of 
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Health (73). As such, our policy recommendations for national government highlight 
the need for leadership, communication, trust, transparency and accountability at 
national level, in order to foster collaboration in Kenya’s health space. We submit that 
four key objectives should be prioritised by the national government in order to define 
a common and realistic set of health system values and goals in Kenya:  
• Building a robust environment for intra-sectoral collaboration to allow all health 
stakeholders to contribute towards UHC agenda-setting;  
• Developing and updating a viable UHC strategic vision that will drive priority 
actions and interventions within Kenya’s health space; 
• Developing systematic priority-setting rules through which potential UHC 
interventions may be objectively considered as the health system evolves; and, 
• Spearheading clear communication channels for intra- and intersectoral 
collaboration to optimise UHC policy adaptation and implementation, as well as 
resource mobilisation for health. 
 
The specific actions and deliverables required to fulfil these responsibilities are 
highlighted in Table 12 and reflect the adaptive, multi-level approach necessary to 
ensure cohesiveness within Kenya’s health system.  
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Table 12: Policy recommendations for national stakeholder UHC priority-setting and health policy strategy 
Policy actions Outcomes 
Timelines & associated deliverables 
Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
Health sector collaboration for UHC value- and agenda-setting 
Develop consultative platform for agenda-setting 
process 
Reports cataloguing stakeholder 
values and beliefs 
Steering 
board 
Consultative 
forums 
Consultative 
forums 
UHC strategic vision and priority-setting rules for health system interventions  
Develop tools through which potential health 
systems interventions may be objectively 
considered 
Strategic framework underlining 
priority health system goals 
 
Technical 
committee 
 
Technical model for ranking & 
prioritising health interventions 
Literature 
review 
Technical 
committee 
Model 
development 
Intra- and intersectoral collaboration to optimise the success of UHC policy adaptation and implementation 
Clarify roles and responsibilities for Kenya’s 
evolving national and county health functions 
Strategic directive underlining roles 
and responsibilities in core 
functional areas 
Technical 
committee 
Consultative 
meetings 
Dissemination 
meetings 
Spearhead collaboration to optimise resource 
mobilisation and healthcare delivery 
Guidelines for collaboration on 
priority health policy areas 
Consultative 
forums 
Roundtable 
meetings 
Roundtable 
meetings 
Adapt legal framework regarding use of county 
funding to improve health resource allocation 
Amend existing Public Finance 
Management Act*  
 Consultative 
forums 
Amendment Act 
*The Public Finance Management Act 2012 legislates the management of public finances at national and sub-national level.
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In addition to the above-mentioned policy actions, we suggest that the Cabinet 
Secretary for Health should be responsible for lobbying efforts to convince County 
Governors to prioritise their public health expenditure over other competing 
development projects.  
 
Sub-national level 
The role of county governments has evolved over the past decade, with responsibility 
for healthcare provision shifting from national to sub-national level since 2013 (73). 
While these changes are largely supported by the stakeholders in our research, there 
are concerns about the capacity of county departments of health to adopt effective 
health budget allocation and annual planning mechanisms in order to optimise 
healthcare service delivery. Indeed, without proper health planning and implementation 
systems, Kenyan counties run the risk of misallocating public resources; alienating the 
citizenry from the healthcare system; and having unpredictable health budgets (28). 
Given this, we recommend three key areas for action to empower county departments 
of health in their evolving healthcare service provision role: 
• Identifying unique sub-national health systems priorities; 
• Developing representative county operational and implementation health plans;  
• Capacity building to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the use of financial 
resources; and, 
• Aligning county health plans with national health policy.  
 
The specific actions and deliverables required to fulfil these responsibilities are 
highlighted in Table 13 below. 
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Table 13: Policy recommendations for sub-national stakeholder UHC priority-setting and health policy strategy 
Policy actions Outcomes 
Timelines & associated deliverables 
Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
Identifying sub-national health systems priorities 
Articulate county health 
system gaps 
Technical report highlighting 
evidence-practice gaps  
Technical support 
Burden of disease and 
health systems 
research 
 
Policy brief highlighting 
resourcing priorities 
 Policy brief 
Roundtable meetings 
with national and county 
government 
Efficient and effective county health plans and health policy implementation 
Financial capacity building 
activities  
Financial literacy training 
program 
 
Completion of training 
course 
Continuous education 
Develop county-level health 
implementation plans 
Annual county health plan, 
including proposed budget 
Consultative meetings 
Annual county health 
plan  
Annual county health 
plan  
Aligning county health plans with national health policy 
Formalise collaboration 
between national and county 
health functions 
Policy brief highlighting 
agreed-upon health systems 
goals  
Roundtable meetings 
with national and 
county government 
Roundtable meetings 
with national and 
county government 
 
  201 
ii. Increasing voluntary health insurance demand 
This thesis outlines the challenges faced in targeting the informal sector for voluntary 
health insurance coverage, revealing a difference not only in the factors considered by 
individuals when making the decision to enrol into health insurance, but also the 
characteristics hindering potential access to resources. As such, health insurance 
schemes seek to cover a broad set of households of differing social characteristics and 
health risks. It is therefore crucial to apply a multi-pronged strategy for targeting and 
sensitising informal sector members, as well as to offer necessary financial incentives 
to attract under-served groups. In terms of targeting more households with the financial 
power to pay premiums, we recommend that schemes: 
• Conduct quantitative and qualitative research programs to understand the 
barriers to enrolment for target populations;  
• Identify mechanisms for targeting large groups of financially-empowered 
individuals, such as through local savings groups or social networks; and,  
• Allocate resources to hold local sensitisation and marketing drives. 
 
We propose that the above-mentioned strategies should be employed in conjunction 
with efforts to target under-served and indigent households in order to promote 
solidarity and equity. Indeed, our findings suggest that some informal sector groups 
face inherent disadvantages in the sociocultural environment, leading to limited access 
to information, financial resources and support networks. We suggest that it will be 
necessary to employ strategies to limit the barriers to health insurance enrolment. 
These strategies are likely to be highly context-specific and may include incentives 
such as subsidies and flexible premium payment options. Nevertheless, we suggest 
  202 
that schemes assess the viability of adapting best practice from other settings in order 
to increase their membership amongst under-served populations.  
Implemented effectively, these complementary interventions will create an enabling 
environment for health insurance schemes to appeal to a broad population set, in order 
to ensure that they maintain a strong population base. 
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11.3 Household survey questionnaire: Cameroon 
 
BEPHA Member  
Household details obtained from BEPHA 
Kumbo Membership List 
 
BEPHA Non-member  
No one in the household is a member of 
BEPHA or any other health insurance 
scheme  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Respondent details 
 
 
1.1. What is the relation of the respondent to the household head (HHRelat)?  
Head    1 
Husband/Wife   2 
Son/Daughter   3 
Grandchild   4 
Father/Father-in-law  5 
Brother/Sister   6 
Nephew/Niece   7 
Son-in-law/Daughter–in-law 8 
Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law 9 
Mother/Mother-in-law  10 
Other Family Relative  11 
Other person not related 12 
 
If respondent is unrelated to household head → terminate interview 
 
 
1.2. Does the household head make monthly payments into a pensions or social security scheme 
(PenSch)? 
Yes     1 
No     0 
 
1.3. Have you or any of your household had health insurance coverage over the past year 
(MembHI1)? 
Yes     1 
No     0 
 
1.4. In which health insurance scheme is the insured household member(s) enrolled(HITypB)? 
Bamenda Ecclesiastical Provincial Health Assistance (BEPHA) Scheme  1 
Kumbo Mutual Health Cooperative Society (Kumbo MUHCOOPS)  2 
Other (specify)        3 
 
1.5. For how long were you/have you been a member of BEPHA (MbrDurnB)? 
Less than one year   1 
1 – 2 years    2 
2 – 5 years    3 
5 – 10 years    4 
More than 10 years   5 
Can’t remember   -999 
 
1.6. Please enter the household’s BEPHA ID number (BEPCINo)  
  iv 
 
2. Composition of household and its characteristics  
[Read out]: I would like to start by asking you about members of your household. In most cases, the household comprises of family members, but it may also 
include non-family members who live in your home. I will request that you provide the first names of the household members to ensure that we match the 
answers to the person concerned. Your names will remain confidential, and will not be passed on to anyone. 
 
 
  
 
 
H
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 m
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#
 
2.0.1  
Name of 
usual 
residents 
(NamRes0) 
 
List 
household 
head first 
 
 
First Name 
2.0.2  
Relationship 
to household 
head  
(RelHH) 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.3  
Age at 
last 
birthday 
(AgBrth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
2.0.4  
Sex 
 
 
(Sex) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male.....1 
Female2 
 
2.0.5 
Religion 
 
 
(Relgn) 
 
(Use 
code 
box) 
 
 
Code 
2.0.6  
Marital 
status  
(MaritSta
t) 
 
 
(Use 
code 
box) 
 
 
Code 
2.0.7 
Literacy 
status 
(StatLiter) 
 
 
Has 
<NAME> 
ever been 
to school? 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
 
2.0.8 
Maximum 
level of 
education 
achieved 
(EduLev) 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.9 
Main 
Employment 
activity during 
past 12 
months 
(EmpAct) 
(Use code box) 
 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.10 
Temporality 
of work 
activity 
(TempoWk) 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
 
2.0.11 
Salary in 
previous 
month 
(Incom) 
 
(Use 
code 
box) 
 
 
Code 
2.0.12 
Nature of 
remuneration 
 
(RemNatr) 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
 
 
Code 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
  v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.2 
Head    01 
Husband/Wife/Partner  02 
Son     03 
Daughter   04 
Father/Father-in-law  05 
Mother/Mother-in-law  06 
Grandchild   07 
Son-in-law/Daughter–in-law 08 
Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law 09 
Father-in-law/Mother-in-law 10 
Niece/Nephew   11 
Other: Family Relative (specify) 11 
Other: Unrelated (specify)  12 
Code box for Question 2.0.8 
Primary school   01 
First cycle secondary   02 
Second cycle secondary 03 
Diploma    04 
University/ Tertiary   05 
Literate (Non-Formal Education) 06 
Don’t know                            -999 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.9 
Self-employed  01 
Public sector employee 02 
Private sector employee 03 
Seeking employment 04 
Unpaid family worker 05 
Apprentice  06 
Student   07 
Don’t know           -999 
 
Code box for Question 
2.0.6 
Single   1 
Monogamous marriage 2 
Polygamous marriage 3 
Widow/Widower             4 
Divorced/separated 5 
Traditional marriage 6 
Not applicable   7 
Code box for Question 
2.0.5 
Catholic               1 
Protestant                       2 
Other Christian              3 
Muslim                           4 
Traditional beliefs           5 
Atheist                            6  
Other religion                 7 
Don’t know               -999 
Don’t want to answer -
777 
Code box for Question 2.0.12 
Fixed salary (weekly/monthly/quarterly)  1 
Daily or hourly pay    2 
Task-based payment    3 
Commission      4 
Business profits    5 
Barter exchange     6 
None      7 
 
 
Code box for Question 
2.0.11 
<23 500 FCFA   1 
23 500 – 47 000 FCFA  2 
47 000 – 94 000 FCFA  3 
94 000 – 188 000 FCFA 4 
188 000 – 376 000  5 
376 000–752 000 FCFA 6 
752 000 FCFA or more  7 
Not applicable  ....... -999 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.10 
Permanent regular work ..........01  
Permanent seasonal work       02 
Temporary, non-defined .........03 
Temporary defined work ........04  
Not applicable            05 
Don’t know         -999 
  vi 
3. Household assets and amenities 
 
[Read out]: I would now like to ask you about the property you live in and the assets that your 
household possesses, including housing, transport, livestock and home appliances.   
 
Interviewer to observe house materials for Qns 3.0.1 – 3.0.3 and enter the corresponding code into 
the box provided  
3.0.1 What is the main material on the roof (RoofMat)? 
No roof       01 
Thatch/palm roof       02 
Rustic mat/plastic roof       03 
Reed/bamboo roof      04 
Wood planks roof       05 
Iron sheet roof        06 
Wood roof       07 
Asbestos/cement fibre roof     08 
Ceramic tile roof        09 
Concrete roof        10 
Roofing shingles      11 
 
 
3.0.2 What is the main material on the floor (FloorMat)? 
Earth, sand, dung floor    01 
Rudimentary wood plank, palm, bamboo floor  02 
Polished wood floor    03 
Vinyl, asphalt strip floor    04 
Ceramic tile floor    05 
Cement floor     06 
Carpeted floor     07 
 
  
 
3.0.3 What is the main material on the exterior walls (WallMat)? 
No walls     01 
Cane/palm/trunks/dirt walls   02 
Bamboo with mud walls    03 
Stone walls with lime/cement   04 
Uncovered mud walls    05 
Plywood walls     06 
Cardboard walls    07 
Reused wood walls    08 
Cement walls     09 
Baked brick walls    10 
Cement block walls    11 
Covered adobe walls    12 
Wood planks, shingles walls   13 
Other      14 
 
 
 
Questions for interviewee 
 
3.0.4 Number of household members per sleeping room  (SleepRm)     
 
 
3.0.5 Does the household own land or property (LandProp)? 
Land       01 
Property        02 
Both land and property     03 
Neither        88 
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3.0.6 Does the household currently own cattle (CattlNum)?  
Yes         01 
No        02 
 
If Yes: 
 
3.0.6.1 How many cows/bulls are currently owned by the household (CowBulNum)?  
3.0.6.2 How many horses/donkeys are currently owned by the household (HorsDonkNum)  
3.0.6.3 How many goats are currently owned by the household (GoatNum)?    
3.0.6.4 How many sheep are currently owned by the household (SheepNum)?    
3.0.6.5 How many chickens/fowls are currently owned by the household (ChickNum)? 
3.0.6.6. How many rabbits/guinea pigs are currently owned by the household (RabtNum)? 
3.0.6.7. How many pigs are currently owned by the household (PigNum)?    
 
 
3.0.7 What is the main source of cooking fuel (FuelSrc)?  
LPG     01 
Natural gas      02 
Kerosene     03 
Coal/lignite     04 
Charcoal      05 
Wood     06 
Straw      07 
Agricultural crop                 08 
Dung     09 
Other     10 
 
 
3.0.8 What is the main source of water (WatrSrc)? 
Piped into dwelling    01 
Piped into yard/plot    02 
Public tap/standpipe    03 
Tube well or borehole     04 
Protected dug well    05 
Unprotected dug well    06 
Protected spring                 07 
Unprotected spring    08 
Rain water      09 
Water from cart with small tank    10 
Surface water – river, lake, dam etc.  11 
Bottled water      12 
Other water source     13 
 
 
3.0.9 What type of toilet facilities are available in the household (ToiltFacil)? 
Flush toilet to sewer    01 
Flush toilet to septic tank                02 
Flush toilet to pit latrine    03 
VIP latrine      04 
Pit latrine with slab    05 
Traditional pit latrine    06 
Bucket toilet     07 
Hanging toilet/latrine    08 
Shares latrine/toilet with other households             09 
Other type of latrine/toilet                10 
No facility/bush/field    11 
 
 
3.0.10 Does the household own any of the following vehicles?          Yes                      No 
3.0.10.1  Bicycle (BicyOwn) 
3.0.10.2  Motorcycle/scooter (MotoOwn) 
3.0.10.3  Car/truck (CarOwn) 
 
  viii 
 
3.0.11 Does the household own any of the following?                    Yes                No 
3.0.11.1    Electricity (Electr)  
3.0.11.2    Generator (GenerOwn) 
3.0.11.3    Electric cooker (CookOwn) 
3.0.11.4    Refrigerator (FridgOwn) 
3.0.11.5    Water pump (PumpOwn) 
 
 
3.0.11 Does the household own any of the following amenities?   Yes                No 
3.0.11.1   Radio (RadioOwn) 
3.0.11.2   Television (TeleOwn) 
3.0.11.3   Mobile telephone (MobTelOwn) 
3.0.11.4   CD/DVD player (DVDOwn) 
3.0.11.6   Computer (CompOwn) 
3.0.11.7   Internet connection (InterCon) 
3.0.11.8   Connection to TV/SAT (SatTVOwn) 
 
 
4. Household expenditure and consumption 
 
[Read out]: I would now like to ask you questions about your food and non-food expenses. 
 
 
4.0.1 How much did your household spend in the past seven days on the foods and beverages 
(FCFA) (WFoodSpnd)? 
 
 
 
4.0.2 How much did your household spend in the past one month on the following household items 
(in FCFA)? 
4.0.2.1. Rent (RntSpnd)       
4.0.2.2.   Electricity (ElecSpnd)       
4.0.2.3.   Cooking gas (GasSpnd)      
4.0.2.4.   Kerosene/paraffin (KerParSpnd)      
4.0.2.5.   Charcoal (CharSpnd)       
4.0.2.6.   Firewood (FirWdSpnd)       
4.0.2.7.   Water  (WtrSpnd)       
4.0.2.8.   Transport (TranspSpnd)      
4.0.2.9. Telephone bills/ mobile airtime (TeleSpnd)    
4.0.2.10. Salaries including wages for domestic workers (SalarSpnd)   
4.0.2.11. Remittances (in cash and kind) (RemitSpnd)    
4.0.2.12. Household products eg soap, tissues, toothpaste etc (HygSpnd)  
4.0.2.13. Tobacco (TobSpnd)       
4.0.2.14. Leisure and entertainment (LeisSpnd)     
4.0.2.15. Hairdresser/barber (HairSpnd)      
4.0.2.16. Others  (OthrSpnd)       
 
[If a breakdown not possible, please provide the total amount spent on items] 
 
 
4.0.3 How much did your household spend in the past one year on the following (in FCFA)? 
4.0.3.1.    Education (registration, uniforms, books, exam fees) (EduSpnd)   
4.0.3.2.    Maintenance and repairs (car, buildings etc.)  (MntSpnd)    
4.0.3.3.    Funerals (including contributions to other households) (FunSpnd)   
4.0.3.4.    Wedding/dowry (including contributions to other households) (WedSpnd)  
4.0.3.5.    Clothing and footwear (ClothSpnd)      
4.0.3.6.    Capital expenditures (including cars, plots etc.) (CaptSpnd)    
 
[If a breakdown not possible, please provide the total amount spent] 
 
 
4.0.4 Are you or any of your household members part of a njangi (MCFMmbr)? 
   Yes    01 
  No     02 
  ix 
 
  
4.0.5 How many njangis are you and your household active in (MCFNo)? 
   One    01 
  2 – 5      02 
   More than five   03 
   
 
4.0.6 On average, how much do you contribute per month to your njangi/tontine (in FCFA) 
(MCFPyt)?    
 
  x 
5. Health-seeking behaviour 
 
[Read out]: I would now like to ask you about the health status of members of your household any illnesses experienced in the last one month. Please try to 
recall details of all events in the last month. Please try to be as specific as possible about any illness episodes, because we have to look at each illness condition 
separately for this study. 
H
o
u
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e
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ld
 m
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N
o
. 5.0.1  
Perceived health 
status compared 
to others of 
similar age 
(HlthgStats) 
Very good  1 
Good   2 
Satisfactory  3 
Poor .  4 
 
5.0.2 
When did you last 
consult with a 
medical 
practitioner? 
(LstConslt) 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
5.0.3 
Illness in the 
past four 
weeks 
(IllMnth) 
 
 
 
Yes  1 
No   2 
 
5.0.4 
Type of 
illness 
(IllTyp) 
 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
Codes 
 
5.0.5 
Severity of 
illness 
(IllSvrty) 
 
 
 
Mild......... 1 
Moderate.2  
Severe ..  3 
5.0.6 
Was a medical 
practitioner 
consulted? 
(Conslt) 
Yes   1 
No   2 
5.0.7 
If No to 5.0.6, 
main reasons for 
not seeking 
care? 
(NoCreReas) 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
5.0.8. 
Any informal 
consultations for 
illness 
(InfCons) 
(Use code box) 
 
 
 
Code 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
Code box for Question 5.0.7 
Lack of money    01 
Self-medication    02 
Poor quality service    03 
High cost of care   04 
Religious/cultural reasons   05 
Long distance to provider   06 
Illness not considered serious enough  07 
Code box for Question 5.0.4 
Malaria              01 
Respiratory tract infection            02 
Diarrhoeal disease             03 
Hypertension & cardiovascular health disease 04 
Anaemia             05 
Diabetes              06 
Other                
Code box for Question 5.0.8 
Home visits by practitioners 01 
Informal drug sellers        02 
Traditional medicine man     03 
Juju man         04 
Other          05 
None           88 
 
Code box for Question 5.0.2 
Less than two weeks 01 
2 weeks – 1 month 02 
1 – 3 months    03 
3 – 6 months    04 
6 – 12 months   05 
One year or more  06 
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5.1 Utilisation of outpatient services and other health-related services in the last four weeks 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you questions about the use of outpatient and other health-related facilities and services by members of your household, and the 
costs paid. 
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 N
o
. 5.1.1 
For what illness did the 
household member visit the 
outpatient facility? 
(IllOPTyp) 
  
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
 
5.1.2 
Outpatient visits made for 
illness episodes during the past 
four weeks   
(OPVist) 
 
 
 
Number 
5.1.3 
Type and 
ownership of 
health provider 
(FacOwnr) 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
 
5.1.4 
Cost paid out-of-pocket for 
outpatient visits, including 
transport, registration, 
consultation, diagnosis, and 
medication? 
(OPCst) 
 
 
Cost(FCFA) 
5.1.5 
How were 
treatment 
costs 
covered? 
(OPCstMed) 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
Code 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
Code box for Question 5.1.5 
Salary/disposable income 01 
Savings    02 
Paid by household member 03 
Paid by non-household member 04 
Sold household assets  05 
Paid in-kind    06 
Other     07 
Code box for Question 5.1.3 
Public district or provincial hospital 01 
Public Health Centre   02 
Private For-Profit Health Centre  03 
Private Clinic/Surgery   04 
Mission/NGO facility   05 
Dispensary    06 
Pharmacy/Chemist/Shop  07 
Other     08 
 
Code box for Question 5.1.1 
Malaria               01 
Respiratory tract infection             02 
Diarrhoeal disease              03 
Hypertension & cardiovascular health disease  04 
Anaemia              05 
Diabetes               06 
Other (specify) 
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5.2 Utilisation of inpatient services in the last one year 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you questions about the use of inpatient facilities and services by members of your household, and the costs paid. Please include 
any deliveries and hospitalisations of one day or more that have been faced by your household within the last year. 
 
 
 
 
 
Il
ln
e
s
s
 e
v
e
n
t 
N
o
. 
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
  
5.2.1 
For what illness 
was the household 
member admitted 
into a health 
facility? 
(IllIPTyp) 
(Use code box) 
 
Code 
5.2.1  
How many times 
was <NAME> 
admitted over 
the past one 
year?   
(IPVist) 
 
 
Number 
5.2.2  
Type and 
ownership of 
health provider 
where admitted 
(FacOwnr1) 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
5.2.3 
In which month 
was the patient 
admitted to 
hospital? 
(MntIP) 
 
(Use code box) 
 
Code 
5.2.4 
Cost paid out-of-pocket for hospital 
stay, including transport, doctor’s fees, 
diagnosis, surgical operation and daily 
bed rate 
(IPCst) 
 
 
 
Cost (FCFA) 
5.2.5 
How were 
treatment costs 
covered? 
(IPCstMed) 
 
 
(Use code box) 
 
Code 
 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
Code box for Question 5.1.5 
Salary/disposable income 01 
Savings    02 
Paid by household member 03 
Paid by non-household member 04 
Sold household assets  05 
Paid in-kind    06 
Other     07 
Code box for Question 5.1.3 
Public district or provincial 
hospital01 
Public Health Centre  02 
Private For-Profit Health Centre 03 
Private Clinic/Surgery  04 
Mission/NGO facility  05 
Dispensary   06 
Pharmacy/Chemist/Shop 07 
Other    08 
 
Code box for Question 5.2.1 
Malaria             01 
Respiratory tract infection           02 
Diarrhoeal disease            03 
Hypertension & cardiovascular health disease04 
Anaemia            05 
Diabetes             06 
Other (specify) 
Code box for Question 5.1.5 
May 2015  01 
June 2015  02 
July 2015  03 
August 2015   04 
September 2015 05 
October 2015  06 
November 2015 07 
December 2015 08 
January 2016  09 
February 2016  10 
March 2016   11 
April 2016  12 
May 2016  13 
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6. Health insurance knowledge and perceived value  
 
6.0   Health insurance literacy  
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you some True/False questions to understand what you know about health 
insurance, and to gain perspective on your perception of health insurance/ assistance schemes. Please 
try to answer as accurately as possible based on your knowledge and/or experience with health 
insurance. 
 
 
6.0.1 Are you familiar with the concept of community-based health insurance (HIConcp)? 
Yes     01 
No     02  
 
If Yes, proceed to Question 6.0.2 
 
 
6.0.2 From which source did you first learn about health insurance (HiKnwlg)?  
Radio       01 
Television     02  
Hospital      03 
Religious establishment (church/mosque)  04  
Family member     05 
Friend       06  
Health insurance agent    07 
Poster       08 
Other (specify)      09 
 
 
6.0.3 How would you rate your knowledge of the principles of health insurance (KnwgHI)? 
Good        01 
Fair       02  
Poor       03 
Don’t know                           -999 
 
 
6.0.4 Have you or any of your household members previously had health insurance/ assistance 
coverage (HICov)? 
Yes       01 
  No       02  
 
 
6.0.5 Which health insurance scheme were you or your household a member of (HISchm)? 
Bamenda Ecclesiastical Provincial Health Assistance Scheme (BEPHA)  01 
  Kumbo Mutual Health Cooperative Society (MUHCOOPS)  02  
Other          
 
 
6.0.6 For how long were you/have you been a member of the health insurance scheme (MbrDurn)? 
Less than one year     01 
  One to five years     02 
Five to ten years      03 
  More than ten years     04 
  Can’t remember              -999  
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6.1  General health insurance knowledge 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you some True/False questions to understand what you know about health 
insurance, and to gain perspective on your perception of health insurance/ assistance schemes. Please 
try to answer as accurately as possible based on your knowledge and/or experience with health 
insurance.  
  
                                                                                            Knowledgable(1)     Not knowledgable (0) 
6.1.1 Health insurance reallocates funds from healthy to 
sick people in order to reduce the costs paid by 
individuals when sick (SckHI)  
 
6.1.2  Health insurance covers an pre-determined amount 
of an insured person’s medical expenses (HICvr) 
 
6.1.3  A regular fee must first be paid to the insurer in order 
to be covered by a health insurance scheme (PrmHI) 
 
6.1.4 Once insured, all health-related expenses at all 
health facilities in your area will be covered 
(AllHthExp) 
 
6.1.5 You must pay the full cost of treatment if you are 
insured and the health facility is a partner of the 
health insurance scheme (TrtCost) 
 
6.1.6 Community-based health insurance schemes are 
profit-making businesses (PrftHI) 
 
6.1.7  If you do not claim benefits, you will get your money 
back (BenHI) 
 
 
6.1.8  How do you feel about other members of your community benefitting from health insurance 
when you don’t fall sick (SoldrtyHI)? 
a) Highly agree 
b) Agree 
c) Neither agree nor disagree 
d) Disagree 
e) Highly disagree 
 
 
[Read out]: People in your household can sometimes become ill. When this happens, you try to help 
them as much as you can. You take them to the doctor or buy medicines. But this can be very expensive. 
Sometimes you may not have the money available and may need to borrow from your neighbours, sell 
your cattle or even visit the money-lender. While you run around trying to get the money together, the 
sick person suffers. If the person is taken seriously ill, they may have to be admitted in the hospital, 
which requires even more money. And of course, there can even be times when more than one family 
member falls ill. All these healthcare costs can sometimes be so much that they can put a lot of financial 
pressure on your family.  
In order to reduce this financial risk, community-based health insurance/ assistance schemes have 
been set up across Cameroon. They require you to pay them a fixed amount of money at the beginning 
of a year so that, if you fall sick in that year, they will cover part of your healthcare costs. 
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6.1.9   What do you feel about buying health insurance for you and your household? 
 
 
6.0.6. Who would you trust the most to manage your health insurance (TrstLvl)? NB: You are 
allowed to select more than one answer  
Government                     01 
Private company       02 
NGO         03 
Church         04 
Members of your community      05 
 
 
 
6.2  Product-specific (BEPHA Kumbo) health insurance knowledge 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you some questions about the BEPHA Health Assistance Scheme.  
  
 
6.2.1  When did you last renew your BEPHA Kumbo Health Assistance Scheme membership 
(HILstRen)?  
Last June      01 
   Last November    02  
1 – 5 years ago   03 
5 – 10 years ago   04 
 
 
[Read out]: I will ask some True/False and multiple choice questions in order to understand what you 
know about the BEPHA Scheme in Kumbo. Please try and answer the questions that I will ask as 
accurately as possible, based on your experience as a current/former BEPHA enrolee.  
 
i. Product availability 
 
6.2.2.  You can register as an individual for BEPHA membership (RegHI) 
6.2.3.  You can join BEPHA as a family or member of a njangi(FamRegHI) 
6.2.4.  You must pay a one-time registration fee and annual premium/ contribution to be a BEPHA 
member (BEPRePy) 
6.2.5.  You can start benefitting from BEPHA coverage immediately after registration (BEPCvRg) 
 
 
6.2.6. To whom should BEPHA premium money be paid (BEPPytWh)?  
NB: You are allowed to select more than one answer 
PosNegHI 
 
ReliabHI 
 
HIPrc 
 
UseHI 
Positive  
 
Reliable 
 
Affordable 
 
Important 
1 
1 
1 
1 
OR 
 
OR 
 
OR 
 
OR 
Negative 
 
Unreliable 
 
Unaffordable 
 
Not important 
0 
0 
0 
0 
  xvi 
                                                                        
a) BEPHA Diocesan Office       01 
b) Priest         02 
c) Kiosk owner         03 
d) BEPHA partner hospitals       04 
e) Any officially-recognised BEPHA agents     05 
 
 
 
ii. Benefit package 
 
6.2.7.  What types of benefits are covered by BEPHA (BenCovBEP)? NB: You are allowed to select 
more than one answer 
a) Outpatient services        01 
b) Antenatal care  and child birth      02 
c) Laboratory tests        03 
d) Surgery         04 
e) Physiotherapy        05 
f) Hospitalisation        06 
g) Dialysis         07 
h) Don’t know         08 
 
 
6.2.8.  What percentage of health care costs is paid by BEPHA for its offered services 
(PercPyBEP)? 
a) 50 percent         01 
b) 75 percent          02 
c) 100 percent          03 
 
 
6.2.9.  What documents are needed to claim BEPHA benefits in partner health facilities (ClmBEP)? 
a) BEPHA Beneficiary Card       01 
b) National Identity Card       02 
c) Birth Certificate        03 
 
 
6.2.10. For how long is BEPHA membership valid (MmbDurBEP)? 
a) One year         01 
b) Five years         02 
c) Forever         03 
 
 
6.2.11. How often can you benefit from BEPHA coverage in a year (OftClmBEP)? 
a) Five times         01 
b) Eight times         02 
c) Every time when sick        03 
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iii. Coverage 
 
     True (1)          False (0)        
6.2.12. It is the member’s responsibility to renew their BEPHA 
membership (RenwRsp) 
 
6.2.13. If necessary, you can pay for BEPHA membership in three 
instalments (BEPptinst) 
 
6.2.14. BEPHA cancels membership if payment is not completed 
one month after due date (CnclBEP) 
 
 
 
7. Willingness-to-pay for health insurance package 
 
[Read out]: This interview will end soon, but before that, I would like to ask you some questions on how 
much you would be willing to pay for health insurance coverage.  
 
 
 
[Read out]: To buy a health insurance package, you must pay an annual premium for you and some 
or all of your family members. The health insurance/assistance scheme will then pay for some of the 
healthcare costs of the insured household members.  
Suppose we offer you a health insurance package that will cover 75% of the cost of outpatient 
consultations, laboratory tests, hospitalisation, medicines, and maternity services for one year? How 
much would you agree to pay for that? PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CONDITION FOR MEMBERSHIP 
IS THAT AT LEAST FOUR OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, INCLUDING YOU, MUST JOIN, AND 
EACH MEMBER CAN ONLY CLAIM BENEFITS FOR A MAXIMUM OF EIGHT TIMES IN A YEAR. 
Please take into consideration your annual healthcare expenses, and your household income and 
expenditure when answering these questions. 
 
 
 
On average, how much does your household spend on healthcare expenses in a year (in CFCA) 
(HlthExp)? ................... 
 
 
Would you agree to pay 12000 CFCA per person per year for such a package (WTP11HI)?                                  
No = 0             Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 11500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP12HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 11000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP13HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 10500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP14HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 10000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP15HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
  xviii 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 9500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP16HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 9000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP17HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 8500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP18HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 8000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP19HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 7500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP20HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 7000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP21HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 6500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP22HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 6000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP23HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 5500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP24HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 5000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP25HI)      No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 4500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP26HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 4000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP27HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 3500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP28HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 3000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP29HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 2500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP30HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 2000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP31HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 1500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP32HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 1000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP33HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP34HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
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[Read out]: Suppose we offer you the same package as before, but instead of covering 75% of your 
costs for outpatient consultations, laboratory tests, hospitalisation, medicines, and maternity, the health 
insurance scheme will cover 100%? How much would you agree to pay for that?  
 
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 0 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP35HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
Would you agree to pay 12000 CFCA per person per year for such a package (WTP36HI)?                                  
No = 0             Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 11500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP37HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 11000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP38HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 10500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP39HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 10000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP40HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 9500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP41HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 9000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP42HI)   No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 8500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP43HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 8000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP44HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 7500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP45HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 7000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP45HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 6500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP47HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 6000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP48HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 5500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP49HI)    No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 5000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP50HI)      No = 0        Yes = 1    
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This is the end of the questionnaire. 
Thank you for taking the time to answer my questions. 
 
 
  
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 4500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP51HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 4000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP52HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 3500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP53HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 3000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP54HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 2500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP55HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 2000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP56HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 1500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP57HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 1000 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP58HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 500 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP59HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
 
 
If no, continue by asking: Would you agree to pay a premium of 0 CFCA per person per year 
(WTP60HI)         No = 0        Yes = 1    
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11.4 Household survey questionnaire: Kenya 
 
Formally-employed household 
Household head makes monthly 
payments into both NHIF and NSSF 
 
Informally-employed household  
Household head does not make monthly 
payments both into NHIF and NSSF 
 
Terminate interview if household head is formally-employed 
 
Informed consent 
[Read out]: Hello. My name is <NAME> and I am carrying out research on behalf of a university. We 
do not work for the government, and we are not selling anything. We would like to ask you some 
questions on your use of health care services in order to understand how to you manage your health-
related costs and needs. This will help us to understand the reasons why some people join the National 
Hospital Insurance Fund, or NHIF, and others do not. The interview will take approximately 30 minutes, 
and the information collected will be strictly confidential. Your name will never be disclosed when 
presenting the results of the study anywhere. 
 
[Note: Enter the code corresponding to the elicited response in the box provided] 
 
 
0.4.1 Are you willing to participate in this interview?  
   No    0 
   Yes    1  
 
If the answer to this question is no→ terminate interview and move on to next interview 
If yes, ask respondent to provide signature and continue with the questionnaire 
 
 
 
[Read out]: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.  As mentioned, we will be seeking to 
collect information about your household spending and use of health care services and products. It is 
therefore important that you try to answer the questions as precisely as possible, to enable us to 
understand your situation well.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to reply to our questions. 
 
1. Respondent details 
 
 
1.0.  Name of household respondent     
 
 
 
1.1.  What is the relation of the respondent to the household head?  
Head    01 
Husband/Wife   02 
Son/Daughter   03 
Grandchild   04 
Father/Father-in-law  05 
Brother/Sister   06 
Nephew/Niece   07 
Son-in-law/Daughter–in-law 08 
Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law 09 
Mother/Mother-in-law  10 
Other Family Relative  11 
Other person not related 12 
 
If respondent is unrelated to household head → terminate interview 
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2. Composition of household and its characteristics  
[Read out]: I would like to start by asking you about members of your household. In most cases, the household comprises of family members, but it may also 
include non-family members who live in your home. I will request that you provide the first names of the household members to ensure that we match the 
answers to the person concerned. Your names will remain confidential, and will not be passed on to anyone. 
 
  
 
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
#
 
2.0.1  
Name of 
usual 
residents 
 
 
List 
household 
head first 
 
 
 
First Name 
2.0.2  
Relationship 
to household 
head  
 
 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.3  
Year of 
birth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
2.0.4  
Sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male....1 
Female 2 
 
2.0.5 
Religion 
 
 
 
 
(Use 
code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.6  
Marital 
status  
 
 
 
(Use 
code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.7 
Literacy 
status 
 
 
Has 
<NAME> 
ever been 
to school? 
 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
2.0.8 
Maximum 
level of 
education 
achieved 
 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.9 
Main 
Employment 
activity during 
past 12 
months 
 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.10 
Occupation 
group 
during past 
12 months 
 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.11 
Temporality 
of work 
activity 
 
 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
 
2.0.12 
Salary in 
previous  
month 
 
 
(Use 
code 
box) 
 
 
 
Code 
2.0.13 
Nature of 
remuneration 
 
 
 
 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
 
Code 
1              
2              
3              
4              
5              
6              
7              
8              
9              
10              
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Code box for Question 2.0.13 
Fixed salary (weekly/monthly/quarterly) 1 
Daily or hourly pay         2 
Task-based payment         3 
Commission           4 
Business profits          5 
Barter exchange           6 
 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.10 
Legislators, administrators and managers   1 
Trained professionals    2 
Technicians and associate professionals   3 
Secretarial, clerical services and related workers  4 
Service workers, shop and market sales workers  5 
Skilled agricultural workers    6 
Craft and related trades workers   7 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers  8 
Elementary (labour) occupations    9 
Other                  10 
Code box for Question 2.0.12 
<1 000 KShs   1 
1 000 – 3 000 KShs  2 
3 000 – 5 000 KShs  3 
5 000 – 10 000 KShs  4 
10 000 – 20 000 KShs 5 
20 000 – 50 000 KShs  6 
50 000 – 100 000 KShs  6 
100 000 KShs or more  7 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.11 
Permanent regular work ...............01 
Permanent seasonal work  ...........02 
Temporary, non-defined .............. 03 
Temporary defined work ..........     04 
Code box for Question 2.0.2 
Head    01 
Husband/Wife/Partner  02 
Son     03 
Daughter   04 
Father/Father-in-law  05 
Mother/Mother-in-law  06 
Grandchild   07 
Son-in-law/Daughter–in-law 08 
Brother-in-law/Sister-in-law 09 
Father-in-law/Mother-in-law 10 
Niece/Nephew   11 
Other: Family Relative (specify) 12 
Other: Unrelated (specify)  13 
Code box for Question 2.0.7 
Primary school           01 
Post-primary/vocational          02 
Secondary           03 
College             04 
University           05 
Literate (Non-Formal Education)06 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.9 
Self-employed  01 
Public sector employee 02 
Private sector employee 03 
Seeking employment 04 
Unpaid family worker 05 
Apprentice  06 
Student   07 
Other (specify)  08 
None    88 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.6 
Single   01 
Monogamous marriage 02 
Polygamous marriage 03 
Widow/Widower  04 
Divorced/separated 05 
Common law union 06 
 
Code box for Question 2.0.5 
Catholic  01 
Protestant 02 
Other Christian 03 
Muslim  04 
Traditionalist 05 
Atheist  06 
Other religion 07 
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3. Household assets and amenities 
 
[Read out]: I would now like to ask you about the property you live in and the assets that your 
household possesses, including housing, transport, livestock and home appliances.   
 
Interviewer to observe house materials for Qns 3.0.1 – 3.0.3 and enter the corresponding code into 
the box provided  
3.0.1 What is the main material on the roof? 
No roof      01 
Natural material roof      02 
Corrugated iron roof      03 
Roofing tiles      04 
Other        05 
 
 
3.0.2 What is the main material on the floor? 
Dirt, earth floor      01 
Wood, plank floor     02 
Cement floor      03 
Tile floor      04 
Other       05 
 
 
 
Questions for interviewee 
 
3.0.4 Number of household members per sleeping room       
 
 
3.0.5 Does the household own or agricultural land/ a farm? 
Yes       01 
No        02 
 
 
3.0.8 What is the main source of water? 
Piped into dwelling    01 
Public tap      02 
Public well      03 
River, canal, lake or surface water   04 
Rain       05 
Private well      06 
 
 
3.0.9 What type of toilet facilities are available in the household? 
Own flush toilet     01 
Shared flush toilet     02 
Own pit latrine      03 
VIP latrine      04 
No facility/ bush/ field    05 
Other       06 
 
 
3.0.5 Does the household employ a domestic worker not related to the household head? 
Yes        01 
No         02 
 
 
3.0.10 Does the household own any of the following vehicles?          Yes                      No 
3.0.10.1  Bicycle 
3.0.10.2  Motorcycle 
3.0.10.3  Car 
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3.0.11 Does the household own any of the following facilities?          Yes                No 
3.0.11.1    Electricity 
3.0.11.2   Radio 
3.0.11.3   Television 
3.0.11.4   Telephone 
3.0.11.5   Refrigerator 
 
 
 
4. Household expenditure and consumption 
 
[Read out]: I would now like to ask you questions about your food and non-food expenses. 
 
 
4.0.1 How much did your household spend in the past seven days on the following foods and 
beverages (in KShs)? 
 
4.0.1.1 Oils and fats (vegetable oil etc.)                      
4.0.1.2 Cereals (maize grains, flour, beans, rice etc.)     
4.0.1.3 Livestock/poultry produce (milk, eggs etc.)     
4.0.1.4 Fish          
4.0.1.5 Meat (beef, chicken, pork etc.)      
4.0.1.6  Sugar         
4.0.1.7 Beverages (tea, coffee etc.)       
4.0.1.8 Bread         
4.0.1.9 Spices (e.g. curry powder)       
4.0.1.10 Vegetables         
4.0.1.11 Fruits          
4.0.1.12 Roots (sweet potato, yams, arrow roots etc.)     
4.0.1.13 Soft drinks (soda, juice etc.)       
4.0.1.14 Alcohol         
4.0.1.15 Meals (road-side vendors, restaurants etc.)     
  
[If a breakdown not possible, please provide the total amount spent on food and beverages] 
 
4.0.1.16 Did your household receive or provide any in-kind transfers of 
food products (name food product)?      
 
 
4.0.2 How much did your household spend in the past one month on the following household items 
(in KShs)? 
4.0.2.17.  Rent          
4.0.2.18. Electricity         
4.0.2.19. Cooking gas        
4.0.2.20. Kerosene/paraffin         
4.0.2.21. Charcoal        
4.0.2.22. Firewood         
4.0.2.23. Water         
4.0.2.24. Soap and detergent        
4.0.2.25. Transport         
4.0.2.26.  Telephone bills/ mobile airtime      
4.0.2.27.  Salaries including wages for domestic workers     
4.0.2.28.  Remittances (in cash and kind)      
4.0.2.29.  Sanitary towels        
4.0.2.30.  Tobacco         
4.0.2.31.  Leisure and entertainment       
4.0.2.32.  Hairdresser/barber        
4.0.2.33.  Others          
 
[If a breakdown not possible, please provide the total amount spent on items] 
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4.0.3 How much did your household spend in the past one year on the following (in KShs)? 
4.0.3.7.  Education (registration, uniforms, books, exam fees)   
4.0.3.8. Maintenance and repairs (car, buildings etc.)      
4.0.3.9. Funerals (including contributions to other households)   
4.0.3.10. Wedding/dowry (including contributions to other households)  
4.0.3.11. Clothing and footwear        
4.0.3.12. Capital expenditures (including cars, plots etc.)    
4.0.3.13. Others          
 
[If a breakdown not possible, please provide the total amount spent] 
 
 
4.0.4 Are you or any of your household members part of a savings or micro-financing group 
(chamaa/SACCO)? 
   Yes    01 
  No     02 
 
  
4.0.5 How many chamaas/SACCOs are you and your household active in? 
   One    01 
  2 – 5      02 
   More than five   03 
   
 
4.0.6 On average, how much do you contribute per month to your chamaa/SACCO (in KShs)? 
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5. Health-seeking behaviour 
 
[Read out]: I would now like to ask you about the health status of members of your household any illnesses experienced in the last one month. Please try to 
recall details of all events in the last month. Please try to be as specific as possible about any illness episodes, because we have to look at each illness condition 
separately for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 m
e
m
b
e
r 
N
o
. 5.0.1  
Perceived health 
status compared 
to others of 
similar age 
 
Very good  1 
Good   2 
Satisfactory  3 
Poor .  4 
 
5.0.2 
When did you last 
consult with a 
medical 
practitioner? 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
5.0.3 
Illness in the 
past four 
weeks 
 
 
Yes  1 
No   2 
 
5.0.4 
Type of 
illness 
 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
 
Codes 
 
5.0.5 
Severity of 
illness 
 
 
Mild......... 1 
Moderate.2 
Severe ... 3 
5.0.6 
Was a medical 
practitioner 
consulted? 
 
Yes   1 
No   2 
5.0.7 
If No to 5.0.6, 
main reasons for 
not seeking 
care? 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
5.0.8. 
Any informal 
consultations for 
illness  
  
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
Code box for Question 5.0.7 
Lack of money        01 
Self-medication         02 
Poor quality service        03 
High cost of care        04 
Religious/cultural reasons        05 
Long distance to provider        06 
Illness not considered serious enough  07 
 
Code box for Question 5.0.4 
Malaria      01 
Sexually transmitted disease  02 
Respiratory tract infection         03 
Diarrhoeal disease    04 
Skin conditions     05 
Typhoid      06 
Other (specify)    08 
 
Code box for Question 5.0.8 
Government hospital   01 
Private hospital    02 
Mission hospital     03 
Government health centre  04 
Mission health centre   05 
Government dispensary   06 
Mission dispensary    07 
Private clinic    09 
NGO clinic    10 
Community pharmacies (Bamako) 11 
Traditional healer           12 
Other     13 
 
Code box for Question 5.0.2 
Less than two weeks 01 
2 weeks – 1 month 02 
1 – 3 months    03 
3 – 6 months    04 
6 – 12 months   05 
One year or more  06 
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5.1 Utilisation of outpatient services and other health-related services in the last four weeks 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you questions about the use of outpatient and other health-related facilities and services by members of your household, and the 
costs paid. 
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 N
o
. 5.1.1  
Outpatient visits made for 
illness episodes during the past 
four weeks   
 
 
 
 
 
Number 
5.1.2 
Type and 
ownership of 
health provider 
 
 
 
(Use code box) 
 
Code 
 
5.1.3 
Did <NAME> pay for 
the services 
received?  
 
 
 
 
Yes  1 
No   2 
5.1.4 
Total cost for visits, 
including transport, 
registration, 
consultation, diagnosis, 
and medication? 
 
 
 
Cost(KShs) 
5.1.5 
How were 
treatment 
costs 
covered? 
 
(Use code 
box) 
 
Code 
5.1.6 
If no health facility was 
attended, how much was 
spent on health-related 
services/ commodities (e.g. 
medicine) in the past four 
weeks? 
   
 
Cost (KShs) 
 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
Code box for Question 5.1.5 
Had cash available      01 
Given money by friends, relatives and family members 02 
Harambee contributions      03 
Borrowed money                    04 
Sold household assets      05 
Waived/exempted      06 
Given opportunity to pay later     07 
 
Code box for Question 5.0.8 
Government hospital   01 
Private hospital    02 
Mission hospital                  03 
Government health centre  04 
Mission health centre   05 
Government dispensary   06 
Mission dispensary    07 
Private clinic    09 
NGO clinic    10 
Community pharmacies (Bamako) 11 
Traditional healer   12 
Other     13 
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5.2 Utilisation of inpatient services in the last one year 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you questions about the use of inpatient facilities and services by members of your household, and the costs paid. Please include 
any deliveries and hospitalisations of one day or more that have been faced by your household within the last year. 
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N
o
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5.2.1  
How many times was 
<NAME> admitted 
over the past one 
year?   
 
 
 
Number 
5.2.2  
Type and ownership 
of health provider 
where admitted 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
5.2.3 
Did <NAME>  pay 
for the services 
received?  
 
 
 
Yes  1 
No   2 
5.2.4 
Total cost of hospital stay, 
including transport, doctor’s 
fees, diagnosis, surgical 
operation and daily bed rate 
 
 
 
Cost (KShs) 
5.2.5 
How were treatment 
costs covered? 
 
 
(Use code box) 
 
 
Code 
 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
Code box for Question 5.2.5 
Salary/disposable income   01 
Savings      02 
Loan      03 
Paid by household member  04 
Paid by non-household member   05 
Sold household assets   06 
Paid in-kind     07 
Other (please specify)   03 
 
Code box for Question 5.0.8 
Government hospital   01 
Private hospital    02 
Mission hospital     03 
Government health centre  04 
Mission health centre   05 
Other     06 
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6. Health insurance knowledge and perceived value  
 
6.1 Health insurance literacy  
 
[Read out]: I would now like to ask you questions to understand your experience with health insurance 
products.  
 
 
6.0.1Are you familiar with the concept of health insurance? 
 Yes       01 
  No       02  
 
If Yes, proceed to Question 6.0.2 
 
 
6.0.2 How would you rate your knowledge of the principles of health insurance? 
Good        01 
 Fair       02  
Poor       03 
Don’t know     -999 
 
 
6.0.3 From which source did you first learn about health insurance?  
 Radio       01 
  Television     02  
 Hospital      03 
  Religious establishment (church/mosque)  04  
 Family member     05 
  Friend       06  
 Health insurance agent    07 
  Poster       08 
  Other (specify)      09 
 
 
6.0.4 Have you or any of your household members previously had or currently have health 
insurance coverage? 
 Yes       01 
 No       02  
 
 
6.0.5 What type(s) of health insurance coverage do you or any of your household members have? 
    NHIF        01  
 Community-based health insurance  02  
 Private insurance     03  
 Others (specify)     04  
 
If yes, please specify which household member(s) and which scheme 
 
 
6.0.5. For how long were you/have you been a member of the health insurance scheme? 
 Less than one year     01 
 One to five years     02  
 Five to ten years      03 
 More than ten years     04  
 Can’t remember              -999  
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6.1.1 General health insurance knowledge 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask you some True/False questions to understand what you know about health 
insurance, and to gain perspective on your perception of health insurance/ assistance schemes. Please 
try to answer as accurately as possible based on your knowledge and/or experience with health 
insurance.  
 
               True            False 
6.1.1 Health insurance reallocates funds from healthy to sick people in order to 
reduce the costs paid by individuals when sick 
 
6.1.2 Health insurance covers a pre-determined amount of an insured person’s 
medical expenses 
 
6.1.3 A regular fee must first be paid to the insurer in order to be covered by a 
health insurance scheme 
 
6.1.4  Once insured, all health-related expenses at all health facilities in your area 
will be covered 
 
6.1.5 You must pay the full cost of treatment if you are insured and the health 
facility is a partner of the health insurance scheme 
 
6.1.6 Health insurance schemes such as the NHIF are profit-making businesses  
 
6.1.7 If you do not claim benefits, you will get your money back 
 
 
6.1.8 How do you feel about other members of your community benefitting from health insurance 
when you don’t fall sick? 
a) Highly agree 
b) Agree 
c) Neither agree nor disagree 
d) Disagree 
e) Highly disagree 
 
 
6.0.6. Who would you trust the most to manage your health insurance? NB: You are allowed to 
select more than one answer  
Government        01 
Private company       02 
NGO         03 
Church         04 
Members of your community      05 
 
 
 
6.1.2 Product-specific (NHIF Informal Sector Scheme) health insurance knowledge 
 
[Read out]: I will now ask some True/False and multiple choice questions in order to understand what 
you know about the NHIF Informal Sector Scheme. Please try and answer the questions that I will ask 
as accurately as possible, based on your experience and knowledge.  
 
i. Product availability 
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    True       False       Don’t know 
6.2.2. You can register for NHIF IS Scheme membership as an 
individual or as part of an organised group 
 
6.2.3. You can pay for NHIF membership monthly or annually  
 
6.2.4. Your children can receive health insurance coverage through 
your NHIF IS coverage 
 
6.2.5. NHIF membership can enable you to have obtain in 
healthcare services in the country for free 
 
 
 
ii. Benefit package 
 
6.2.6.  What types of benefits are covered by the NHIF in its IS Scheme? NB: You are allowed to 
select more than one answer 
a) Outpatient services 
b) Maternity services 
c) Caesarean section operations 
d) Hospitalisation 
e) Family planning procedures e.g. vasectomy 
f) Chronic diseases 
h) Don’t know 
 
 
6.2.9.  What documents are needed to claim NHIF benefits in accredited health facilities? NB: You 
are allowed to select more than one answer 
a) NHIF Card 
b) Hospital invoices 
c) National Identity Card 
d) Birth Certificate 
 
 
6.2.11. How often can you benefit from NHIF coverage in a year? 
a) Five times 
b) Eight times 
c) Every time when sick 
 
 
 
iii. Coverage 
 
6.2.12. How often must NHIF membership be renewed? 
a) Every month 
b) Every six months 
c) Every year 
d) Every two years 
e) Never 
 
   True      False       Don’t know 
6.2.13. It is the member’s responsibility to renew their NHIF membership 
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6.2.14. If necessary, you can pay for NHIF membership in instalments 
  
6.2.15. NHIF cancels membership if payment is not completed one 
month after due date 
 
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. 
Thank you for taking the time to answer my questions.  
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11.5 Key questions addressed during semi-structured UHC interviews 
Topic 
Key areas to be 
addressed 
Stakeholder questions 
Extending NHIF 
to non-covered 
population 
Existing health 
financing 
programmes  
Risk pools existing in Kenya (e.g. vertical programmes, 
other health financing schemes) 
Players providing financial/technical support to the 
Kenyan health sector and the NHIF 
Modalities of NHIF financial and technical support (type 
of contribution, amount, target population, time period 
of support) 
Targeting of under-
represented 
populations 
Targeting of specific segments of population by NHIF  
Outreach/marketing efforts towards the informal sector 
by NHIF 
Perceived success of marketing/targeting strategies 
towards informal sector coverage 
Inequalities in 
coverage 
Perceived impact of current funding landscape on 
informal sector coverage  
Perceptions of feasibility of expansion of voluntary 
informal sector enrolment into the NHIF  
Including other 
services into 
NHIF benefit 
package 
Current health 
benefits package for 
voluntary NHIF 
scheme 
Health interventions currently included (outpatient and 
inpatient) 
Health interventions on negative/exclusions list 
Expected budget for basic health package per capita 
Institutional mechanisms for rationing health benefits 
package (practice guidelines, ex-post rationing etc.) 
Perceived financial burden on informal sector patients 
with NHIF coverage 
Perceptions of overall NHIF funding landscape vis-à-
vis the NHIF’s cost of coverage 
Perceptions on appropriateness of current health 
package for Kenyan health landscape 
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Efforts to expand 
NHIF voluntary 
scheme health 
benefits package 
Health interventions to be included in future (outpatient 
and inpatient) 
Prioritisation of particular health interventions by 
stakeholders 
Reducing cost-
sharing and fees 
Scale of financial 
risk pooling 
Current levels of payment into risk pools (who pays, 
how much, when, and for how long) 
Efforts to consolidate existing risk pools 
Minimising OOP 
payments 
Perceptions on ability of NHIF to meet costs associated 
with current health benefits package 
Acceptability of patient copayments at different levels 
of hospitals  
Fully-subsidised healthcare services offered within and 
outside NHIF 
